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JIACHUN HONG, for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND 
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TITLE: DOCUMENTARY PRODUCTION AS A SITE OF STRUGGLE: STATE, CAPITAL, 
AND PRECARITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY CHINESE DOCUMENTARY 
MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Jyotsna Kapur  
Documentary filmmakers have been considered artists, authors, or intellectuals, but rarely 
as labor. This study investigates how the nature of work as well as life is changing for those who 
work in the expanding area of TV documentary in China, in the midst of China’s shift towards a 
market-based economy.  How do documentary makers reconcile their passion for documentary 
making with the increasingly precarious conditions of work? And, how do they cope with and 
resist the pressures of neoliberalism to survive in increasingly competitive local and global 
markets? 
Based on data gathered through the interviews with 40 practitioners from January 2014 to 
August 2017 and my own experience as a director and worker in the Chinese documentary for a 
decade, I outline the particularity and complexity of the creative work in China. My research 
indicates that short-time contracts, moonlighting, low payments and long working hours, 
freelancing, internship, and obligatory networking have become normal working conditions for 
cultural workers. Without copyright over their intellectual creations, cultural workers are 
constrained to make a living as waged labor, compelled to sell their physical and mental labor in 
hours or in pieces. Self-responsibility and entrepreneurism have become the symbols of the 
neoliberal individual. 
Following the career trajectories of my interviewees, I elaborate on the mechanisms by 
which cultural workers are selected, socialized and eliminated. When they decide to escape from 
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the production line, they use four types of strategies: going international, surviving in the market, 
switching to new media career, and sticking to journalistic ideals.  
This dissertation also reveals that global production has intensified exploitation by 
increasing working hours through a 24/7 production line that works across national borders and 
time zones, amplifies competition by introducing global talent, and alienates local workers by 
imposing the so-called “universal” aesthetics of global production.  
The crisis of cultural work is the outcome of the incapacity of the neoliberal imagination 
to imagine plausible and feasible futures for sustained creative work. It is through my research 
into the history of documentary production in China and conversations with cultural workers that 
I found explanations for the increasing precarity of work and possible forms of resistance to it in 
post-socialist China.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THEORIZING DOCUMENTARY MAKING AS CREATIVE LABOR 
 
Introduction 
Documentary production is an important sector of the Chinese cultural industries. Chinese 
television stations broadcasted a total of 70,000 hours of documentary programs in 2016. The 
investment in documentary industry in the same year was about 3.5 billion yuan (renminbi, the 
Chinese currency, approximately $508 million), yielding around 21 billion yuan ($3.1 billion) in 
advertising revenue (He, 2017). Thousands of people work from day to night, producing 
documentaries for the largest post-socialist nation today and the second largest economy in the 
world. The industry is also an ideological factory where cultural workers manufacture formulaic 
ideological products.   
In this dissertation, I focus on the experience of labor in this industry. I explore the 
cultural practices and belief systems of documentary workers as they investigate the tension 
between autonomy and control, between the demands of the state and the market, and confront 
the difficult choice between pleasure in one’s intellectual labor and the precarity of its working 
conditions. The subjects of my study are the practitioners, such as producers, directors, writers, 
camerapersons, sound recordists, gaffers, editors, musicians, fixers, and festival organizers.  
I have personal experience in this industry. I started working as a documentary director in 
China Central Television (CCTV), the largest national TV station in China in 2004, and since 
then produced documentaries for various projects. I worked as an employee of television 
stations, as an independent filmmaker, and as a freelancer. I have experienced the same joy of 
self-expression as well as the depression brought about by the censorship system and market 
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insecurity that documentary workers shared with me during the course of writing this 
dissertation. When I began working as a filmmaker, I was motivated by the desire to find the 
truth through my camera, but I also worried about the life of financial insecurity of the temporary 
and freelance employment that I was entering. My coworkers, friends and I have had numerous 
discussions about the nature of our work in the past ten years. And, this dissertation is a way to 
grapple with the confusions that those conversations tried to clarify so obsessively. 
I ask: What is the experience of working in the Chinese documentary industry?  What are 
the attitudes and beliefs of documentary producers towards documentary practice as well as its 
role in society? What kind of factors shaped their documentaries?  How do documentary 
practices change in response to the shift from a socialist to post-socialist society?   
Historicizing the Chinese documentary 
Documentary in China has played a different role from the liberal democracies in the United 
States or Europe. From its first propaganda forms to its recent transformation in the market 
economy, documentary has been explicitly stated as a mainstay of the nation-building project 
and national education in China. Following Lenin’s view of documentary as the “visualization of 
political ideology,” making documentary in China is like publishing the Party’s newspaper (San, 
2005, p. 354).  
The development of Chinese documentary has passed through four stages: newsreel 
journalism, zhuanti pian (special topic documentary), independent documentary and commercial 
documentary. Since its birth in the 1920s, Chinese documentaries started as the newsreel. The 
function of the newsreel was to document historical moments, economic achievements and 
events of national pride. From the 1950s to 1980s, newsreel documentary was “not only 
ideologically driven but also systematically controlled by the government in terms of production, 
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distribution, and exhibition, including the organization of film viewers on a large scale” (Chu, 
2007, p. 63). Under the influence of the Leninist view of documentary as the most powerful tool 
for mass education, documentary was considered a forceful form of visualized political argument 
in China at this stage. 
In the 1980s, Chinese National TV stations began to produce documentary series called 
zhuanti pian (special topic documentary), literally special topic feature-length films that went 
beyond the focus in the newsreel to presenting a thesis or argument about culture. Notably, the 
three documentary series co-produced with Japan’s NHK, The Silk Road / Sichou zhilu (Muto, 
1980), The Yangtz River/ Huashuo changjiang (Dai, 1983), and The Great Wall / Wang 
changcheng (Liu, 1991), established a new television form that showcased grand national themes 
in a non-conventional way. The earlier documentaries completed scripting before shooting, 
relied mainly on staging and re-enactment as the main visual representation methods, and 
recorded sound in post-production, while zhuanti pian introduced spontaneous shooting, used 
location sound, replaced the voice-of-God narration with the presenter’s on-site introduction, and 
focused on the local residents’ lives instead of historical heroes. This new documentary genre 
was prevalent throughout the 1980s and since then, has remained the primary genre of non-
fiction programming in China. Most of the 70,000 hours of documentaries produced in 2016 fall 
into this category. 
From the early 1990s, documentary production has been divided into two camps: the 
“official” and the “independent.” Wu Wenguang 's Booming in Beijing/ Liulang Beijing (1990) is 
widely regarded as the pioneering work of the independent documentary movement in China. 
The film portrayed the lives of five artists, all of whom have abandoned stable work, and lived a 
marginal, individualistic, freelance life, which was very rare in the country’s collective 
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communist social life. The film is revolutionary, for it is the first time that Chinese filmmakers 
produced work outside of the national media system and represented the voice of individuals. 
The film drew on the fly-on-the-wall realistic style of American Direct Cinema. It attracted 
attention on international film festivals and established a documentary format completely 
different from the dogmatic “zhuanti pian” mode. Since then, more filmmakers joined this “new 
documentary movement”, as Lu (2003) calls it, and produced ethnographic observational 
documentaries independently, among which are Duan Jingchuan's No. 16 (1996), Barkhor South 
Street/ Bakuo nanjie 16 (1996) and Yang Tianyi’s Old Men/ Laoren (2000).  
In the meantime, China Central Television also launched a short documentary program 
called Living Space/ Shenghuo kongjian in 1993, which presented a seven-minute story of 
ordinary, everyday Chinese life. It borrowed the observational documentary skills from the 
independent practitioners: handheld cameras, fly-on-the-wall observations, synchronous sound, 
and character driven narratives. Most of the current active Chinese documentarians are in one 
way or another influenced by this documentary program. They were either trained in this 
program or inspired by it to start their career in documentary production. I myself am one of 
them. I had a chance to intern in Living space in 1998 when I was a college student, and since 
then I was determined to be a documentary filmmaker in the future. I joined this program in 2004 
and worked there till 2007 when I decided to make documentaries independently and then pursue 
my academic goals. It is in this phase that a dualistic structure of documentary production 
emerged in China. 
The last stage is from 2011 up to the present, characterized by the industrialization of 
documentary production. Documentary works not only as a propaganda tool but also as a cultural 
commodity to generate profits. The commodity feature of documentary was not explored until 
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recently. The Chinese government was seeking to promote the nation’s soft power 
internationally which, as defined by Joseph Nye, refers to the ability of a country to attract and 
persuade others do what it want without force or coercion (Nye, 1990, 2004). In this cultural war, 
documentary is considered as a powerful way of introducing Chinese culture to the outside 
world, and thus media organizations and the practitioners bear the pressure to produce more 
“universally appealing” work for the “go abroad strategy.” As a result, China Central Television 
established a documentary channel in 2011, and the government published a regulation policy 
requiring each of the 34 satellite television channels to broadcast at least half an hour 
documentary programming every day starting from January 1st, 2014. The policies paved the 
ways for the fast growth of the documentary industry, which soon entered the era of “big-budget 
production.” Documentary now turned into a big sector of the cultural industries that provided 
employment to a large number of its practitioners.  
Significance of the dissertation 
Documentary films have often been analyzed as film texts and as carriers of dominant or 
alternative ideologies but rarely are the practitioners considered as a social phenomenon in their 
own right. To fill the academic gap, this dissertation will focus on the life, play and work of the 
practitioners, and explore the nature of labor involved in documentary practice in China.   
This study is significant because it brings documentary production into the purview of 
labor studies. When I look at documentary producers as labor, I am, like Pierre Bourdieu (1984) 
and Stuart Hall (1980), talking about professionalism as a way of class formation. Documentary 
filmmakers have invariably been spoken of as artists, authors, or intellectuals, but rarely as labor.  
Digging into the nature of labor in cultural work will help us find the secrets of 
exploitation in a post-socialist country (Berry, 2004; Naughton, 2017). It will further our 
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knowledge about the changing nature of life in the shift that deepens the relations of the market 
in everyday life. The post-socialist era brought about a profound change in Chinese people's 
attitudes toward money.  There was initially a certain reticence towards money in socialist China. 
From the 1950s to late 1970s, Chinese people lived a collective life. The economy was planned 
by the central government, and no one was allowed to work for money or their own interests, but 
worked for the purpose of the whole collectives. Capital fetish was considered the cancer of the 
capitalism. It was taboo to talk about money, especially in the field of cultural production. With 
the economic reforms of 1978, China started to endorse market logics and the mode of capitalist 
production. But still, cultural workers usually feel embarrassed to talk about money. They have 
internalized the “ideology of the aesthetic” as Terry Eagleton (1990) describes it, i.e., art should 
be for art sake, and not for money. As Hans Abbing (2002) states in his book Why Are Artists 
Poor?, artists buy into the ideology that romanticizes poverty as a reward for artistic ambition. 
The reason why they accept it, Abbing tells us is that each one hopes one day to become famous 
and rich, a status granted only to a very few. Bourdieu’s capital theory also helps to understand 
the art-capital tension. He stated that conventional economic rules of capitalism, i.e., the more 
money is made the higher the value of the work, are reversed in the artistic field. Here people 
seem to prefer cultural capital like recognition, reputation, and rewards over money.  
In conclusion, this dissertation aims to contribute to labor theory by analyzing 
documentary practices in a post-socialist nation. It will also shed light into the stratified nature of 
the labors, as well as the multi-formed precarity that would otherwise remain hidden in the new 
cultural economy in the context of globalization and digitalization. 
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Literature review 
The study of documentary practice works at the intersections of documentary studies, labor 
theory, political economy, and Bourdieu's theory of cultural production. In this part, I first take 
up documentary studies which have largely focused on documentary contents textually, 
aesthetically and economically in Western countries. I will then introduce the history of the 
development of the Chinese documentary industry as well as some academic debates over it. 
Existing literature focuses mainly on the independent documentary sectors and intends to take 
documentary as arts, while neglects a fact that the majority of the documentaries are made by 
and for television in China. In addition, television documentaries provide a large number of job 
opportunities to the in-house or freelancer practitioners. The social relations constructed around 
TV documentary's production, dissemination and consumption are under-explored.    
The second set of literature is about cultural work and precarious labor. Documentary 
production is an essential sector of the culture industry. It provides a good case to reveal the 
hidden forms of exploitation in the cultural industries that were relatively underdeveloped in the 
time of Karl Marx. New terms, such as immaterial labor, affective labor, and emotion labor 
underscore that knowledge has been commodified to the extent that some like Yann Moulier-
Boutang and Ed Emery describe the present as “cognitive capitalism” (Moulier Boutang & 
Emery, 2011). Passion, experience, and lifestyle have been institutionalized as soft compensation 
for the flexible and precarious employment in documentary industries. Self-exploitation remains 
the underlying mechanism that capital gain profits from creative industries. Artists are not 
considered a hero of resistance anymore, but “a model labor in the new economy” (McRobbie, 
2002).  
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The third area of literature, I rely on is about cultural industry, creative industries, 
cultural economy, and neoliberalism. From Theodore Adorno’s theory of culture industry to 
Richard Florida’s concept of the creative economy, scholars have moved from critical tradition 
to a practical policy study, from criticizing the culture industries as an ideological states 
apparatus to embracing them as the core engine of the new economy. This study would draw 
from the critical tradition and integrate political economy and cultural studies in order to study 
the practice and subjectivities of the Chinese documentary workers.  
The last group of literature is Bourdieu’s theory of cultural production. Bourdieu suggests 
a historical, process-oriented research method. His division of the large-scale and restricted-scale 
production corresponds to the dualistic structure of television documentary and independent 
documentary production in China. Using Bourdieu’s field theory, we can see how agents with 
different habitus use various position-taking strategies to compete for economic, social, and 
cultural capital.   
Documentary studies: from textual analysis to production studies 
Defining documentary 
Documentary is an art form, an inquiry into reality, a scene for witness, a space for social 
engagement as well as an act of political intervention (Yu, 2016). The practice of documentary 
involves, as Michael Renov (1993) has suggested, the creation of a second-order reality, which 
aims 1) to record, reveal, or preserve; 2) to persuade or promote; 3) to analyze or interrogate; 4) 
to express (p. 25-35).  
Several debates in documentary scholarship should be noted. The first one regards the 
truth claims of documentary. British filmmaker Grierson defined documentary as “the creative 
treatment of actuality” (Grierson & Hardy, 1966) in the 1930s. On one hand, this acknowledges 
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that the documentary is distinguished by its assumed ontological proximity to reality, or as 
Michael Renov asserts, “every documentary issues a ‘truth claim’ of a sort” (Renov, 1993, p. 
55). This explains the ongoing power of the American direct cinema tradition in world 
documentary. Its longtime “fly-on-the-wall” observational style remains a powerful documentary 
method in China even now. On the other hand, critics question the blind faith in the transparency 
of the images and sounds, and ask that documentary be considered to be a set of “performative 
acts” (Bruzzi, 2006). Every step in the documentary filmmaking process involves manipulation, 
and there will never be one hundred percent truth or authenticity in documentaries. In addition, 
documentary has been associated with propaganda since the beginning (Jowett & O’Donnell, 
2018). John Corner (2008) notes that during the 1930s British Documentary Movement, many 
documentaries were “self-conscious exercises in ‘propaganda’, intended to persuade as much as 
inform” (p. 23). I will explore this debate around the truth claims of documentary among 
Chinese practitioners, and how it is embedded in their work and lives.  
The second area of debate is about “independent” documentary versus “official” 
documentary (or television documentary, because all Chinese television stations are controlled 
by the state, and all the television documentaries have to go through state censorship system and 
are thus considered “official”). Previous literature focuses more on independent documentaries in 
China but in this dissertation I will explore mainly the television documentary. Although the first 
official documentary Robert Flaherty's Nanook of the North (1922) was released in 1922, 
documentary scholarship, according to John Corner, didn’t start until the mid-1970s when 
television became popular. Western scholars shifted their focus from cinema documentary to 
television documentary partly because of television’s fast development in the 1960s, and the 
emergence of some observational programs, drama-documentary, and current affair formats. At 
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that time, as Dai Vaughan (1976) said, “almost all serious documentary is now produced for 
Television” (p. 50). The debate over television's role in documentary development does not only 
happen in the United States but also in the U.K. (Dover, 2004; Sørensen, 2014; Zoellner, 2009), 
Australia (Roscoe, 2004; Williamson, 2007), New Zealand (Jackson, 2012; Hodgetts & 
Chamberlain, 2003) and many other countries. The division between official documentary and 
independent documentary raises important issues of institutionality as well as of cultural 
practice. 
 
Chinese documentary studies 
The main academic scholarship on Chinese documentary starts from the early 21st century, when 
scholars explored China’s post-1990s independent documentary movement (Berry, Lu, & Rofel, 
2010; Cui, 2010; Lu, 2003; Robinson, 2013). Xinyu Lu is among the first scholars who noted 
and clearly defined the new independent documentary movement in China. She analyzed the 
social historical conditions in the 1990s and treated independent documentary as one of the 
aesthetic and emotional responses to the social change that happened in the 1980s, including the 
1989 Tiananmen democratic movement, the rising consumerism, and the post-socialist nostalgia 
towards the austere socialist lifestyle (Lu, 2003).The frustration and anxiety among the young 
Chinese was expressed in various art forms including poetry, music, paintings and independent 
documentaries. Also, the digital video recording technology allowed the amateurs or semi-
professionals to start shooting and editing documentaries outside of the TV system (Wang, 
2005). A new underground documentary culture has emerged since then. Scholars did intensive 
textual analysis of classic independent documentaries, conducted ethnographic research in pubs 
and coffee houses where documentaries were screened, and interviewed practitioners to 
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understand their strategies of dodging censorship (Cui, 2010; Johnson, 2012; Pickowicz & 
Zhang, 2006; Zhang, 2004). Studies on Chinese independent documentaries have gradually 
gathered some momentum in the past decade.  
Compared to the independent documentary, however, television documentary didn't 
attract much attention from film and media scholars in the English-speaking academic world. 
Yingchi Chu’s (2007) book Chinese Documentaries: From Dogma to Polyphony is the first 
English book on Chinese TV documentary. Chu traces the development of Chinese TV 
documentaries from the earlier state-controlled “dogmatic mode” to the current “polyphonic 
mode,” and contextualizes it in the transition from a planned economy to the market economy in 
China since the late 1970s. She discusses the struggles of Chinese documentarians caught 
between the demands of the state for propaganda and the pressures of the market for profits.  
The interplay between the “official” and independent documentary films has also been 
taken up by scholars (Berry & Rofel, 2010; Nakajima, 2010). Berry questions the use of the 
word “independent.” First of all, most of the early Chinese documentarians had connections with 
the official television organizations. They worked for projects of China Central Television 
(CCTV), used the institution’s equipment, including cameras, tapes, lighting and sound 
equipment to do their work. Wu Wenguang’s Booming in Beijing is a good example of this 
“hijacking” pattern of production. Secondly, most of the independent documentarians received 
their training from and practiced their expertise in public TV organizations. The first creative 
impulse of independent directors as they emerge in the 1990s is to begin “rethinking television 
documentary practices” (Lu, 2003). At the same time, their documentary philosophy also 
influenced documentary practices in public television stations, such as in CCTV’s Living Spaces. 
The independent documentary makers like Jiang Yue produced the first group of TV 
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documentaries for Living Spaces and have helped establish the classic format of the TV 
documentary program. 
Given this dialectical relationship between the indie filmmaker and the public TV system, 
Berry suggests, we use the term “alternative” instead of “independent” to refer to independent 
documentary practices. In addition,  independent documentaries which were mostly screened in 
underground exhibitions, coffee shops and foreign festivals could work as a kind of “pressure 
release mechanism” (Pickowicz, 2006), helping to ease tension between the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP)’s strict control over cinema and the need for freedom for artistic creativity while 
also producing  films that gained international reputation (Zhou, 2015).  
The documentary form has developed rapidly in the last decade in China and sub-genres 
and new practices emerged. In China’s igeneration (Johnson et al, 2014), Johnson and other 
scholars explore the video culture of the new generation in China: Tianqi Yu describes the 
female first-person documentary as an expression of resistance to the largely male-dominated 
film world; Yiman Wang uses the term “docu-ani-mentary” to investigate the animal presence in 
contemporary Chinese documentary making. Also, Shenshen Cai (2015) investigates the newly 
emerged form of web documentary and reveals how commercial media like Sohu (a Chinese 
internet service provider company) adapt the state-led nationalist discourse in their programming 
to enter the market. The documentary is ever-changing, and we should remain sensitive to the 
new documentary practices, as well as the power relations and the nature of labor underlying 
them.    
From textual analysis to production studies 
Previous documentary scholarship largely focused on documentary texts instead of documentary 
practitioners, and on cultural artifacts rather than the practice of documentary production. The 
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underlying assumption of these analyses was that the text is the work of an author, who inserts 
messages in the text, with the hope that it could change the perception or attitude of the readers 
towards certain issues. However, my personal experience as a documentary director tells me that 
the authorship is just a small portion of documentary filmmaking. The production process is 
composed of all sorts of practices, which are the result of the negotiations between creative 
workers and structuring factors, like socio-economic status, educational background of the 
documentarians, and ownership of the organization. The process also involves feelings like 
passion, frustration, desperation, and insecurity. These emotional factors attract people into the 
documentary industry, and it is these that keep them in or finally push them out of the industry. 
Emotions have been a key to understanding the new cultural economy (Hochschild, 1983, 2003, 
2012). A holistic and process-oriented study is needed to explore what goes on in the process of 
documentary production. It requires scholars to approach the Chinese documentary practitioners 
not only as an author, but also as a human, fundamental to which is their relationship to their 
labor.  
Production studies connects political economy and cultural studies. It is a human-
centered approach that focuses on the capacity of humans to produce meaning in everyday 
practices. Toby Miller et al. (2005) criticize the political and social myopia inherent in textual 
analysis when it fails to account for outsourcing practices in Hollywood and their impact on the 
texts that get made. Based on over ten years of research on media workers in the film and 
television industry in Hollywood, John Caldwell (2008), has written extensively on the self-
representation, self-critique, and self-reflection of these workers. Delving into behind-the-scene 
discourses and rituals of these media practitioners, Caldwell reveals to us what “production” 
means.  
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As Vicki Mayer, Mark Banks and John Caldwell (2009) say in the introduction of their 
book Production Studies: Cultural Studies of Media Industries, we should “take the lived 
realities of people involved in media production as the subjects for theorizing production as 
culture.  Production studies gather empirical data about production: the complexity of routines 
and rituals, the routines of the seemingly complex process, the economic forces that shape roles, 
technologies, and the distribution of resources according to cultural and demographic 
differences” (p. 4). Vicki Mayer (2011) investigates the real lives of the below-the-line television 
workers in the new television economy. David Hesmondhalgh and Sarah Baker (2008) talk about 
the precarious lives of the independent media workers in the UK television industry. One of 
Caldwell's students, Qi Wang (2008), discusses the culture of the filmmakers born between 1960 
and 1970 in China in her dissertation Writing Against Oblivion. She calls these filmmakers the 
“Forsaken Generation”, a generation that is marginalized, forsaken by history. She provides a 
detailed analysis of how these filmmakers use “personal/individual filmmaking” to demonstrate 
unofficial personal historiography of recent Chinese history. In the next section, I will review the 
literature on cultural work and cultural labor in the Marxist tradition. 
 
Cultural work, creative labor, and self-exploitation 
From factory labor to creative labor 
 
Documentarians are always considered artists, authors, intellectuals, but rarely, as labor. The 
nature of labor of those involved in Chinese documentary production has received little attention. 
“Creative labor” is a useful concept to understand the social relations involved in culture work. 
David Hesmondhalgh and Sarah Baker (2011) trace the history of the concept “creative labour” 
in their book Creative labour: Media Work in Three Cultural Industries, and explain that 
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“creative labor” was invented to differentiate from manufacturing, service and technical labor 
and other low-paid, low-status and menial jobs.  
 Karl Marx had disclosed the secret of capitalism—i.e., capital accumulates by the 
exploitation of labor through his observation of the low-paid, low-skilled, streamline factory 
workers a century ago.  However, in neoliberalism, the further escalation of technological 
development and globalization have deepened exploitation by individualizing the worker even 
more. 
The theorists of autonomist Marxism, like Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt, Mario Troni, 
and Maurizio Lazzarato have, since the 1970s, taken up the term, “immaterial labor” to discuss 
the nature of cultural work in the new capitalist system. Autonomist Marxism emerged from 
Italy out of the struggles of Italian workers and students in the 1960s and 70s. They consider the 
information society as the global triumph of capital. Work extends beyond the walls of the 
office. The factory is increasingly disseminated into society as a whole. It becomes “social 
factory” (Gill & Pratt, 2008), or as Negri calls, “factory without walls,” and as a result, “the 
whole society is placed at the disposal of profit” (Negri, 1989, p. 79). The mass streamlined 
worker of the factory is replaced by socialized worker. The passage from Fordism to post-
Fordism also brings a new relationship between capital and labor and “the new productivity of 
cognitive and affective forms of labour-power start to become hegemonic” (Hardt & Negri, 
2018, p. 417). Affective labor, a specific and essential aspect of immaterial labor that requires 
intense but invisible work embedded in producing and managing emotions, such as caring, 
listening, smiling at work, furthers exploitation by manipulating subjectivities (Hardt, 1996). The 
control over the subconsciousness of workers can be more authoritarian than the older Fordist 
system.  
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In the new economy, cultural laborers such as artists, media workers and IT workers 
become what McRobbie called “the new labor” (2002). These new laborers have high wage, high 
skills, and high social status, but are engaged in insecure, casualized or irregular labor –always 
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the market, which depresses wages for such workers as a whole. 
They are the iconic representatives of the “brave new world of work” (Beck, 2000), where 
human society is individualized, and risks are transferred from the society to individuals 
(Bauman, 2000, 2001).  
The number of permanent employees in cultural industries has decreased greatly, and 
employment is increasingly taking the form of the “atypical worker” (Water et al., 2006) or 
“nonstandard worker” (Kalleberg, 2000), such as freelancers, part-time workers, flexible 
workers, unpaid interns, or other contingent workers (Ursell, 2000). Ross calls the new form of 
exploitation “flexploitation” (2009). The concept of “creative labor,” together with a number of 
other newly invented terms, including immaterial labor (Lazzarato, 1996), affective labor (Hardt 
& Negri, 2000), emotional labor (Hochschild, 1983), lifestyle labor (Zendel, 2014), aesthetic 
labor (Hracs & Leslie, 2014) pointed to the new labor practice that bind the worker into the 
productive life of society.  
What are the differences between creative labor and non-creative labor?  Scholars first 
refer to the content that creative labor produced. Creative labor engages in symbolic production. 
Most of their products are not tangible or touchable physical objects, but information or 
immaterial service. Lazzarato used “immaterial labor” to refer to “the labor that produces the 
information and cultural content of the commodity” which “involves a series of activities not 
normally recognized as work” (Lazzarato, 1996, p. 133). 
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Creative labor conceptually challenges the old dichotomy of mental and manual labor and 
puts the traditional elite groups of the former under the same labor conditions and power 
relations as the latter. The other difference lies in the discourse of “fun” that is attached to 
creative labor. Compared to Fordist factory work, cultural work is considered “intensely 
pleasurable (at least some of the time)” (Gill & Pratt, 2008, p.15). Workers in the creative 
industries are supposed to work for pleasure and be willing to sacrifice secure contracts or stable 
payment for the “coolness” of cultural work.  
However, it is problematic to use the term “creative” to distinguish certain forms of work 
from others. Hesmondhalgh (2002) reminds us that the differences between creative and non-
creative labor are largely arbitrary, and labor is always open to temporary and contingent 
relations. Jim McGuigan (2010) furthers this debate by asserting that creative labor is a universal 
human attribute, and cultural work is a meaning-producing practice that materializes it. From 
their point of view, every job has creative components, and it is unfair to designate some 
occupations as “creative” while others as uncreative in the cultural policy discourse (Conor, 
2014). Therefore, creative labor studies should focus on the experience of the contingent work in 
particular industry, such as television, film, new media production or documentary, and the 
conclusions cannot be over-generalized.  
Precarity: exploitation in the new economy 
The key to understanding creative labor in post-Fordist or post-industrial economy is 
“precariousness” or “precarity.”  Precarity refers to all forms of insecure, contingent, flexible 
work – including illegal, seasonal and temporary employment; homeworking, subcontracting and 
freelancing; and so-called self- employment (Neilson & Rossiter, 2005). It is a conceptual tool 
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invented to “aid in naming, understanding and ultimately transforming the conditions of labor 
under post-Fordism” (Brophy & Peuter, 2007, p. 180). 
Precarity has become a central feature of cultural work. A Marxist approach can account 
for the processes, practices, and structures that have resulted in the increasing precarization of 
cultural work. Scholars have done extensive empirical studies on creative labors in different 
cultural fields, including screenwriting field (Conor, 2010, 2014), music industry 
(Hesmondhalgh, 1999; Zendel, 2014), fashion model industry (McRobbie, 2004), video game 
industry (Dyer-Witheford, 1999). Each of these studies points to industry-specific and 
geographically unique forms of precariousness. However, they share certain stable features: a 
temporary, project-based jobs; long working hours; poor pay; lack the pathway of promotion; 
passionate attachment to the work; pride of being creatives; reliance on networking for job 
opportunities; a mix mentality of bohemianism and self-entrepreneurialism; and a profound 
feeling of insecurity (Banks, 2007; Caves, 2000; Jarvis & Pratt, 2006; McRobbie, 2002; 
O’Connor, 2010; O’Connor, 2012a).  
Precarious work is largely understood in terms of time. The temporality of life becomes 
increasingly governed by work. Capitalists rely on punishing schedules and oppressive deadlines 
to realize the “flexploitation.” Cultural workers have larger autonomy in deciding the pace of 
work, but they have to finish the work by the deadline. For instance, media work allows a 
flexible lifestyle, but the mentality of “the show must go on” forces cultural workers to organize 
their life around work and convert free time into free labor when the deadline is approaching. 
The fluid boundary between work and life balance is alienating and problematic (Weeks, 2005).  
In addition, creative labors spend time in social networking, which becomes compulsory 
sociality for them to find job opportunities and survive. The lack of ladder of promotion or career 
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pathway in the cultural industries is both the reason and the result of this network sociality. As 
McRobbie argues, work “has been re-invented to satisfy the needs and demands of a generation 
who, ‘disembedded’ from traditional attachments to family kinship, community, now find that 
work must become a fulfilling mark of self” (McRobbie, 2002, p. 521). Moreover, the workers 
have to devote non-working hours to learn new skills and improve themselves as a more 
competitive laborer.  
Chinese documentary filmmakers also work in precarious conditions. The 
documentarians are often employed on short-term contracts, with the lowest level of health care. 
The basic wage is low and salaries are irregular. They need to do multiple jobs, and their career 
trajectories do not follow a fixed hierarchical path. It is consistent with the findings in other 
countries. As Mark Banks and David Hesmondhalgh observe, “there is an oversupply of labor to 
the creative industries with much of it working for free or on subsistence wages” (Banks & 
Hesmondhalgh, 2009, p. 420). The precarious working situation has profound personal, familial 
and social costs, and my project is concerned with investigating and revealing these in the 
context of Chinese documentary production.   
 Why do workers in the creative industries still seek work, even when they know the 
precarious nature of the work? The secret lies in the pleasure that the work can give.  “Pleasure, 
self-expression, self-enterprise, and self-actualisation . . . seem to be at the heart of explanations 
of why people want to work in the media” (Ursell, 2006, p. 161). Creative industry workers are 
like the “industrialization of Bohemia” (Ross, 2003). People are motivated by the “cool” of the 
new economy, and the promise of autonomy and social prestige. As Jim McGuigan (2009) 
mentioned in his book Cool Capitalism, “cool hunting" is a feature of consumerism in late 
capitalism. The cool attitude has “three core personality traits, namely narcissism, ironic 
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detachment and hedonism” (Pountain & Robins, 2000, p. 28). Since most of the creative workers 
are young people in their twenties or thirties, there is also a “precarious generation,” who is more 
ready to trade fun experience at the cost of work security than the older generation (Beck, 2000).   
When we talk about labor, we should see not only exploitation but also the possibility of 
resistance and solidarity. We also need to recognize the agency of the cultural workers, their 
efforts to make work less alienating and their desire to realize their dreams as an autonomous 
artist. In this sense, freelancing presents an alternative to routinized jobs and the hope to have 
some degree of autonomy over one’s time.  As Andrew Beck (2003) notes, freelance cultural 
work can be viewed simultaneously as “labor at the margins” and as “a last space of resistance" 
(p. 4). Thereby, on the one hand, precarious work and self-exploitation have been the underlying 
mechanism of the new capitalist economy, while on the other, they constitute a new force of 
resistance and a challenge to the existing capitalist production and consumption.   
 However, the discussion of creative labor should not fall onto the simplistic 
pleasure/pain, labor/resistance dichotomy, rather, I see both tied up in a dialectical relationship 
that is lived day to day at work and underlies its complexity.   
 
Cultural industries, creative industries, and cultural economy 
The culturalization of the economy and the economization of culture 
 
The tension between art and commerce is a core dynamic in the cultural economy.  The past 
decades have witnessed the trends of “culturalization of economy” and “commodification of 
culture” (Lash & Urry, 1994) as creativity turned to the engine of the new economy. Cultural 
production was transformed to profit-oriented activities and was operated in an industrial mass-
production mode as was the documentary production in China.  
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Scholars use different names to refer to the documentary industry: media industry, 
cultural industries, creative industries, the creative economy, or the cultural economy. These 
concepts refer to different things and represent different ontological stances, but they all connect 
to studies in political economy and share an industrial analysis approach, which fits the 
discussion of my project.  
A lot of review articles have been written about cultural industries (Flew, 2013; 
Garnham, 2005; Hesmondhalgh, 2002; O’Connor, 2010, Raunig, 2011). Here I will start the 
discussion of the art-commerce relationship from Adorno's orthodox description of the culture 
industry. Adorno and Hokheimer (1997) criticized the industrialization of mass-produced culture 
and the commercial imperatives that drove the system.  For Adorno, art needs to be “the social 
antithesis of society” (Adorno et al, 1997). It represents the non-negotiable and awakens a 
critical consciousness toward the commercialized world. However, “cultural industries produced 
texts as profit-generating commodities,” that have to be “operating within a context of great risk, 
and so needing to do what they can to get a ‘hit’” (Garnham, 1987, p. 56). When mass 
production brings its assembly lines into the cultural domain, culture products become 
standardized commodities, "everybody must behave (as if spontaneously) in accordance with his 
previously determined and indexed level, and choose the category of mass product turned out for 
his type”(Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997, p. 123). Although Adorno’s analysis was criticized for 
holding up high culture reflecting an elitist nostalgic attachment to pre-industrial forms of 
cultural production, it serves as a powerful cautionary warning against commodification (Miège, 
1989).   
While Adorno described the commodification of culture by the capitalistic media 
industries, Bourdieu describes the process by which cultural work seemed, on the surface, to 
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have a certain autonomy from the rules of capitalism. Bourdieu studied the field of literature in 
the mid-nineteenth century and found that cultural production had achieved a relative autonomy, 
and cultivated a relatively mature “market for symbolic goods.” Bourdieu furthers Adorno's 
discussion of the cultural industry by dividing cultural production into two subfields, large-scale 
production and restricted-scale production. What happens in the large-scale production is similar 
to Adorno's description of culture industries that is “characterized by the subordinate position of 
cultural producers in relation to the controller of production and diffusion media, principally 
obeys the imperatives of competition for conquest of the market” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 125). 
From cultural to creative industries 
Cultural industries studies have experienced a “policy turn” in the 1980s. Along with the 
development of the information and communication technologies and the globalization of the 
labor division, creativity has been reconfigured as engines of economic growth and social 
transformation. The Australia and British governments look upon creative industries, creative 
clusters and creative cities to pull up local economies. The U. K. was aiming to be the “world's 
creative hub” (Purnell, 2005). Some scholars from Australia and the U. K. turned away from 
Frankfurt school’s critical attitude towards the industrialization of culture, to embrace the 
government’s position of promoting creative industries. Scholars at the Queensland University of 
Technology, such as Terry Flew, Stuart Cunningham have written extensively to give theoretical 
legitimacy to “creative industries” (Cunningham, 2002; Flew, 2005, 2012, 2013; Flew & 
Cunningham, 2010; Hartley, 2005; Potts & Cunningham, 2008). They believe that the term of 
“creative industry” can capture the significant entrepreneur dynamic of the “new economy” that 
the “arts,” “media,” and “cultural industries” do not. 
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However, critical scholars like Toby Miller, David Hesmondhalgh, and Jyotsna Kapur 
point to the neoliberal logic underlying creative industries. For instance, Toby Miller ( 2005, 
2011, 2016) point to the international division of cultural labor underlying Hollywood's profit-
making strategies, as labor is outsourced to the Third World. This is exploitative of workers in 
the Third World and reduces wages and the negotiating power of labor union in the U.S. Jyotsna 
Kapur (2011) states that the creative industry policies “have exacerbated rather than eliminated 
inequality” (para. 12). As neo-liberalism continues the capitalist logic of using arts as commodity 
and making labor invisible, work in the creative industries has become increasingly precarious. 
The debate between the critical tradition and policy studies continues. In this project about the 
Chinese documentary industry, I would follow the critical tradition and use labor theory and 
class analysis methods to investigate the power relations in documentary production, 
dissemination, and consumptions. 
 
Bourdieu's theory of cultural production 
Field, habitus, and cultural capital 
 
Bourdieu concerns how a relative autonomy of cultural sphere is made possible in a specific 
historical moment. Bourdieu described media, art, academic settings, and various areas of 
intellectual production, as fields that appear to be autonomous. However, he showed that this 
autonomy was only apparent and would change according to the expansion or regulation of 
capital and that it had its own internal relations which were economic in nature.   
Bourdieu distinguishes cultural production from other economic manufactory field using 
the interlocking conceptual tools of field, habitus, and capital. He summarizes the relationship 
between the three concepts using the following equation: [(habitus)(capital)] + field = practice. It 
means that practice results from relations between one’s dispositions (habitus) and one’s position 
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in a field (capital), within the current state of the social arena (field) (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 101).  
Therefore, in order to study the practices of cultural workers, we need to first know field, 
habitus, and capital.  
A field is not a concrete place, but rather a social-spatial arena and a relationship that is 
always being negotiated.  It is a system of social positions where agents are located. Fields 
interact with each other, but most are subordinate to the larger field of power and class relations 
(Bourdieu, 1983).   Bourdieu further divides the field of cultural production into two subfields: 
large-scale production and restricted-scale production. The subfield of large-scale production is 
organized under the principle of heterogeneous public, that is, to compete for profit and market, 
or in Bourdieu's term, economic capital. On the contrary, the field of restricted production 
applies an opposing principle – “the economic world reversed” (Bourdieu, 1983), where cultural 
producers compete not for economic capital, but for cultural capital and symbolic capital, that is, 
reputations, recognition, certifications, etc. “Arts for the sake of arts” is the ideal motto in the 
restricted field.  The restricted production is not oriented to the recognition from the general 
public but to the appraisal from peer producers. 
Within these apparently autonomous fields, such as art, Bourdieu explains are internal 
rules by which people come to occupy positions (Bourdieu's term, “Post”) in relation to their 
attributes and dispositions (what Bourdieu terms, “Habitus”). Habitus is a system of embodied 
dispositions, tendencies that organize the ways in which individuals perceive the social world 
around them and react to it. These dispositions are usually shared by people with the similar 
background (in terms of social class, religion, nationality, ethnicity, education, profession etc.), 
Habitus makes difference and work as a way of class formation. In Bourdieu's theory of cultural 
consumption, certain goods tend to be favored by the dominant fraction of the dominant class, 
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and others by the dominated fraction of this class. Fields of cultural production are associated 
mostly with the dominated fraction of the dominant class. The documentary practitioners are in 
this group.    
Key to determining habitus, Bourdieu explains is “Cultural Capital,” a concept by which 
he deepens Marx’s concept of capital beyond the economic area and into the more symbolic field 
of culture. He sees symbolic capital (prestige, honor, attention) as a crucial source of power. 
Cultural capital refers to the collection of symbolic elements such as skills, tastes, posture, 
clothing, mannerisms, material belongings, and credentials that one acquires through being part 
of a particular social class. The practices are determined by the interaction between habitus and 
positions of the agents. According to Bourdieu (1993), cultural capital is a major source of social 
inequality. Cultural capital comes in three forms—embodied, objectified, and institutionalized. 
One’s accent or dialect is an example of embodied cultural capital, or what Bourdieu literally 
defines habitus, while a luxury car is examples of cultural capital in its objectified state. In its 
institutionalized form, cultural capital refers to credentials and qualifications like degrees or 
trophies.  
Bourdieu’s field theory bridges agency with structure. In his eyes, agents negotiate their 
positions in a field, but the position they occupy is confounded by their habitus and the rules. 
Bourdieu’s theory of cultural production is a conceptual tool,  and scholars, including Bourdieu 
himself, have used the framework of field theory in analyzing cultural production in various 
fields, including education field (Bourdieu, 1998), journalistic field (Benson, 1999; Benson & 
Neveu, 2005; Champagne, 2016; Willig, 2013), literacy field (Albright & Luke, 2010), new 
media(Benson, 2006), and others (Couldry, 2003).  
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Critiques of field theory 
Bourdieu's field theory does not provide a perfect model for understanding cultural production. 
First, Hesmondhalgh (2006) and Goran Bolin (2012) both point out that Bourdieu seems 
obsessed with the small-scaled elite cultural production subfield, while neglecting the less elite 
and more industrialized mass production subfield. He didn't make the detailed analysis of the 
mass production, and thus overlooked the complexities within this part of the production. In this 
dissertation, I will provide a thorough case study to large-scale production (television 
documentary production) to reveal how Bourdieu's concepts of field, habitus, capital, interact 
within this subfield. 
Secondly, scholars argue that although Bourdieu's model talks about agency and structure 
following Marxist tradition, he didn't talk about the alienation, exploitation, and labor's 
subordination to capital. Instead, he focused on explaining the mechanism of the agency and 
autonomy of the creative agents. I disagree with this critique. Although Bourdieu didn't use the 
terminology of labor, alienation, exploitation, he still clearly revealed the exploitative nature of 
the capitalist production by pointing out the conversion among different forms of capital. Taking 
French literacy field as an example, he writes that the fast-growing cultural production in the 
nineteenth century seemed to bring the writer a certain freedom from patronage. However, 
Bourdieu showed us that autonomy was for them just an illusion. Taking the example of the 
French writer, Flaubert, he explains that these writers were dependent upon the taste of the 
bourgeois and thus the market. Furthermore, Flaubert and others like him confronted the irony of 
ridiculing in their work the very class they relied on for purchasing their work. In my 
dissertation, I take up the critiques of labor in the creative industry in conjunction with 
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Bourdieu's field analysis, to elaborate on the shifting nature of work in the documentary field in 
China. 
In the era of globalization, cross-national corporations have become bigger players in the 
field of cultural production. Capital, labor, and technology are all flowing constantly across 
national borders and reconfiguring organizations and the industry. Documentary production in 
China has been actively engaged in cross-border co-production. As Ursula Huws (2007b) 
describes, information is broken down into small interchangeable standard units which can be 
reconfigured by people from different places, and jobs migrate seamlessly from continent to 
continent over the internet searching for the best skills at the lowest price. 
 
Research questions 
 
The Chinese documentary industry has gone through the transition from socialist to the post-
socialist mode of production, and as a result, its conditions of employment have also changed 
fundamentally. During this process, the traditional “Danwei” and “Bianzhi” system loosed up, 
and the permanent positions have been replaced by flexible, intermittent, contracted jobs.  The 
documentary workers have gradually changed from state officials to the precarious labor in the 
last forty years. This study will trace the history of the employment relations in the TV 
documentary industry. Therefore, I propose the first set of questions as follows: 
-- How has the employment system of the Chinese documentary industry changed over 
time? 
-- How has this change affected the working conditions of the documentary workers? 
 
In addition, I want to explore the precarious lives of the Chinese documentary workers. 
Drawing on the labor process theory, I will investigate the laboring practices of the workers, 
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including the payment, working time, social welfare, freelancing, and internship. I will analyze 
the pyramid structure of the documentary workers. The second set of questions about precarity is 
as follows: 
-- What forms of precariousness have the documentary workers experienced? 
-- What is the mechanism behind forms of self-exploitation inaugurated by the erosion of 
permanent jobs?    
-- What leads to the precaritization of cultural workers? 
 
Moreover, I explore the laboring practices of the documentary workers in the ideological 
factory of the China Central Television. The career trajectories of the workers reveal the subtle 
interaction between the individuals, organizations, and the broader structure. From entering the 
industry and sustaining the status, to exiting, the documentary workers employ various strategies 
to seek better positions in the documentary field. The third set of questions is: 
-- What is the mechanism of rationalizing documentary work in the ideological factory? 
-- How do the cultural workers experience and feel about their jobs?  
-- How do they reconcile the political and economic pressure in this industry?  
 
Finally, I investigate how the Chinese documentary producers embedded themselves into 
the global market.  Globalization has been a trend that left no nations out of a global market. The 
technological development makes co-production more convenient. Also, the Chinese 
government considers documentary as an essential way to promote its soft power in the global 
scope. Therefore, co-production has been largely growing, and most of the big-budget 
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documentaries are co-produced across borders. It has reconfigured the documentary production 
process and the laboring conditions of the documentary workers. The third set of questions is: 
-- What are the new labor practices in the global co-production in China?   
-- How do Chinese documentary workers join the International Division of Cultural 
Labor in the cross-border co-production?  
Methodology 
This study aims to explore practices, beliefs, and contextual factors of Chinese documentary 
production, and thus methodologically, it goes beyond textual analysis of the film contents and 
deploys ethnographic methods to look at the real production practices of the cultural workers. 
This project relies mainly on qualitative methods to collect data, including in-depth interviews 
and participant observation. I also reflect on my own working experience in the Chinese 
documentary industry. 
 
Positioning and self-reflexivity  
 
I undertook this study as both a practitioner and an academic. I have worked in the Chinese 
documentary industry for over ten years and participated in various types of documentary 
practices. I worked as a documentary director in China Central Television (CCTV) for three 
years between 2004 and 2007 and produced several social issue documentaries. The CCTV 
workplace is like an ideological factory where creatives live a schizophrenic life, criticizing the 
government in private while hiding all negative words at work. The pay and working condition 
of documentarians worsened over the years, and the work became more and more precarious. I 
have also worked as a freelancer, taking projects from different TV stations and production 
companies. My role in these projects varied from director, to production manager, to writer. The 
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nature of the projects was also diverse, from critical feature documentaries targeting international 
documentary festivals, to propaganda documentaries of the TV stations, to marketing 
documentaries. The feeling of insecurity brought on by the flexible work pattern was a root cause 
of my move from the industry back to academia.  
My personal experience in the Chinese documentary plays a vital role in this dissertation. 
I do not intend to indulge in an autoethnographic study, and as Bourdieu states in the beginning 
of his book Sketch for a Self-Analysis (2008), “I analyze myself not out of a narcissism need, but 
for connecting to the broader society” (p. 2). Firstly, my experience determined the topic of this 
study, a continuation of my journey of self-exploration. My experience and perspective could be 
a conduit, through which an understudied area of cultural production could be opened for 
academic scrutiny. I am curious about how people started their career with love and passion but 
ended with frustration. If this result is a shared feeling within the documentary community, what 
is wrong and how can we improve it? Secondly, it influences my way of selecting interviewees 
and doing interviews. I started by talking to the people with whom I worked. Some of them have 
arrived at a top rank in the community after ten or fifteen years of work. They can provide me 
with information about changes in the working conditions and their feelings towards their careers 
over time. Also, my understanding of the documentary industry enables me to identify key 
personalities, as well as people from different layers of the practitioner community. Thirdly, I am 
aware of the limitations of thinking as a practitioner. As a practitioner, I only knew a limited area 
of the industry and was acquainted with the lives of similar-minded people. Also, documentary 
making ten years ago was very different from the way it is today. For example, it was hard to get 
in touch with any international co-production ten years ago. It is hard to imagine the impact of 
globalization of documentary making on the workers’ lives from merely past experience. To get 
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a bigger picture of the industry, I conducted extensive fieldwork from January 2014 to August 
2017. 
I observed the international documentary marketplace. In April 2014, I worked as a 
volunteer on the organizing committee of the 2014 Asian Side of the Doc (ASD) festival, which 
was jointly held by the Central Newsreel and Documentary Film Studio and the French Sunshine 
Documentary Festival. This four-day festival provided a venue where the international 
documentary sector gathered to see projects, buy programs and find partners. I helped with 
translating the catalog of the festival and assisting in the business negotiation of two global co-
productions. Documentary festivals are where filmmakers learn to price documentaries and 
understand the tastes of international buyers. They are the right place to investigate the flow of 
capital and labor in this industry, for it is the place to observe capitalization of the cultural 
product directly. 
I have also participated in global production. From June 2014 to July 2016, as part of my 
field studies, I worked as a director in a documentary series A Book a City, which filmed in 
global cities like London, Paris, Berlin, and Rome. This cross-border project was fully funded by 
Zhejiang TV, a state-controlled television station in China, but it relied mainly on geographically 
mobile laborers. The project recruited crews globally: the editor was based in Hong Kong; the 
photographer came from Germany; I, the director, was based in the U.S.; and the producer 
worked out of Beijing. Other crew members, such as fixers, sound recordists and gaffers were 
recruited locally in the cities of filming locations. This project enabled me to feel, observe, and 
experiment with new ways of organizing documentary production. 
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Qualitative interview 
Qualitative interviewing provides an efficient way of gathering opinions and life experience from 
a subject’s perspective. I deploy semi-structured interview in this project. Regarding the degree 
of the uniformity of the questions, interviews range through a continuum from structured, semi-
structured, to unstructured interviews (Bryman, 2001). For structured interviews, researchers can 
only ask a predetermined set of questions using the same wording and order of questions as 
specified in the interview sequence. It does not fit into an explorative, grounded-based study like 
this project. On the other hand, semi-structured interviews give researcher freedom in terms of 
content and structure and allow them to explore complex topics and issues in a flexible manner. 
Due to the broad nature of the field in this study, I chose to use semi-structure interviews. I also 
take the interview as an interpretive practice. In the moment of storytelling, the interviewees are 
actively constructing a life world. The meanings of the interviews are “contextual, improvised 
and performative” (Dillard, 1982, p. 32).  
I interviewed 40 documentary practitioners in China, including documentary directors, 
producers, photographers, gaffers, editors, production assistants, and festival organizers. The 
interviews lasted from half an hour to two hours and were conducted from February 2014 to 
August 2017. Most of the interviews were conducted face-to-face except three Skype interviews. 
The locations of the interviews include cafés, tea houses, restaurants, production studios, and 
film festival venues. All the interviews were conducted in Chinese. They were recorded and 
transcribed. Due to the large amount of the transcription, I only translated the assert that I 
intended to use in this manuscript. In order to protect the privacy of the interviewees, I assigned 
a pseudonym to each of them. (Please see Appendix B for the background information of the 
interviewees). The only exception is two documentary experts (informant 1 and 20), who talk 
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about the documentary industry in general instead of their own working experience, and I will 
use their real names.  
Snowballing was the main sampling method to recruit the subjects.  I started with the 
people I knew in my previous and current documentary working experience, and then connected 
with the candidates they recommended. The whole interview process stopped when I felt that the 
data reached saturation and no new knowledge was to be gathered. Snowballing, or chain referral 
sampling, suit for the study of subcultural groups. It is an efficient way to gain access to a 
relatively closed community, which requires the knowledge of insiders to locate people of 
research interests (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). The saturation here refers to the theoretical 
saturation, which means “no additional data are being found whereby the sociologist can develop 
properties of the category. As he sees similar instances over and over again, the researcher 
becomes empirically confident that a category is saturated” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 61).   
 
Participant observation 
My experience of working in the Chinese documentary industry gave me access to various 
scenes of documentary practices, find key interviewees, and build rapport with the informants. I 
had the opportunity to take part in and closely observe the following: 
1) A big-budget documentary series featuring global filming from 2014 to 2016; 
2) Three international documentary festivals: Asian Side of Doc in 2014, Hong Kong; 
film festival in 2014, Westlake International documentary festival in 2016;  
3) A project of importing and subtitling American documentary series in 2014; 
4) An online community of documentary filmmakers from 2014 to 2017; 
5) Numerous gatherings of the documentary practitioners. 
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Participant observation, a principal research method used in qualitative research, involves 
both participating in and observing a culture, and gathering authentic qualitative data of the real 
interactions (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). There are four types of observation roles that a 
researcher can take based on the degree of immersion: complete observer, observer as 
participant, participant as observer, and complete participant (Gold, 1958). The researcher could 
live a life of total immersion with a native culture, often for several years at a time; or live lives 
of partial immersion, taking a minor role in the field and spending more time in observing, for a 
relatively short period. But most of the time, a researcher has to shift among these positions 
during the whole field trip. However, it also has the implied pitfall of the researcher becoming a 
“native” or “complete insider”, who takes things for granted and loses the distance needed for 
reflexive analysis. I was cautious about the danger and, most of the time, I maintained 
ethnographic sincerity and took the position of a partial insider or a “professional stranger” 
(Agar, 1996).  
 
Layout of the dissertation 
 
I begin chapter 2 with a discussion of the major shift that has occurred in Chinese documentary 
production from permanent employment in state service to the precarity of temporary, contract-
based, self-employed labor. I first introduce the “danwei” (work unit) and “bianzhi” (quota of 
personnel) system in the socialist period. I will then divide the transition of employment system 
into three phases: that is, the permanent employment system era starting from 1958, the 
producer-responsibility system starting from the early 1990s, and the commission system starting 
from the 2010s. By locating the documentary production in a historical framework, I argue that 
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the analysis of the precarious work of the Chinese documentary labor is significant because it 
reveals what happens in the Chinese documentary industry when communism meets capitalism.  
Chapter 3 is on the precariousness of creative labor in the Chinese documentary industry. 
The chapter starts with a description of the pyramid structure of the Chinese documentary 
workers. The workers have been stratified according to their employment status. They have 
formed what Bourdieu has named the “dominated fraction of the dominant” and the “dominant 
fraction of the dominated.” For the latter group, short-time contract, moonlighting, low payment 
and long working hours, freelancing and internship have been a normal working condition. They 
also have to hold multiple jobs and spend time in social networking. The analysis shows the 
pathway for the cultural workers to transit from documentary personae to a neoliberal individual. 
Chapter 4 is based on interviews and observation of the career trajectories of the media 
practitioners involved in the production of CCTV’s documentary program, The True Story. 
Through these life stories, I describe the double pressures from the political sphere, i.e., through 
state censorship and the economic world, i.e., market driven audience research. 
Chapter 5 addresses the impact of globalization upon the laboring practices in the 
Chinese documentary industry. Global co-production increased as the government decided to 
promote its soft power internationally. The technological development also leads to 
deterritorialization and sets people free from time-space limitation. The co-production is 
increasingly organized globally, seeking the best skills with the lowest price. This chapter talks 
about how creative workers in the Third World embed themselves into the New International 
Division of Cultural Labor (NIDCL). My observation of the documentary series A Book a City 
will illustrate the new mode of documentary co-production. I will also critically analyze the labor 
hierarchy in this new division of labor.   
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Finally, the dissertation concludes with an overview of the precariousness experienced by 
the Chinese documentary workers.  It also discusses the theoretical implications of this study of 
creative labor in the Chinese documentary industry for understanding the dominance and 
exploitation in the cultural economy. I will then discuss the resistance and the solidarity of the 
documentary workers. In the end, I bring up the concept of “good work,” envisioning a less 
precarious, more autonomous form of documentary work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DOCUMENTARY MAKERS IN TRANSITION:  FROM STATE EMPLOYEES TO 
PRECARIOUS WORKERS 
 
We used to be queens, but now we are slaves.  
         — Hummel et al., 2012 
 
Roman Hummel, who is a US journalist, describes the fall in his working conditions from 
that of royalty to a slave.  This is, however, a global shift.  In my research and experience, I find 
this assessment to apply equally strongly to Chinese documentary filmmakers, who have 
witnessed a steady decline in autonomy in the midst of increasing precarity.  In fact, precarity 
has become the central feature of documentary work in China. 
In this chapter, I describe the major shift that has occurred in Chinese documentary 
production from permanent employment in state service to the precarity of temporary, contract-
based, self-employed labor.  I ask:  How has this change affected working conditions of the 
Chinese documentary makers?  What are the changes it has brought about in the cultural 
workers’ conditions of living?  How do documentary makers reconcile their passion for 
documentary making with these new conditions, which clearly lean towards self-exploitation? 
And, how do they cope with and resist the pressures of neoliberalism to survive as an 
entrepreneur in an increasingly competitive market where each is responsible or his or her own 
welfare?   
In answer to these questions, I must start with an introduction to the political 
administrative system of danwei (work unit 单位) and bianzhi (quota of personnel 编制), which 
has defined the distinctive class status of Chinese documentary workers, as compared to those 
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from other nations. I then trace the history of the Chinese documentary and analyze the social, 
economic contexts that led to the deteriorated class status of documentary workers. 
“Danwei” and “Bianzhi”: the withering away of “iron rice bowl” 
Media industries of the advanced capitalist society have witnessed the increase of temporary, 
casual employment relations. Beginning in the 1950s, major Hollywood studios started using 
“putting-out systems” to replace traditional “term contracts,” under which writers, actors, and 
skilled production technicians worked exclusively for one studio full-time for a guaranteed 
period. Under the new system, contracted workers were assembled on a project basis for the 
completion of a single movie (Christopherson & Storper, 1989). This Hollywood practice had 
become global by the end of the twentieth century.  The Hollywood fine-tuned ways of working 
grew pervasive under the paradigm of post-Fordist production on the whole. Gillian Ursell 
(2000) has traced this development in the casualization of television jobs in the United Kingdom. 
Due to privatization and escalating competition in the 1990s, relations between broadcasters and 
television workers were deteriorating, manifested by the rapid decrease of permanent positions 
and increase of casual work. The wages for freelance television workers were also declining.  
However, China has a different story because of its socialist system, where media 
organizations are not private companies as is the case in the United States, but are all state-
owned enterprises. Two central institutions are important here.  The first is “danwei” (work unit 
单位) and the second is “bianzhi” (quota of personnel 编制). “Danwei” refers to the 
organizations or institutions where people work, and “bianzhi” is the number of persons and the 
budget allocated to each organization by the State. For example, if an organization, i.e., danwei 
has a bianzhi of 20 but employs 30 personnel, the finance bureau will only allocate funds to pay 
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for 20 employees (Ang, 2012). Both systems are product of the planned economy under the 
socialist period of China from the1950s till now. 
The Danwei system 
“Danwei” (work unit) literally refers to the place of employment. But it means much more than 
just the place of people. A danwei is not only an economic affiliation but also a political and 
social entity, which played a substantial role in Chinese society especially during the period 
when the Chinese economy was heavily socialist before Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms in 
1978 (Lu & Perry, 1997). At that time, danwei was the basic social unit of the society. The 
central government made budgets and allocated resources to individual danwei according to the 
number of employees. A danwei usually had its own housing, childcare, canteens, schools, 
clinics, shops, and provided exclusive services to its employees. It also controlled every aspect of 
their lives. The workers had to obtain permissions from the danwei about travel, marriage, or 
even giving birth to children. For an extended period, from the mid-1950s to early 1980s 
particularly, the State employed a system of planned purchase and supply to monopolize the 
selling and buying of food. A danwei distributed grain ration coupons to its employees according 
to the number of family members and their ages, which was the only guarantee that the 
employees could buy grain, flour, rice, oil, eggs, cloth, and bicycles. At those historical times, a 
person without a danwei could barely survive in China.   
The danwei system also represented permanent employment in the planned economy 
period in China from 1949 to 1978. It echoed a national education policy where the State 
provides jobs to college graduates (Baofenpei 包分配). In the early national building period, the 
government needed a large number of skilled, highly educated workers, while the number of 
graduates from college or professional schools was very limited due to the small size of high or 
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middle-level education. When a person graduated, the State automatically offered him a job and 
sent him to a danwei. The person would have this job his whole life. The danwei was not going 
to dismiss workers with bianzhi because strictly speaking, the workers were employees of the 
State, not the danwei. However, a shortcoming of the system was that the workers could not 
choose jobs of their interests. For instance, the first generation of documentary makers started 
their career not because they loved it, but because the State needed them to do this job. 
The Bianzhi system 
Media workers occupy a contradictory class location in China. Chinese television was born and 
developed as the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of China from the very beginning. 
Chairman Mao Zedong spoke of the importance of the mass media and regarded it as a weapon 
for class struggle. Based on his ideas, media in China are considered a loyal servant of the party-
state.  
Before the 1980s reform, journalists who worked for the party media were all recruited 
by allocating them positions within the political administrative system (bianzhi system) (Bao, 
2008). The bianzhi system is closely related with the former Soviet control system of 
nomenklatura (ruling class) which, as Bohdan Harasymiw defined (1969),  refers to “a list of 
positions, arranged in order of seniority, including a description of the duties of each office” (p. 
121). People with an inside-the-system position (tizhinei 体制内) are leading personnel in the 
State and Party organs, who have the guarantee of a life-long job, or as they say in China “an 
iron rice bowl”, a promising career, a riskless stable income, and no competition (Brødsgaard, 
2002). Not only does the government allocate numbers of personnel to each industry, it also fixes 
levels within that industry. By controlling the bianzhi the party-state exercises control over the 
entire administrative apparatus from central to local level.  
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There are three main categories of bianzhi: administrative bianzhi (xingzheng bianzhi 行
政编制), enterprise bianzhi (qiye bianzhi 企业编制), and the bianzhi that applies to service 
organizations (Shiye danwei bianzhi 事业编制) (Brodsgaard 2002). The administrative bianzhi 
specifies the number of administrative organs and the number of personnel in these organs. The 
enterprise bianzhi refers to the number of personnel in state-owned profit-oriented economic 
enterprises. Shiye bianzhi refers to the number of authorized personnel in public service 
organizations, such as media organizations.The number of bianzhi remains stable over the years. 
For instance, the number of employees with bianzhi in China Central Television (CCTV) is 
about 2,500 to 3,000, and it did not change much in the past thirty years.  
In the bianzhi system, media practitioners were more like government officials, mandated 
to obey the party principle and integrated into the orbit of the party as a means of political 
control. The State subsidized and paid the salaries of these party organ media as if they were 
“state employees” (Lee, 2001). Thereby, the first generation of documentary filmmakers 
occupied a privileged class location. They were the “dominated fraction of the dominant group,” 
using Bourdieu's concept (Bourdieu, 1988). They are high in cultural capital, that is, an 
intelligentsia based in fields of symbolic production, but lower in economic or political capital 
than the dominant fraction based in fields of material production and power. 
The decline of permanent employment 
The bianzhi and danwei structures loosened up when Deng Xiaoping started the “Reform and 
Open the Door” policy in 1978.  With increasing liberalization of the economy, private 
enterprises came up as an important economic sector. The bianzhi system could not satisfy the 
needs of these fast-growing firms for talent. Although state-owned enterprises still kept main 
elements of the danwei system, private or foreign companies employed a more flexible 
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employment system and started recruiting temporary workers (Linshigong 临时工) who were 
willing to take jobs without bianzhi but with higher pay. 
Since the 1990s, however, permanent employment was no longer guaranteed. Two 
national policies have led to the end of the permanent employment system. In 1991, the reform 
of housing system started removing housing from the responsibility of the Danwei, and in 1998 a 
national policy banned the Danwei from providing housing to their employees. Additionally, in 
1996, the Education Ministry of China released a policy, “Regulations on the State stopping 
providing jobs to college graduates,” saying that college graduates were no longer offered a job 
by the State and they had to look for jobs in the markets by themselves. In 2003, people could 
get married or divorced without the permission from one's work unit. As a result, permanent 
employment relations began to wither away in the big cities of China from the late 1990s. 
Transition of employment system in the Chinese documentary 
Like other industries, the Chinese documentary industry also began to see a decline in permanent 
positions and the growth of the population of temporary work. A brief history of the shift is 
helpful at this juncture.  Scholars have different ways of dividing the history of the Chinese 
documentary into periods. He Suliu (2012) draws the following timeline for China’s television 
documentary: political period (1958-1977), the cultural period (1978-1992), the individual period 
(1993-1998), and the commercial period (1999-2004). In particular, he singles out the year 2011 
as the beginning of a new era because of the launch of China Central Television (CCTV) 
documentary channel. Yingchu Chu (2007) makes a similar division of time periods but employs 
a different naming strategy. She characterizes the period from 1957-1977 as the Mao period, also 
the “dark ages” of documentary; the period from 1977 to 1992 as the transitional period; and the 
period after 1992 as the reform period (p. 31).  
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Aiming to address the employment relations in the documentary history of China, I 
divide them into three phases according to the dominant documentary formats and the 
employment system in each stage, that is, the permanent employment system era starting from 
1958, the producer-responsibility system starting from the early 1990s, and the commission 
system starting from the 2010s. 
The permanent employment system and special topic documentaries 
The start of Chinese television documentary was in 1958 when the first television station of 
China was established. The first group of television workers came mainly from radio stations and 
Central Studio of Newsreels Production, one of the earliest centers of documentary production in 
China. 
The Central Studio of Newsreels Production remained the official production center of 
documentary films in China until the 1990s. Established in 1953, the Central Studio of 
Newsreels Production was called “Royal Photographers,” which had exclusive access to 
significant events and moments of the State, recording the activities of national leaders, covering 
major events, and documenting national achievements. It has the most extensive video footage 
concerning the history of the People's Republic of China. It was similar to Soviet Union's Central 
Studio of Documentary Films which was the particular newsreel division of Sovkino producing 
newsreel series like news of the day, foreign newsreel, Soviet sports, Soviet cinema, etc. The 
then Deputy president of the Central Studio of Newsreels Production, Qian Xiaozhang, received 
a four months training in the Soviet Union in 1954. 
Chinese documentary films in this period were mainly a cinematic illustration of 
governmental policies, adhere to the Leninist view of documentaries as visual propaganda. 
Central Studio of Newsreels Production produced three types of documentaries: scripted 
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documentary, compilation film, and newsreel (Chu, 2007). Films typically dealt with the 
following areas of subject matter approved by the State: 1) significant national political events; 
2) socialist construction projects in industry, agriculture, defense, science, and technology; 3) 
military; 4) minorities; 5) foreign affairs; 6) culture and art; and finally, 7) sports (Chu, 2007, p. 
70). These scientific or educational films produced by other domestic film studios were generally 
called documentaries. Guided by the aesthetic of socialist realism, these documentaries aimed to 
inspire socialist consciousness in the people and to serve the mainstream political ideology of the 
State using the Leninist call for political visualization (Lu, 2016). It was the aesthetic style of the 
Central Film studio that led to the special form of zhuanti pian (special topic documentary) that 
has been popular on Chinese TV screen for decades. 
Central Studio of Newsreels Production also produced a weekly 10-minute media outlet 
entitled News Clips, which functioned as the primary source of news to the Chinese people prior 
to the era of television. It also supplied content to television stations after they were established 
in 1958. 
Both Central Studio of Newsreels Production and China Central Television were state-
owned enterprises, and people working there are state employees. The employees relied on the 
danwei for salary, housing, and healthcare. The first group of television workers was composed 
of young graduates, experienced journalists and technicians from other media agencies, 
demobilized serviceman, and supporting workers. As mentioned before, they did not choose their 
own career on their free will but were allocated to the jobs according to the needs of the nation. 
A telling case is Liu Xiaoli, the president of the Chinese TV Documentary Committee 
and the series director of the 1990s’ influential Sino-japan co-production Odyssey of Great Wall/ 
Wang Changcheng (1991). Liu was an army officer who had served in the Chinese People's 
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Liberation Army (PLA) before being transferred to Beijing TV station (later renamed China 
Central Television) in 1966. According to Premier Zhou's opinion, the Central Radio Department 
of China started selecting some editors and reporters from the army soldiers at that year. The 
candidates had to be Party members, with high school diplomas and at least the position of an 
army captain. Liu was one of the candidates. In an interview, he said that he had never watched 
or even know what television was. 
In 1966, Liu and other 29 army officials were transferred to the Central Radio 
Department and assigned to three television stations (Dong, 2014). “The leader of the television 
station, Dai Linfeng, told us: ‘television work requires both physical and spiritual strength, so 
your grain ration is higher than ordinary intellectuals. You can have 34 jin (17 kg) of rice per 
month,’” said Liu (as quoted in Dong, 2014). Zhu Ying in her book Two Billion Eyes also 
documented that “employment practices at CCTV prior to the early 1990s followed the general 
practice in China’s state-run enterprises, which put family and political background and 
connections ahead of professional credentials. China’s State Administration of Radio, Film and 
Television enforced a similar practice at CCTV, and it meant that the first generation of CCTV 
employees were mostly former army officers and people with the “right” family pedigrees (Zhu, 
2014, p. 52). 
Why did the State choose army officials to participate in the newly emerging television 
industry? What was the impact of military training on the media production practices? The first 
quality of army officers is loyalty. Being loyal to the Party and the State is the first prerequisite 
for state employees. They need to execute orders from above without question. This quality was 
considered essential in an era when class struggle was considered the major problem of China. 
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The second quality is the so-called “tough-minded military mentality,” that is, the ability to stick 
to a goal regardless of obstacles.  
The influence of the army mentality in documentary production may be illustrated with 
the 1988 case of CCTV collaborating with Nippo Hoso Kyokai (NHK, the Japanese public 
service broadcaster, to produce a documentary series on the Great Wall. NHK's documentary 
production was more sophisticated than Chinese in terms of production experience and 
storytelling skills. Liu Xiaoli, the then director of the military department of CCTV, volunteered 
to be the director of the Chinese team and was approved. Most members of Liu's team were 
former army soldiers. They felt driven to make stronger visual representations about the Great 
Wall, their national heritage although the quality of their training and equipment were much 
lower than their Japanese counterparts. Liu explained his feelings in an interview, “I had an 
unspoken word to myself: ‘We, the Chinese soldiers, must fight for our nation. We must not lose 
in this competition against the Japanese. We should perform better than them’” (as cited in 
Dong, 2014).  
The documentary series Odyssey of Great Wall was a huge success when it was broadcast 
on the Chinese TV screen in 1991. It created a new aesthetic style: location sound instead of the 
“voice of God” narration and a focus on the people who resided along the Great Wall instead of 
historical heroes (Chu, 2007). Several documentary series, such as the Silk Road (Muto, 1980) 
and the Yangtze River (Dai, 1983), reinforced the style of the zhuanti pian (special topic 
documentary). These two TV documentaries became classics for future generations of 
filmmakers.  Since the 1970s, the special topic documentary became the mainstream form of TV 
documentaries, most of which document the cultural heritage of China or stage national 
achievements in the form of documentary series. 
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Coming back to the role of the documentary makers, the first generations were all 
permanent employees of CCTV, who traveled a clear professional upward career path. For 
example, Liu Xiaoli (series director of the Odyssey of Great Wall) had been the director of the 
military department of CCTV, and after retirement, worked as the director of China’s 
Documentary Academic Committee, in charge of the highest-level national documentary festival. 
Wei Bin, an episode director of the Odyssey of Great Wall, was the director of CCTV 
documentary channel from 2015 to 2017. The documentary makers who started their careers in 
the 1970s and 1980s are now at the top of the pyramid in the documentary industry. They control 
the distribution of resources including funds, projects, personnel, and rewards, making sure that 
TV documentaries function as the ideological apparatus of the Party and the State. 
 
The producer-responsibility system and “telling ordinary people’s lives” 
 
The period from the early 1990s is often viewed as the golden age of Chinese TV documentary 
production (Chu, 2007; He, 2012). The media reform that started in 1992 changed the Chinese 
media substantially. In that year, Deng Xiaoping made a speech on his tour of Shenzhen 
announcing the advancement of the halted economic reform process. The State stopped 
subsidizing media organizations and allowed them to make profits in the market. The media 
experienced rapid commercialization, marketization and restructuring in the 1990s (Zhao, 1998). 
As a result, a total of 676 TV stations were established in 1992, with one national broadcaster –
CCTV, 30 provincial stations, 295 municipal stations, and 350 county stations. These neoliberal 
policies created the double bind that while media remained state-owned, they could no longer 
rely on state funds. Television producers now had to fund themselves with advertisement 
revenues while at the same time fulfilling the propaganda duties of state media.  
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The birth of the news magazine TV program Oriental Space in 1993 is a signature 
achievement of the television reform in CCTV. Living Space was one session of this news 
magazine, which screened realistic mini-documentaries focusing on ordinary people's lives daily. 
The character-driven realistic aesthetic style has challenged the previous zhuanti pian (special 
topic documentary) by creating a revolutionary narrative structure. Its slogan – telling ordinary 
people's lives—has been a household name to this day. 
Yet, the period also opened up new opportunities for explorations in documentary form.   
A proliferation of counterculture and Avant-garde arts happened in the early 1990s. The pro-
democracy student movement and the Tiananmen Square event of June 4th, 1989 had brought 
cultural lives to a halt for nearly three years. The depressed cultural forces outburst dramatically 
after Deng Xiaoping's tour of Shenzhen Special Economic Zones and proposed to further the 
economic reform in 1992. Cultural pioneers responded to the social change with different art 
forms. In this period, seminal works emerged in music, paintings, dramas, and poems. Rock 
bands like Cui Jian, Tang Dynasty; theatre drama directors like Meng Jinghui, poets like Haizi, 
pushed their respective disciplines to new heights.  
It is essential to understand the change of the documentary field in the broader cultural 
movement of the early 1990s. The birth of the first independent documentary film, Wu 
Wenguang's Booming in Beijing in 1991 shows a new way of using videos to investigate 
ordinary people's lives. The launch of the first daily documentary program Living Space in 
CCTV in 1993 provided platform to showcase realistic character-driven documentaries. 
Documentary makers came from various backgrounds and brought the artistic inspiration to their 
films. There was not a clearly marked line between television documentary and independent 
documentary. For instance, CCTV invited independent documentary directors like Jiang Yue, a 
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well-known independent documentary director who directed the award-winning film the Other 
Bank in 1995, to make short documentaries for the Living Space. Wu Wenguang's Booming in 
Beijing came out of his work for a CCTV project called The Chinese, which started in 1988 but 
was stopped because of the Tiananmen events in 1989. Also, the new documentary field attracted 
talents from various art disciplines, such as writers, painters, sculptors, and musicians. At this 
time, TV documentary emerges as a legitimate art form of self-expression in addition to its 
function of propaganda.  
The media reform also led to the change in the employment system in media industries 
and brought the Producer Responsibility system into practice in CCTV. To innovate program 
formats and expand programming, CCTV needed to attract capable talents. However, the 
permanent employment system dictated that CCTV had to ask for the permission of the State to 
hire even one permanent employee, and it had no say on who would be allocated to them. To 
bypass the permanent recruitment system, Yang Weiguang, the then director of CCTV, 
innovated within the recruitment system and started to hire talents on temporary contracts. This 
came to be characterized as the Producer Responsibility System.  Lifelong employment was no 
longer secured for the new recruits, but CCTV offered higher pay to attract talents away from 
their steady jobs. 
The producer' responsibility system allowed program producers to recruit their own crew, 
outsource projects to freelance filmmakers and manage their own budget. Du, a former employee 
of Living Space, states:  
 
Chen Men (the former producer of Living Space) found all sorts of weird 
persons. They came from all over the country. They quit previous jobs and 
came here for a dream. Everyone felt they were part of a big thing. The quality 
of the programs is high even when evaluated by today's standards. Living 
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Space was at the apex of fame at that time. Even people in the remotest villages 
liked our program. (interview 2) 
 
Mao, a senior producer of CCTV’s current affairs department, notes: 
 
We had a decent salary. Not as high as today, but higher than ordinary 
professions. We were young at that time. There were not many to consider. We 
were working in rented offices and living in underground dormitories provided 
by the program. No one talked about money. We were completely concentrated 
on improving skills and the quality of our documentaries. (interview 8) 
 
As a result, two types of employment conditions have coexisted since the 1990s. There 
are the permanent workers under the bianzhi system, who are treated similar to state officials. 
Then there are the contracted or temporary workers under the market system, who have to sign 
yearly contracts with the organization. The workers who entered the media after 1992 tend to be 
in the market system.  
Documentary workers today are more likely to be in temporary contracts because most 
documentary programs or companies started after 1993. The True Story was one of the two main 
documentary programs in CCTV in the 2000s. It was the weekend version of the legendary 
Living Space, which produced and broadcasted weekly 45-minute documentaries about current 
affairs. It had about 40 employees in 2006. None of them were permanent employees, not even 
the producer. Only about five people signed a contract with the station (Taipin 台聘). Most of 
the rest were in a lower level contract with the News Commentary department. The new 
employees did not have basic welfare, usually referred as five insurances and one fund 
(Wuxianyijin 五险一金), which included pension, medical insurance, unemployment insurance, 
work-related injury insurance, childbirth insurance, and housing accumulation funds. Without 
the necessary insurance, they were vulnerable to illness or accidents. For instance, a post-
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production technician had an emergency surgery and stayed in the hospital for two months in 
2005. He could not afford the medical expenses, which had exceeded his annual salary. He had 
no insurance. Private insurance was still a new thing at that time.  In the end, the producer 
allocated part of the program's budget to pay for his medical expenses. After this event, the 
program bought commercial medical insurance for each of its employees. 
While the new employment system attracted high-quality talent to the documentary 
industry, it has also been the source of inequality within television stations. Today, CCTV has 
2500 to 3000 permanent employees (bianzhi yuangong 编制员工), but the number of overall 
employees of CCTV has increased to about 20,000 (Zhu, 2012). A large number of temporary 
workers were recruited with various sorts of contracts, corresponding to the different level of 
salaries and welfares. The complicated hierarchical salary system has led to the precariousness in 
the documentary industry, which I will discuss in detail later.   
 
The commissioning system and CCTV documentary channel  
In the 2010s, the Chinese government started to promote its soft power internationally, which is 
“the ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce and use force” (Nye, 1990). Documentary 
is a powerful way of introducing Chinese culture to the outside world. Thereby, media 
organizations and the practitioners bear the pressure to produce more “universally appealing” 
work for the “go abroad strategy.” 
As a result of this national policy, China Central Television launched a documentary 
channel in 2011. Also, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and 
Television (SAPPRFT) published a regulation policy requesting each of the 34 satellite 
television channels broadcast at least half an hour documentary programming every day from 6 
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am to 1 am starting from January 1, 2014.The policies paved the way for the fast growth of the 
documentary industry. The investment of documentary has increased from 800 million yuan 
($116 million) in 2010 to 3.5 billion yuan ($508 million) in 2016 (Zhang, 2011, 2017) and the 
number of documentaries produced increased from 5094 hours in 2010 to 22,000 hours in 2016 
(He, 2011, 2017). Documentary has turned into a rather big sector of the cultural industries that 
employed a large number of practitioners. Scholars like He Suliu call the year of 2011 “the start 
of the new era of the Chinese documentary industry” (He, 2011).  
By 2012, Chinese television has seven professional documentary channels: CCTV 9 
(documentary channel), CCTV 10 (science and education channel), CETV Channel 3 (Chinese 
education television), Beijing documentary channel, Shanghai SMG documentary Channel, 
Hunan Golden Eagle documentary channel, and Chongqing Channel 3. The documentary 
channels aired a total of 29,870 hours of documentary programs in 2016. Also, the 34 provincial 
satellite TV stations aired at least half an hour documentary each day to conform to the 
regulation from the SAPPRFT. The total investment of Chinese documentary production was 3.5 
billion yuan ($508 million) and attracted a total of 23.3 billion yuan ($3.38 billion) advertising in 
2016. At the same time, according to He’s (2017) documentary reports, the public broadcasting 
services of the United Kingdom invested 540 million pounds ($710 million) and produced 
16,954 hours of documentaries in 2016, and Australia invested 0.15 million Australian dollars 
($120 million) and produced 447 hours of documentaries. From 2011, Chinese documentaries 
have turned into a large and fast-growing market.  
The industrialization of the documentary industry includes rationalizing documentary 
production and inventing new ways that labor is organized in documentary production. The 
commissioning system has been trying to build up a more efficient documentary streamline. If 
53 
Living Space of the 1990s represents a small workshop, CCTV documentary channel has updated 
to a modernized ideological factory in the 2010s.  
The separation of broadcasting and production has made the commissioning system 
possible. CCTV documentary channel works mainly as a broadcaster rather than the production 
center. Initially, only 30 CCTV employees were assigned to launch and run the 24-hour 
broadcasting channel. The employees had to shift roles from frontier directors or photographers 
to commissioners and producers, who initiate and supervise these outsourced projects. They had 
to mobilize various units in the production to produce programs. 
The CCTV documentary channel makes documentaries in two ways. The first one is the 
in-house production. A CCTV producer takes a project and then recruits freelancers to form a 
temporary team. Usually, the producer initiates the topic and proposes outlines. When talking 
about how to start topics, Zhang Jie, former deputy director of News Probe, an investigative 
reporting program of CCTV, states that the stories will be evaluated by three criteria: their appeal 
to national interests, audience needs, and media interests. Zhang argues that it is in the 
overlapping area that producers could find the most valuable topics and engage their creative 
autonomy (as cited in Luan, 2016). Freelancers work closely with the producer to develop the 
plot and doing field research. When production is over, the freelancers do not share the 
copyright. In some cases, the names of freelancers may not even be shown in the credits. 
Thereby, the freelancers do not own any copyright, and in some cases, have to yield the right to 
authorship too.  
The second is the commissioning system. CCTV documentary channel outsources 
projects to social production companies. A CCTV producer supervises the production process to 
guarantee the quality of the finished product. The documentaries will broadcast on CCTV, who 
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provides funds and owns the copyright. This is the mechanism of the CCTV documentary 
commissioning process. In 2011, the documentary channel launched a bid-inviting press 
conference, calling projects to bid for the fund of 10 million yuan ($1.45 million). A total of 51 
production companies participated in the bid, among which 31 companies submitted 42 project 
proposals, and in the end, 13 projects from 6 companies were chosen. “We have invested 1 
million yuan ($145,000), a lot more than we get from CCTV. We did not expect to make money 
from this project. It is a promotion for our company,” says Feng Ji, manager of Yixiang Oriental 
production house (as quoted in Zhang, 2012). 
In both cases, television stations need an interconnected network of suppliers, from 
whom they can recruit freelancers, outsource projects, or buy finished documentaries. The 
launch of CCTV documentary channel has led to the boom of independent productions. As Lin 
Xudong, a senior documentary expert, recalls, “Almost overnight, hundreds of production 
companies came up in the market. Before, there were less than ten in Beijing, among them only 
two or three with relatively high influence in the market” (Lin, interview, July 25, 2014).  
Lin’s feelings are also verified by the statistics, which shows that only 31 production 
companies submitted proposals to the 2011 bid conference, less than one percent of the 
registered 4,678 production companies in China. But the number of registered production 
companies increased three times, to 14,386 in 2017, among which a more extensive portion has 
incorporated documentary production into business scope.  
Freelancing has also turned to a career option for documentary makers. An annual report 
on Chinese documentaries of 2017 shows that 34 percent of the surveyed documentary 
practitioners consider independent production and freelancing as ideal for their career (He, 
2017). The biggest hit of 2014, A Bite of China, demonstrates the high professional qualities of 
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the freelancers. The production team of this CCTV documentary series about Chinese food and 
cuisine culture were all freelancers, except the producer. 
 
Conclusion 
From the brief overview of the history of the television documentary in China over a half-
decade, we can see the social-economic contexts under which the forms of employment evolved. 
The documentary workers have transformed from state officials in the permanent employment 
system to contracted workers in the producer responsibility system, and to freelancers in the 
commission system. Job security deteriorates during this process. The iron rice bowl is withering 
away. The cultural workers were increasingly engaged in irregular, seasonal, atypical, and 
project-by-project jobs. In the next section, I will explore the precarious working conditions of 
the documentary workers, with an aim to find the secrets of exploitation in the new cultural 
economy. 
  
56 
CHAPTER 3 
PRECARIOUS WORK OF THE DOCUMENTARY WORKERS 
 
People in this industry age fast because they work like machines. They work non-stop 
until running out of fuel. They think they are the best and push themselves to the limit to 
win the competition.  
           — Jing, interview 5 
 
In this chapter, I explore the precarious working conditions of the practitioners, regarding 
their pay and working time, holding down multiple jobs, networking, freelancing, internship, 
copyright, and labor unionizing. The data I used in this chapter comes mainly from the 
interviews with forty documentary practitioners conducted in my field studies in China from 
February 2014 to August 2017. My personal experience of working in this industry for a total of 
ten years also informs my analysis.    
As the State began to retreat from media industries and encourage commercialization of 
television production from the late 1990s, documentary workers were transformed from state 
employees to cultural laborers. Lack of employment security and the process of precaritization 
are felt hard among the cultural workers in the current documentary industry of China. Forms of 
insecure, contingent, flexible work, including illegal, seasonal and temporary employment, 
homeworking, subcontracting, freelancing, and so-called self-employment have become 
common.   
Two theoretical frameworks guide my analysis in this section. The first is the particular 
nature of cultural production in post-socialist societies. Several scholars, including Paul 
Pickowicz (1994), Chris Berry (2007; 2004), and Zhang Yingjin (2004), have investigated the 
Chinese independent documentary filmmakers under the framework of “postsocialism”. I draw 
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on their conceptual tools to shed light on the experience of cultural workers themselves in post-
socialist cultural production.  
The second is the creative labor theory and the concept of precarity. Precarity is a term 
invented to refer to the widespread condition of temporal, flexible, contingent, casual, 
intermittent work in post-industrial societies, brought by the neoliberal labor or market reforms 
that have strengthened management and weakened the bargaining power of the employees since 
the early 1970s (Neilson & Rossiter, 2005). It tries to explain how a large part of the population 
is subject to flexible exploitation (low pay, high blackmailability, intermittent income), and risk 
of existential precariousness (high risk of social exclusion, welfare cut, high cost of living, etc.). 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) have argued that the flexible labor force has now 
moved from the peripheral position it had under Fordism to a core position in the process of 
capitalist accumulation under Post-Fordism, which is thought to be increasingly based on the 
casualized efforts of affective, creative, immaterial labor.   
The significance of my research is that I reflect on an untouched media sector in a post-
socialist nation where the planned economy has dominated cultural production for several 
decades. What is unique about the precariousness in the documentary industry in China? What 
can my study contribute to the theoretical debates on precariousness? I want to find answers to 
the following questions: what is the mechanism behind forms of self-exploitation inaugurated by 
the erosion of permanent jobs? What leads to the precaritization of cultural workers?  
 
Pyramid structure of the documentary makers 
Before proceeding to the analysis of their working conditions, I would like first to identify 
different types of documentary makers, as they are not a homogenous group. Rather, the workers 
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were located in different positions, facing different extents of exploitation, and thus showing 
different attitudes towards precarious lives. 
Here, I am using China Central Television (CCTV) as an example, but keep in mind that 
most television stations in China share the same pattern of employment relations. They have a 
highly hierarchical employment system, consisting of permanent workers (bianzhi 编制), station 
employees (taipin 台聘), dispatched workers (qipin 企聘), and temporary workers (lingshigong 
临时工). Employees differ in basic salary, annual bonus, housing fund, transportation allowance, 
and overtime allowance. Their access cards have different looks and authorizations. The access 
cards are categorized in A, B, C, and D, corresponding each to a different status.  
 
At the top of the pyramid are the permanent workers. They have usually entered this 
industry prior to 1992. They share all the welfare that the old system has promised them, like 
residence permit (Hukou), housing, medical insurance, and a pension plan. They have a better 
salary and share advertisement revenues. They are now in the highest position in the industry and 
charge of the resources including economic, cultural and symbolic capitals. According to public 
statistics, the number of permanent workers of CCTV is 2,098 in 1992, 2,503 in 1998, and hasn't 
grown to this day. But the number of Channels of CCTV has increased from 3 to 17.  
Below the workers of class A are employees who signed contracts directly with the 
station. They do not have a bianzhi, but other than that, they are treated similarly to the 
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permanent workers. Station employees usually began their career in the early 1990s. They are 
typically middle-level managers, like producers of television documentary programs or deputy 
directors of documentary departments, studios, or companies. They have a relatively high power 
of making decisions on creative, financial or human resource issues, but also have to take 
commands from above. Their duties include mediating between the commands of high managers 
and the needs of lower status workers. Limited by the contract status, workers in class B cannot 
go any further, and the upward ladder stops in middle-level managing. 
The dispatched workers in class C, strictly speaking, are not considered the real 
employees of the station. The form of dispatch labor started in 2002. Workers signed contracts 
with a labor dispatch company, which then sent them to work at television stations. By 2006, 
CCTV had at least 10,000 dispatch workers, five times more than its permanent workforce.  
The lowest section of the pyramid is comprised of temporary workers of class D. They 
work for individual programs or projects. Some of them do not even have contracts. They have a 
low basic salary and rely mainly on project compensations. The last two groups of workers 
comprise the majority of the population of Chinese documentary makers, and my study focuses 
on these two groups.     
The stratification within the documentary workers have reshaped the class relations. Very 
few people go upward to the top and become the “dominated fraction of the dominant group.” 
Their success stories remain the attraction to the new members. On the other hand, most cultural 
workers sink to the bottom, becoming the “dominant fraction of the dominated group” or even 
the proletariat. The declining class status is accompanied with the dropping of the salary. Their 
working conditions are as bad as if not worse than some of the manual labor, such as 
construction workers or domestic helpers who do not require high education. A survey on the 
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working conditions of documentary workers (He, 2017) finds that 23 percent of the respondents 
earn a salary less than 3,000 yuan ($435) per month, 29 percent between 3,000 and 6,000 ($435 
and $870), and 25 percent between 6,000 and 10,000 yuan ($870 and 1,450). About half of the 
documentary workers admit that their salary can hardly cover the family expenses. Instead of 
calling themselves “uncrowned kings,” the documentary workers are more frequently using the 
term “documentary labor.” This proletarianization process provides a framework to understand 
the precarious working conditions of the documentary workers.  
 
Precarious labor in the Chinese documentary industry 
Pay and working time 
 
The payment of documentary filmmakers is a universal question. One of the documentary 
filmmaking panels at the Sheffield Doc/Fest in 2013 asked a question: “how do filmmakers get 
paid?” The independent filmmakers used this chance to complain about their declining working 
conditions. Previously, British documentary filmmakers were treated as employees of the 
networks, and the sentiment among British filmmakers is that they want those days back. The 
same sentiment is seen in the Chinese documentary industry. 
The hierarchical structure of the employment status leads to unequal pay discrimination. 
“Doing the same jobs while earning different pay” is a big problem in Chinese television 
stations, and also in documentary departments or documentary channels. The payment is not 
based on the positions, capability, or experience but employment status. This is the outcome of 
the complicated system combining the bianzhi and market systems. The permanent workers and 
station employees can share the advertisement profits annually, ranging from 7,000 to 10,000 
yuan ($10,200 to $14,500) (Yin, 2014). Dispatched workers, and temporary employees, 
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however, do not have that. Many temporary workers have worked in television stations for many 
years and have been the mainstay of the programs, while still receiving unfair treatment in salary 
and welfare. The sense of insecurity and inferiority influences their production in the long term.   
Lack of insurance or social welfare prevented young documentary makers from staying at 
their jobs longer. As Nanchu He (2015) has demonstrated, media work may be fun for young 
people, but once they get married and have a family, they usually rethink the decision about the 
flexible work. Wang, a photographer, explains his decision of leaving CCTV for a position in a 
production studio: 
 
I will always be a temporary worker, even after having worked there (CCTV) for all my 
life. I will just be a life-long temporary worker. I feel like a second-class citizen there. 
There is no chance for me become a permanent worker. If I have to change jobs sooner or 
later, it is better to do it now. (interview 10) 
 
Most permanent employees have been in management positions and stopped doing the 
shooting, reporting or editing work, while contracted workers, on the other hand, have 
undertaken most of the frontier production work but were compensated much less. A fair 
compensation system is vital in retaining and motivating employees while losing the internal pay 
equity remains a significant threat to the harmony in the work environment. 
In addition, documentary workers have to face the external pay equity. Station projects 
pay less than the market rate. The disparity in prices partly has led to the outflow of talents from 
TV stations to independent production companies. The precarious working conditions prevented 
the employees from staying long. CCTV has lost its most talented documentary directors and 
producers recently. In 2017, there was a wave of middle-level managers and producers resigning 
from CCTV, and among them, Chen Xiaoqin, a signature director of CCTV documentary 
channel, quit and joined an Internet video company. 
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Secondly, default or being behind in payment is not unusual. The production of a 
standard size TV documentary series takes several months or years. The production companies 
usually receive 50 percent of the production budget in advance, 30 percent upon the acceptance 
of the finished film, and the remaining 20 percent after the airing of the program. Freelance 
directors and screenwriters get paid in a similar three-step timeline. Photographers, sound-
recordist, and gaffers charge a daily rate and usually get wages after each workday. In this sense, 
the core creative persons, like the directors and screenwriters, take the most significant risks. 
They provide services in advance, without knowing when they will get fully paid. It could be one 
month or one year depending on the programming schedule of the TV stations, which is entirely 
out of the workers’ control. As Karl Marx (1976) pointed out, the capital enjoyed the labor and 
paid for it later on. In the UK, after years of fight, workers gained the rights to get paid weekly 
instead of monthly. But in the Chinese documentary production, late payment has been normal 
for the commissioning projects.   
Thirdly, lack of upward mobility prevents documentary makers from serving a long time 
in documentary programs. In the first several years of the career, documentary makers have had 
a slightly higher salary than their peers working in other professions. Non-monetary rewards like 
flexible schedule, traveling to exciting places and meeting influential people have provided extra 
compensation. But as contracted workers, they did not have the chances of getting promoted to 
the positions of program producers or department directors. They were repeating the same work 
routines from project to project. Their salary or welfare even became worse as they were 
deskilled by the introduction of new recording or editing technologies. Therefore, ten years later, 
documentary makers find themselves left far behind by their peers who might have been 
promoted to manager levels. Sheng, a documentary director of CCTV, notes:  
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 My friends used to call me ‘artist’ and admired my lifestyles ten years ago… 
What they envied most was that I did not need to stay in office from 9 am to 6 
pm. Those flattery words created an illusion for me. Especially when my work 
showed on TV, the feedback from friends made you feel like a star…But now, I 
am in my mid-30s. The friends who used to look up to me have been promoted 
to department directors or managers and have a much higher salary than I do. 
They have a house, a family, and a stable job. What do I have? Nothing. I am 
still traveling around and repeating similar projects… I love documentaries, but 
it is not a job that allows me to raise my family. I am thinking of switching jobs. 
(interview 15)  
 
Karl Marx (1976) points out that the length of the working day, the intensity of labor, and 
increasing the productivity of labor are all crucial for capital to increase the surplus value it can 
draw from the exploitation of labor. To increase surplus values, capitalists must extend the labor 
time, increase the work intensity, or increase their productivity. However, by simply increasing 
the criteria of the product quality, company owners can extend labor time and increase work 
intensity. The most mentioned term in documentary programs or production companies is 
“Zuopin“ (work, particularly artwork作品), that means, to treat a documentary as a piece of 
artwork, instead of just an industrialized cultural commodity. To make an industrial product, 
documentary makers provide services of average or slightly above average level, but creating an 
artwork (Zuopin) requires perfection, which takes much longer working time.  
Some documentary companies systematically used the documentary makers’ artistic 
pursuit of craftsmanship as a means of exploitation. They tacitly transform large-scale 
production to small-scale production, where economic rules can be discarded, and create an 
environment that people feel ashamed to calculate working hours or request more monetary 
compensation. In this way, documentary making is turned into a “labor of love,” and filmmakers 
invest more working time into the project than they should. Here they are working for investors, 
not themselves, because documentary makers do not share the copyright or any further profits.  
64 
Freelancing 
As He’s (2017) survey shows, one-third of documentary makers aim to work as an independent 
producer in the future. However, what does independent production mean to them? What do they 
want to get from doing independent production? Do they want a higher level of autonomy in 
controlling the contents and ways of expression, or do they just want to work for themselves 
instead of being employed by organizations? The answers to these questions are related to 
different mentalities. The first one relates to the drive of art expression, while the second one 
links to the neo-liberalist self. The two mindsets are distinct but interconnected for documentary 
makers. 
Independent production has its prototype derived from a US ‘‘publishing model’’ in 
which production is sub-contracted out to the independent sector. The US network television 
initiated such a business model during the 1950s. The independent production moment occurred 
in Europe during the 1990s due to the privatization of public channels and the licensing of new 
commercial channels  
However, freelancing as a career does not have a long history in China. It only began in 
the early 2000s when the State stopped providing jobs for the college graduates. Until then, the 
social system, including house registration system (Hukou 户口) and social welfare system, was 
not designed to encourage freelancers. Instead, it had proven to be a barrier against self-
employment. For instance, Beijing is the center of the documentary industry, and people 
passionate about making a career in documentary gather here seeking jobs. But, under the current 
household registration system, it was hard for a freelancer to get a resident permit in Beijing 
without a proper Danwei. Without the resident permit, freelancers are not eligible to buy houses. 
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Their children are not accepted by most elementary schools unless they pay extra fees. As a 
result, most freelancers are unable to settle down permanently in Beijing. They come and go. 
Many freelancers were previous TV station employees. They thought that freelancing 
would allow them higher autonomy in self-expression. They are either self-employed or open a 
small company and take projects from various employers. However, the majority of documentary 
projects come from national or provincial TV stations. They find themselves in a harder 
situation. Firstly, they no longer have the rights of suggesting topics to the stations as they did 
before. In this sense, they have lower control over the content they are producing. They can only 
compete for the existing topics provided by the station. Secondly, freelancers are more 
vulnerable to censorship. When they were working in the station, middle-level managers like the 
producers or department directors would usually represent them to negotiate with higher ranked 
censors. But now, as outsourcing companies or freelancers, they have to treat the TV station as 
clients and meet their needs and requirements. Thirdly, freelancers usually give up the rights to 
copyright and yield the rights to share the profits. They are more alienated from work and lose 
connection with the final documentaries once the projects are over. 
Furthermore, streamlined contracts put freelancers in a vulnerable position. It is common 
for documentary workers to work on temporary projects with no contract. Freelancers lack the 
negotiating power to defend their rights in the contract. In a short-term project, employers intend 
to rely on verbal commitment or deal memos rather than a formal written contract. In a big and 
long-term project, usually, the commissioners provide a standard form contract, which protects 
mostly their own interests. Very few freelancers hire a lawyer to go through the contract and 
adjust agreement terms to protect themselves. If freelancers actually do that, get a reputation of 
being a difficult person, which may cost them further work opportunities. For the same reason, 
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when employers violate the contract or verbal agreement, most independent freelancers would 
have to accept the consequences instead of taking the matters to court. Do not go to law if you 
can help it. In addition, it is time-consuming and expensive to file a suit against a company or 
organization. These are additional costs that freelancers have to worry about. Guo, a senior 
documentary director, mentions his unpleasant collaboration with a big television network in his 
interview with me: 
 
Guo: I have worked in a big budget documentary series for two years. We 
agreed on the rate in the beginning. But the television started a new financial 
policy last year, and as a result, all ongoing projects were halted. We, the eight 
directors including me, only got half of the payment in the beginning. But for 
the rest, I have no idea when to expect. The situation of post-production 
companies is even worse. They have invested a lot but got nothing.  
 
Me: Did they sue the television station? 
 
Guo: No. They won’t. The station is their biggest client. They have many 
collaborations projects. Also, it is not that the project producers are not willing 
to pay. I believe they will if they can. It is the station’s new policy. The project 
staff can do nothing about it. (interview 23) 
 
Liang, a post-production director, had this to say: 
 
We care about long relationship. Usually, when the clients pay me less this 
time, they may pay me more in other bigger budget projects to make it even. 
But default in payment will definitely weaken their reputation. No one wants to 
work for you. That is the punishment. (interview 28) 
 
Added to above-mentioned risks, freelancers also have to struggle to fulfill the crucial 
tasks of securing work, self-promotion, training and skills development, invoicing and chasing 
payments, and the various tasks involved in maintaining a freelance career. 
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Multiple job holding 
Documentary making is not a career to make people rich. Documentary workers need to do other 
jobs, most of the times commercial projects of advertisement or feature films, to raise money for 
themselves and their family. Private jobs provide a higher compensation. They then use the 
money to subsidize the projects of their interests. It echoes with what Fast et al. (2016) called the 
hobbyist approach to the documentary. As a hobbyist, you do not make money from it. Instead, 
you invest in it. Gao Feng, the director of Central Newsreel Production Studio, states in the 
interview, “you have to do commercial work to raise yourself. Documentary making is like a 
hobby. You shall not expect to make a living with it” (Gao, interview, March 19, 2014). 
The flexible working schedule makes moonlighting possible. Documentary makers do 
not work on regular hours of nine to five. Some of them even need not show up in office most of 
the time. What they need to do is to finish the projects assigned to them. TV station employees 
are not supposed to take second jobs, but similar to most industries of China, there is a 
significant grey area where people can negotiate spaces for moonlighting. The managers 
(producers) show tacit understanding of their behaviors. Mao, the producer of a documentary 
program, states: 
 
My bottom line is that their outside jobs shall not affect their work in our 
danwei. If the program needs them, they need to be available without any 
hesitation. Based on this consensus, I will not punish the persons who take 
outside projects. I understand that they need more money for life, and I know 
they deserve more than they get now. (interview 8) 
 
Multitasking is another strategy to maximize job opportunities or improve work 
efficiency. To survive in an uncertain working environment, documentary filmmakers have to 
master different skills such as directing, photographing, editing, sound recording, or lightning, so 
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as to broaden the scope of work opportunities. One-man-band is widely seen in independent 
productions as a way to reduce costs, especially for longitudinal character-driven documentaries. 
Huo, an award winning director , usually works as the director, photographer, and editor of his 
own projects, with his wife working as a sound recordist. In this one-man-band way, Huo avoids 
extra investment in hiring additional crews and  maintains better control over the project.  
 
Networking sociality 
Freelancer documentary makers find it obligatory to socialize with peer documentary makers, 
commission producers, and potential sponsors. While the old generation of documentary with 
permanent status has carved up the territory of the documentary field, the younger generation is 
trying to connect with each other in social media in order to seize limited opportunities to survive 
in the commercialized market. They have to frequent film festivals, to get publicity and socialize 
with potential buyers. They also stay active in social media, responding to posts, sending 
birthday wishes, commenting on the new release of group members’ projects, and congratulating 
someone’s work getting awards. The documentary makers do it in the hope that people think of 
them when there are chances for new jobs. They are no longer proud artists or professionals 
waiting for new projects to fall on their laps. Instead, they have to continually look for new 
employment opportunities, potential buyers, and investors.  
Networking is the major source of employment information for documentary makers 
because cultural jobs need many extra functional skills, which are hard to tell with traditional 
recruitment methods. This informal network of recruitment of documentary talents has its root in 
the early 1990s. The documentary program Living Space recruited most of its employees through 
the friend networks of the founders. This has been mythologized as successful experience in 
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news coverage on the golden age of the media reform. Currently, a personal recommendation has 
been the major means of finding suitable talents for the documentary projects. For a short-term 
collaboration, it is hard to make the sound judgment on people's skills, aesthetic styles, and 
temperaments, which are core to the success of cultural productions.  
Only people familiar with both the quality of the people and the requirement of the 
projects can recommend the right ones. The recruitment posts in job finding websites did not 
bring good candidates. That is a waste of time and resources. Also, the recommender functions 
as a sponsor, guarantee the capability and reliability of the candidates. If the employee made 
troubles in the project, such as touching sensitive topics, the recommenders would have to take 
responsibility too. 
I observed the online interaction of a WeChat (a Chinese messenger) group that consists 
of 178 documentary makers for two years. The central conversations within the WeChat group 
are about sharing job opportunities. The social media network has worked as a non-standard 
form of recruitment. For example, On January 05, 2018, someone posted, “I am working in 
Shenzhen, can anyone recommend a local photographer?”  “Does anyone have contacts of the 
crews of Rhythm Earth? I want to talk about the business collaboration with them.”  
The organizer, Mu, is a documentary freelancer who has participated in several large-
budget television documentaries. He is the most active person and always posts recruitment 
advertisements:  
 
Looking for documentary directors. Totem China is looking for directors for 
individual episodes. Total of ten episodes, 45 minutes each. The project starts in 
April. Please forward this information to anyone interested.  (post by Mu, on Feb 
15, 2017) 
 
A friend is looking for a bilingual local production manager in Shanghai. A 
foreign crew is going to film in Shanghai for 11 days this April. Working duties 
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include coordinating interviews and one-day B-roll shooting in Shanghai Square. 
The candidate needs to speak fluent English. (crying emoji). (posted by Mu, on 
March 5, 2017) 
 
The person interested in the job will then message Yan asking for more details. The point 
of networking is not to keep track on the recruitment posts, but to get the personal 
recommendation of the person who posts. To do that, WeChat members spend time chatting, 
hoping to impress others with their capability or artistic tastes, acting as if they are in a labor 
market. 
Documentary festivals are the networking hubs. It is the market where people sell ideas by 
pitching to potential buyers and sell finished documentary films to international markets. Festival 
networking is not only time consuming, but also expensive. Attending a documentary festival, 
for instance, Guangzhou International Documentary festival, one needs to pay round tickets, 
registration fees, and hotels, which is at least 1000 dollars. Usually, it is hard to establish the 
relationship for the first time you met unless you are very successful documentary makers. 
People have to meet in different festivals in different countries or cities, and then build up the 
relationship. It is vital for young professionals to publicize their projects and to sell their projects 
in pitching sessions. I will discuss documentary festivals in details in the next chapter.  
A sense of community is central to documentary makers. The individual artistic 
entrepreneurs have to build up solidarity that has been destroyed by the media 
commercialization. Marita Svensson (2012) mentioned the importance of a “community” of 
investigative journalists sharing similar ideals and finding moral support, a sense of home, a 
shelter, and a spiritual home in shared ideals and struggles. This is more of an interpretative 
community rather than a clearly defined one. In the first month of my entry in the documentary 
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industry in 2004, one of my coworkers told me, “this is a lonely profession, and you would need 
friends.” 
 
Internship 
Apprenticeship is a traditionally employed method of educating new talents and socializing new 
members at television stations. In pre-modern Europe, skilled occupational training primarily 
took place through apprenticeships, and apprentices made up a substantial portion of the 
workforce (Paul, 1977). Apprentices were not only trained but also simultaneously incorporated 
in the production of goods. In some industries, people would serve a at least three-year 
apprenticeship with a master and in return gain a right to practice the craft they had been taught. 
It is also the case to use long apprenticeships in traditional Chinese film studios before the 
commercialization of media sectors. One has to work as a production assistant for two years and 
a camera operator for two years before working as an independent photography director. 
Documentary making, especially feature-length documentary, is also a complicated visual art 
form that practices long time apprenticeship.  
On the other hand, scholars also explored the exploitation of internship in journalism 
(Madison, 2014),  film and television production (Paterson, 2001; Gillian Ursell, 2000), 
advertisement (Gugerty, 2011), and computer game production (Nieborg & van der Graaf, 2008). 
The internship is a traditional way to lower the threshold for entry into an organization. Interns 
represent an essential part of what Murdock (2003) called the “reserve army” of cultural 
workers. Cultural firms now offload financial risks onto individuals. To be a cultural worker one 
must accept and adapt to intermittent employment, low wages, and precarity, drawing out the 
romanticized notion of suffering for one’s art into industrialized, highly capitalized cultural 
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industries (Miège, 1989; Ross, 2009). The investigation on the internship can reveal the secrets 
of free labor in the Chinese documentary. 
Most Chinese television stations provide an insufficient quota for the formal internship. 
As television stations ceased recruiting new employees through public employment, internship 
represents a lower threshold for entry into an organization. The competition for internship 
opportunities is increasing because as a result of the separation of production and broadcasting, 
television stations intend to recruit administrative staff, rather than creative persons. Mao, the 
producer of a weekly television documentary program, states: 
 
To be honest, our program does not need interns. We have been short of 
creative people and cannot put extra efforts into supervising them. Each intern 
here has strong recommenders in the back that we cannot reject. I told the 
employees in our program not to use them for trivia office work, like ordering 
food or cleaning offices. They came here to learn skills of documentary 
making, and we should teach them something that they could use in their future 
jobs. (interview 8) 
 
On the other hand, the fact that documentary making requires long apprenticeships 
prevents the interns from being promoted to official employees.  
 
It is almost impossible to find qualified employees from interns. They stay here 
for at most two months, but it takes years to cultivate a documentary director. I 
only promoted one from interns to official employees in the past ten years. She 
interned here in the third year of her college. After that, she went back school 
and made a documentary under the supervision of our experienced director. 
She came back to our program after graduation, taking some minor jobs, like 
directing a five minutes story for a larger project. Gradually, she became a 
qualified one. That is the only successful case. (interview 8)  
 
Social production companies, however, have substantial needs for interns. These profit-
oriented corporations always strive to maximize profits. Following this capitalistic logic, high 
profits correlate with low wages. Interns provide cheap, free and willing labors. The number of 
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projects fluctuates seasonally in these production companies, so they have to employ temporary 
workers for emerging projects. The young interns, although lacking experience in creative 
production, can still do supportive work, like doing research, contacting interviewees, etc. The 
apprentice is performing what Kathleen Kuehn and Thomas F. Corrigan (2013) have labeled 
“Hope labor,” i.e., work done for absolute little or for free in the hopes of getting a better-paid 
job later. An intern puts in extra unpaid hours in the hope of getting a permanent position. It is up 
to the interns to prove their worth to management. If the interns fail to create value, the 
employers have a good reason to terminate the internship. Thus, the risk is firmly put on the 
apprentice rather than the employers who can cherry-pick among competing hopefuls (2013). 
Scholars have coined the term “intern economy” (Frenette, 2015) to refer to the systematic 
exploitation of the interns as free labor. When you see on a recruitment advertisement that a 
cultural production company wants to recruit 20 interns, and the description of the work duties 
are almost the same as regular directors or post-production technicians, it is easy to figure out 
how they are going to treat the interns.  
However, there is still a need to consider the agency of the interns. They actively seek 
experience as a stepping-stone of the entry to this industry. The internship is part of their choice 
for self-interests and self-realization. The interviewees tend to consider the intern experience as a 
learning process. Li, an independent documentary director who once interned one year in a 
CCTV documentary program, says:  
 
It depends on how you think about it. I think I learned a lot from the internship. I 
got a chance to work with fantastic directors. They treated me well. I knew a 
little bit AIVD, so they used me as the second post-production editor. I benefit 
from the knowledge I learned there even today. I love to consider it as a training 
session. It is free. I don’t pay tuitions. I even get paid for it. Is there anything 
better than that? (interview 9)    
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Copyright 
Copyright is the exchange value of documentary products. Economists view copyright primarily 
as providing the economic incentive for creators to produce intellectual and artistic works 
(Bettig, 1996; Towse, 2002). What matters to companies is not the time and money spent on a  
project or the control over the labor process, but ownership over the final product, which can be 
re-published, re-licensed, and re-purposed, generating extra surplus value and lowering labor 
costs. Thereby, copyright is the domain where the exploitation takes place. 
First, neither television contracted workers or freelancers share the copyrights of 
documentary projects they produce. As Zhang Zhaowei (2002) described, documentary workers 
are like the OEM (original equipment manufacturer) home factories that manufacture or 
assemble cultural products according to the demands of the clients. Once they finish the 
production process, they have no connection with the final products, and thus do not share the 
profits generated by the brand effect, the reproduction, and redistribution. A telling case is A Bite 
of China, the most commercially successful documentary series in CCTV by so far. All the 
directors and photographers were freelancers, except Chen Xiaoqing, a senior employee of 
CCTV, who worked as the producer of the series. Ren Changzhen, the series director who built 
up the crews and organized the production, is widely seen as the real soul of the films. But when 
A Bite of China were broadcasted on CCTV and achieved the tremendous success in audience 
rate, it is Chen Xiaoqing, the representative from CCTV, that appeared in all the awarding 
ceremonies.  The name of Ren Changzhen was never mentioned in any awarding ceremonies or 
any media coverage of the enormous success. A Bite of China has turned to be the number one 
television documentary brand in China, which attracted 100 million yuan ($14.5 million) in 
advertisements for the second season and 210 million yuan ($30.5 million) for the third season. 
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However, Ren and his team have never shared any rights to the copyright or patent of the 
documentary series. Ren Changzhen states, “We want to participate in the huge success. We 
have never experienced that, and we have the rights to experience it.” (as cited in Unpublished 
inside stories, 2014). The extent of exploitation is cruel in the outsourcing production in cultural 
industries. According to the same article, Ren Changzheng got 70,000 yuan ($10,200) for 
directing an episode. But the value she created for the brand of A Bite of China is worth 200 
million yuan ($29 million).  
Secondly, Chinese television and documentary funds underprice the copyrights of 
documentaries. The copyrights of documentaries are cheap, and documentary practitioners are 
not getting proper compensations. A monopoly of state-owned television has limited the price of 
documentaries. In 2007, the cost of a television documentary was less than 100 yuan ($14.5) per 
minute. Today, the rate that television stations offer is about 2,000 yuan ($290) per minute, but 
the cost of production has increased to the maximum of 80,000 yuan ($11,600) per minute 
(Zhang, 2017)  
Documentary funds also exploit documentary makers by acquiring copyrights of the 
selected projects at a low price in the name of providing funds. CNEX (the short form of 
“Chinese Next” and “See Next”), the oldest NGO documentary fund in China, used to fund 
several independent documentary films each year. They provide the fund 50,000 yuan (around 
$7,250) to selected projects in exchange for the copyrights. The fund has provided crucial 
financial support for desperate independent filmmakers and has supported many influential in the 
past two decades. But the exploitation through copyright shall not be overlooked either.  
Thirdly, lack of protection of ideas turns people into volunteer labor. Copyrights protect 
expression and patents protect inventions, but neither protects ideas. In the brainstorm sessions 
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of pre-production, senior directors are invited to contribute their ideas and perspectives about 
how to explore the ideas of the projects. No one thinks that ideas are intellectual properties, and 
people just use the valuable suggestions without paying anything. Documentary filmmakers are 
not considered as professionals like lawyers or doctors, who charge for providing advice. 
Exploitation in copyright also demonstrated in free fan work. As smaller, cheaper and 
portable digital cameras became popular, documentary making has been an activity that 
everyone can participate. It blurs the line between producer and consumer. As Jenkins (1992) 
says, media fans are consumers who also produce, readers who also write, and spectators who 
also participate. The existing literature on fandom and the rising interest in fan labor market have 
investigated the amateurization of cultural production as a site of free labor (Fast et al., 2016; 
Sotamaa, 2007). Chinese documentary channels, production companies, and commercial video 
websites have actively promoted all sorts of Youth DV competitions and mini-documentary 
competitions, promising to broadcast the winning projects on television or video websites. A 
small amount of rewarding money could mobilize the amateurs from all over the country to 
produce documentaries enthusiastically. The fans' acceptance of free labor is something that 
media industry has learned to take advantage of in recent years (Fast, 2012; Jenkins, 2006).  
 
Conclusion: from documentary personae to neoliberal individuals 
From the above analysis of the development of the Chinese documentary and their current 
working conditions, we can see the pathway from documentary personae to a neoliberal 
individual. What is the impact of the precaritization of documentary production on production 
values? And how does it affect the autonomy of the cultural workers?  
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Previous generations of documentary makers learned and polished their skills on the job 
over years of accumulated experiences. In the Danwei, the steady employment relations with a 
commitment between the employer and the employees allow documentary makers to develop the 
spirit of crafts. They take pride in the documentary career, witnessing and recording the 
transition of the society, speaking for the voiceless ordinary people, and promoting social 
responsibility.  
However, the transformed production environment has a detrimental effect on the spirit 
of craftsmanship, and instead, it promotes the mentality of neoliberal individuals. The emerging 
attitudes that dominate the Chinese documentary industry emphasize commercialism, 
competition, flexibility, and self-entrepreneurs. It is the worker’s responsibility to develop skills 
and to meet the requirement of the fast-changing production environments. It is natural for the 
company to fire the workers if they cannot adapt themselves quickly enough. A capable and 
enterprising person should have found a better place in the market, opened their own companies, 
or worked for themselves. Only the incapable persons are still staying in the television stations 
where traditional bureaucratic values and socialist propaganda streamline still dominate.  
Contrary to the popular imagination, independent documentary workers have experienced 
a higher level of precariousness. They invest an enormous amount of time and energy in 
maintaining a steady flow of work, through networking and socializing (Paterson, 2001). As 
such, the traditional values and skills of documentary production are being replaced by those of 
the entrepreneurs seeking market opportunities.  
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CHAPTER 4 
IDEOLOGICAL FACTORY: BECOMING AN IDEOLOGICAL WORKER 
 
 
The institution (tizhi) means the ideological bondage. Those who quit the official TV jobs 
do not automatically regain freedom of mind. Many of them are now chasing awards or 
money. They can’t go back to the beginners’ mind. The hope is in the new generation. 
They haven’t worked within the official system. They make documentaries for self-
expression, not for broadcasting. They are the future of the industry.  
— Guo, interview 23 
 
A factory is a site where laboring and exploitation happen in industrial society. In post-
Fordist society, a factory has extended its exclusive domain to the whole of society. The concept 
of “social factory” (Gill & Pratt, 2008) or a factory without walls, refers to a situation where the 
production and reproduction relationship have spread into all sorts of venues including schools, 
modern artistic offices, or even homes.  
 State-owned television stations in China function as ideological factories with the 
documentary film being one of its elite product lines. These TV documentaries have consistently 
staged and celebrated the national heritage, national achievements, traditional cultures, and 
heroes of the country. Very few documentary programs cover contemporary issues in daily life 
or launch any kind of critique of state policies. The True Story, a weekly documentary program 
of China Central Television (CCTV), is an exception to this rule.  From 2000 to 20010, The True 
Story has produced a total of over five hundred 45-minute documentaries. It sought to both fulfill 
the propaganda functions of the state on the one hand, and express alternative ideas and monitor 
the government on the other. Thus, it turns documentary production itself into both an act of 
reinforcing state dominance as well as articulately resisting it.  
Therefore, investigation of this particular documentary program, The True Story, will 
provide valuable information about ways in which the ideology factory operates, the lives and 
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experiences of cultural workers, and ways they react to political and economic pressure. The data 
in this chapter comes from my in-depth interviews with ten cultural workers from 2014-2017. It 
relies on my personal experience working on The True Story program from 2004-2006 and 
documents the production manuals, the program list, the author notes for each of the 
documentaries, and the media interviews that workers have given over those years.   
In this chapter, I first introduce the workplace of documentary workers, and the routine 
lives they have lived, juxtaposed with idealized narratives of the lives of cultural workers. I then 
explore why and how documentary workers enter the industry, and the politics governing the 
inclusion and exclusion of documentary programs in general.  I also investigate how cultural 
workers learn to work, as both red socialist ideological comrades and creative laborers under the 
market system, and what success means to them. In the last part, I explore how cultural workers 
exit the TV documentary industry, for what reasons, and what kind of strategies they utilize to 
cope with their situations.   For the sake of preserving the anonymity of workers who are still in 
the process of production, I do not identify the individuals who are sources of the quotes. 
 
The True Story and the documentary production line 
China follows the Soviet policy regarding media, under which all the media are state-owned, and 
the Central Publicity Department, formerly known as the Central Propaganda Department, takes 
responsibility for all media. China Central TV is the only national TV station. 
Depending on the definition of TV documentary, in a narrower sense, CCTV only had 
two documentary programs from 2000 to 2011, before the launch of the documentary channel; 
one was The True Story in the news center, and the other was called Documentary in the science 
and education center. Why did they need this documentary production line? In Chapter 2, I 
indicated that CCTV began to experiment with new television forms and employment relations 
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in the 1990s. The news magazine TV program Oriental Space, as I discussed there, was an 
example of such experimentation. Lin Xudong, a documentary expert and consultant for Living 
Space, states: 
 
Documentary programs like Living Space were supposed to be affiliated with the science 
and education department of CCTV because it charges in documentary production. The 
news commentary department should be focusing on investigative journalism. But it is 
hard to tell the difference... Living Space was not initially planned a documentary 
program, but a program teaching people common sense knowledge for daily life. (Lin, 
interview, July 25, 2014) 
 
Later, when contracted documentary filmmakers like Jiang Yue made a short 
documentary, Mysterious Three Heroes in 1993, the current realistic style was gradually taking 
shape. It started to focus on stories of ordinary people, and Living Space became a TV column 
showcasing mini-documentaries about people’s lives. The unexpected popularity contributed to 
the status of Living Space as a classic TV documentary form. It produced eight-minute, character 
driven mini-documentaries every day from 1993 to 2000.  
However, the audience gradually got tired of repeated themes and similar story plots in 
the series. In 2000, Living Space launched its weekend version, The True Story, which produced 
and broadcasted 20-minute, and later 45-minutes, documentaries.  
 
Entering the industry  
It is hard to depict the lives of the Chinese documentary workers, because there are a variety of 
experiences and lifestyles, depending on their backgrounds, work types, regions, and genders. 
Lacking statistical data poses another challenge to a labor study such as this one. The only 
available statistics show that there were 988 documentary makers in all the provincial TV 
stations in 2010, among which three documentary channels employed 330 (Shanghai 150; 
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Hunan, 80; China Education TV 3, 100) (He, 2011). This group of people played a vital role in 
producing ideological products, but we have only some vague ideas about their lives. How did 
they live, what did they think, and how did they react to the changing media industry?  In this 
chapter, I would like to use a CCTV documentary program, The True Story, as the topic for a 
case study, to illustrate the dynamics of the work and lives of TV documentary workers. 
 
A career trajectory approach 
Tracing a documentary maker's career trajectory is a common strategy in reconstructing the lived 
experience of cultural workers. The trajectories are highly particular, depending on the workers' 
positions in the cultural domain, their social and educational backgrounds, and the goals they 
want to achieve. Many documentary maker interviewees for this project entered this industry not 
because of passion for documentary work, but because of desire for a television job. Many of 
them “have a clear goal of finding television work” (Mu, interview 37), and for them 
“documentary was an unexpected thing” (Han, interview13). Mao, a senior documentary director 
at CCTV documentary channel, having entered the industry in late 1993, states, “I never heard of 
the term ‘documentary’ at college. Our producer, who later was dubbed the ‘Godfather of the 
Chinese TV documentaries,’ didn't know what ‘documentary’ meant either. It was a new concept 
then” (interview 8). 
Others took the job because of love for audio-visual expression. Compared to the 
fictional film industry, documentary is a much less expensive and convenient form of self-
expression. It does not need a big budget or a large-sized crew. It does not need scripts either. 
Director Fen spoke demonstratively about her creative drive as a documentary maker: 
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I love audio-visual arts. Documentary is one of them, an easy and inexpensive one. So, I 
did it. Fictional films are very industrial and expensive, costing at least millions of 
dollars. I would not even think about it. Documentary making allows personal 
expression. You only need a mobile phone, and everyone can engage in this self-
expression. (interview 34) 
 
Documentary production at The True Story rarely recruits fresh graduates, so many of the 
filmmakers had previous work experience in video production sectors. They consider 
documentary making as a way of personal expression. Director Mu states the appeal of 
documentary work to him:  
 
I was an advertising director for 12 years. That job made me sick, due to endless 
meetings with clients. I had to try my best to beautify their product, even when it was 
dogshit. I was tired. So, I switched to documentary work. At least now I don’t need to 
socialize with people, except the interviewees. (interview 37) 
 
For others, documentary making is merely a job. Documentary director and photographer, Li, 
states:  
 
Li: I have no other option. I have no firm recommendations, nor money. It is so hard to 
get a job on The True Story. I produced a short documentary at school, which received an 
award in The True Story’s competition. Then, I got an opportunity to intern there. 
 
Me: Have you thought about documentary making as a vocation? 
 
Li: No. When a person with nothing to his name finds a path, he will grasp his only 
choice. Documentary making for me is a way of making a living. I have no plans, no 
goals. No, nothing. (interview 19)  
 
While many interviewees mention their pragmatic attitude towards TV documentary 
work, some expressed the reason why they refused to enter this industry or exited this industry 
after a while. Huo, an awarding winning director who worked for national media for ten years, 
notes: 
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A filmmaker with an independent character will not enter the TV documentary industry. 
Think about independent documentary filmmakers, like Hu Jie, Zhao Liang, and others. It 
is hard to imagine that they work on a mainstream television documentary project. I 
watched the documentary series Peking Opera, by Kang Jianning and Jiang Yue. I was 
shocked by their schizophrenia. The pioneers of the independent Chinese documentary 
have degraded their craft to endorse and promote dominant ideology through their 
cultural product. It is a shame. They should leave this industry. (interview 4) 
 
In the neoliberal economy, employers prefer ready-to-use labor and tend to pass the bulk 
of training and social welfare to individuals. The door is closed to the cultural worker 
“wannabes.”  Internships, no matter how long, will not get newcomers a permanent position in 
the television documentary industry. The workers accumulate experience project by project, and 
gradually polish skills by themselves. In a competitive commercial environment, the calculation 
of cost-profit correlations for employers will naturally skew towards hiring experienced labor.   
The precarious nature of documentary work is obvious when compared to what happened 
in the old socialist system, in which a fresh college graduate was assigned to a job of which 
he/she had no prior knowledge. Back then, he/she had the time needed for personal growth, 
chances for making mistakes, and space for self-exploration in any occupation. 
 
The appeal of documentary making  
One needs to ask two questions: Why does the documentary industry hold such fascination for 
young people? And which forms of cultural or social capital do they value and seek? 
TV documentaries have been considered the pearl of the news commentary department of 
CCTV.  There are several reasons for this from the point of view of workers. First, work in the 
documentary field comes with more autonomy in comparison with other television forms. The 
directors can develop ideas according to their interests. The TV station provides funding, time, 
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and other resources to support their full expression. They can spend a long time on self-initiated 
topics. For example, ecological problems, social stratification issues, and the impact of new 
technologies on society are topics of current interest. The lure of autonomous creation is 
immensely appealing to the workers. 
Second, documentaries have more extended value than instantly consumed television 
news products, which disappear in the flow of news information. A film offers analysis and 
expression whose value, if it resonates with history, increases as time goes by. Moreover, 
documentaries travel further than news. Besides screenings on television, documentaries are also 
screened at domestic and international film festivals and circulated in the form of DVDs or 
books. Also, some documentaries produced by The True Story directors inspire fictional films. 
For example, Li Yang's film Blind Mountain (2007) was inspired by a documentary from The 
True Story, which tells a story about a young, female college graduate being drugged, kidnapped 
and sold as a bride to a villager in China's Shaanxi province.  
Third, documentaries are one of the most comprehensive forms of TV arts. Making a 
documentary requires a full set of visual-audio skills. Documentary filmmakers possess the most 
comprehensive capabilities in video production, like developing ideas, shooting, directing, sound 
recording and editing. At TV stations, documentary makers are usually considered “masters” of 
TV production and staff members look up to them.   
 
Prejudice in selection 
The process of recruiting new members reveals the practices of inclusion and exclusion that 
underlies the documentary industry. While some groups of people can access opportunities for 
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documentary jobs, others cannot. From the selection criteria and process, we can see prejudice 
towards specific groups of cultural workers in the documentary industry. 
The interviewees mentioned that video production skills are the top concern of 
employers. The industry tends to rank capability and personality above educational backgrounds.  
Director Wu states, “The criteria are straightforward. Can you do it? Stay if you can and leave if 
not” (interview 25). Director Fu mentions the same experience:  
 
All the newcomers must show Mr. Chen their films. If he thinks it is OK, then he will 
keep you. He will then start to torture you. For my first film, I made seven revisions. I 
was driven crazy. Ten minutes, seven editions. Can you imagine? Editing was not digital 
at that time. I had to reshoot from the beginning for every revision. I got sick of it. I asked 
him if I could let go of that project and make a new one. (interview 7) 
 
When recalling the educational backgrounds of the 40 members of her team, the former 
producer of The True Story states:  
 
There is not a clear pattern in the educational backgrounds of the documentary makers I 
have recruited. Chinese higher education is not successful, so graduates do not 
necessarily fit the jobs in their major. I personally don't use people from film schools. 
They are obsessed with light, frames, and equipment. But the most challenging task 
during documentary shooting is to take good shots in an unprepared state. Workers have 
to make decisions every second. (interview 8) 
 
Besides educational background, other factors like gender also factor into the unequal 
treatment of newcomers to the profession. The directorial team of The True Story has a 
somewhat balanced gender composition. There are seven female directors and nine male 
directors. Its executive management is primarily female. Both the producer and the chief director 
are female. In the media industry, it is a common saying, “use women as if they are men, and use 
men as if they are oxen.” However, this neglects to acknowledge the domestic labor of women, 
who still have more responsibility as far as domestic labor is concerned. Female directors are less 
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likely to do the post-production at night, which is a notorious habit of documentary people. 
Director Guan, a 45-year-old director who left CCTV to work in a production house making 
commercial and customized documentaries, says:  
 
Working overnight brings more harm to women than to men. This industry is tough and 
unfair to women. I once worked overnight for five consecutive days. I have been doing 
that for each of my projects. You see, my body has been ruined. You can look at other 
female coworkers. They are the same. Now, I insist on not working at night. My boss 
gave me a name, “Honeysuckle.” Why? Because it thrives in full sun and sleeps after the 
sunset. I don't care. Why should I sacrifice my body for making those streamline 
documentary products? I already finished my duties by working during the day. 
Microsoft even forbids employees to work overtime by locking the office. (interview 6)  
 
While the job of documentary director is for both males and females, the photographer 
has been a muscular vocation in China. Female photographers are very rarely seen. Producer 
Zhao states:  
 
The first time I went to the Amsterdam documentary festival in 2006, I was surprised to 
see so many female photographers. They are as strong and as big as guys. Physical 
disadvantages seem not a problem for them. I have never seen a female photographer in 
the Chinese documentary industry. Maybe there are some in the film industry, because 
directors of photography in fiction film do not need to operate the heavy cameras. 
(interview 21) 
 
However, when equipment becomes light and portable, especially when SLR cameras 
like Canon 5D (950g) and Sony a7r (625g) became the mainstream models for documentary 
filming, documentary photography opened its doors to women. Digital advancement is reducing 
exclusions that have previously been based on gender.  
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Sustaining status 
Learning censorship 
The newcomers entered the editing room with passion and excitement, and soon they found the 
idealism and professionalism taught at college classrooms unfit in the real workplace. Chinese 
TV stations take a Grierson view of documentary, using it in the service of the government. For 
John Grierson, “Propaganda is education…We are medicine men hired to mastermind. We are 
giving every individual a living conception of the community which he has the privilege to 
serve”(Grierson & Hardy, 1966). The mold waiting for the new members ahead is to become a 
propaganda worker, producing the symbolic product that represents the state as a totalized and 
unified nation with a bright future. TV stations need and encourage a particular type of 
creativity, that is, to make the documentaries appear not to propagandize. 
When asked how and when they learned to practice censorship, some interviewees 
mentioned the weekly meeting in which the leaders of the TV station would explicitly announce 
the guidelines for the coverage plan, including what to cover and what cannot be covered. But 
actually, they could feel the influence of censorship in every step of the production process. 
Director Guo reflexively analyzed his own attitude towards the internalized self-censorship:  
 
You spent one month on a documentary, but it did not pass the review because of some 
ridiculous reasons. You love your work, and you want it to be on TV. Then gradually you 
learned survival skills. You had to learn both how to express yourself, and how to pass 
the censorship tests.... It was a natural process. For any young people who want to go 
upward, they must learn these things by themselves, unless they do not want to succeed 
in this society. TV stations and documentary productions are just a microcosm of the 
society. Self-censorship is a necessary skill for success in the society. (interview 23)  
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Some documentary makers prize their autonomy and actively challenge censorship by 
covering semi-sensitive topics or adding subtle messages into their films. Director Lu, who left 
the industry ten years ago, notes: 
 
In my time, it was glory if one’s documentary got censored. It was like a badge for the 
courage of the director to touch upon sensitive areas. However, the author still feel 
frustrated because after so many sleepless nights, the audience can’t watch their work. In 
addition, he will not get paid. (interview 40)  
 
Censors are not entirely the Other. They come out of the ranks of filmmakers. The senior 
director will tell newcomers his understanding of the rules, the producer will do the first review, 
and she/her is the first censor. 
 
What do you want?   
This is a speech that documentary director Chen Xiaoqin delivered at the 2015 China Academy 
awards for Documentary Films: 
 
I remember how poor we were when we started making documentaries. What has 
supported us for so many years? I can describe it in one term, ‘passion.' Now, passion 
also has a price tag. I remember a story happened at Living Space, of the News 
Commentary Department in the early 1990s. The team was talking about whether a bonus 
should be distributed to each director as other programs did. The directors of other 
programs have saved enough money to buy an apartment in a suburb of Beijing. But the 
directors of Living Space, the directors with documentary dreams, were upset and left the 
meeting, leaving word with the producer, “we are not working here for stinky money! We 
are here for our documentary dream!” (applause) However, times have changed. How 
much are documentary dreams worth? Can they carry us through our whole documentary 
career?  (He, 2016) 
 
Poverty has been accepted as normal by documentary practitioners. None of the 
documentary makers who completed interviews considered making money as their primary goal. 
As Bourdieu (1996) observed about the perceived autonomy of cultural production, it stemmed 
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from the apparent contradiction that fundamental economic rules of capitalism were upheld or 
even reversed in the restricted production field. Rather than value those who made the most 
money, for example those working in mass entertainment, the arts granted high status to the high 
arts.  In other words, creatives look for recognition from peers, rather than from the masses. In 
fact, economic success in some way contaminates the purity of the pursuit of cultural or 
symbolic capital, embodied in tangibles and intangibles, such as reputations, awards, skills, or 
experiences. Director Guan says, “my goal is to make documentaries of self-expression and films 
with social meaning. Also, I hope the job can feed me.” Guan’s husband is a screenwriter, living 
an even more precarious life than hers. She expresses her concern about her documentary career:  
 
I must survive first. In any case, making a documentary film is not the ultimate goal. My 
goal is self-improvement. I learned things from the lives of the interviewees and the 
production process. I had a meaningful life and I made useful films. That’s good for me. I 
don't want to make streamline rubbish. Totally meaningless, right? You throw it away 
when it is finished, and don't even look at it yourself. Why should I waste my life doing 
that? (interview 6)  
 
Capitalism produces poverty to prevent resistance. When a person is held up with the 
burden of making a living, he/she is less likely to utilize documentary as a way of resistance to 
the system. In addition, censorship also limits the autonomy of artistic creation. Some of the 
cultural workers realized that their dream of self-expression was impossible to realize within the 
TV system: 
 
I don’t wanna be a TV director, a director in the system (tizhinei), but a successful 
international director. I’m not talking about winning awards at international festivals, 
which is not feasible at this stage, but becoming a director with global vision. TV has its 
propaganda duties. I want to step out of the propaganda framework to make 
documentaries that record real lives of people and investigate real social problems. 
(interview 23) 
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Proletarianization of documentary workers has made documentary making not a perfect 
option for a lifelong career. Many workers began to exit the system to look for other futures. 
 
Exiting the streamline  
Precarious work is contingent, temporary, seasonal, or project-based work. It is not sustainable. 
At some point, documentary workers have to think about ways to exit the profession. The lack of 
upward mobility prevents senior workers from staying. They cannot enter middle-level 
management. Moreover, in the neoliberal market of China, people always like new stuff, new 
ways of storytelling, new cameras, new lights, and new sound effects. 
New technologies also erode the authority of senior workers. Self-training becomes 
harder with age. They do not operate as well as young people on the SLR camera, aerial filming, 
the GoPro, or the Final Cut Pro, and no longer provide the best, latest, and most efficient 
resolution. In the meantime, their salaries decrease. Salary levels in the whole industry remain 
static while housing prices have increased tenfold in the last ten years. 
On the other hand, many young people believe in individualistic success stories and take 
risks for flexibility. They have grown up in a neoliberal environment and are willing to work for 
free or low pay just for the experience. This large "reserve army” of labor has lowered salaries 
and social welfare of older cultural workers.  
Li, the producer of a crime program, states, "I am about 40 now. It is the age to do 
managing jobs. I cannot hold the camera and do front-line filming anymore. I can think bigger 
and have more perspective. There is no way to get promoted, so I have to leave” (interview 19).  
The True Story has gone through several revisions in 2008 and been renamed 
Documenting in 2009 and Baixin Stories in 2010. It gradually transformed, from a realistic 
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documentary program into a regular news program. Documentary workers have had to decide on 
their future. Is TV documentary work in China sustainable? Can the practitioners do it all their 
life? If not, what is the exit mechanism and what strategies they will choose?  
The True Story had 30 directors, cameramen and post-production technicians, among 
whom seven have stayed, while five have switched to other TV programs, and 11 quit their jobs 
at CCTV. Among the people who resigned from CCTV, two worked as independent directors 
and now work on their own film projects; three established a studio producing social media 
videos and VR videos; four joined social production houses and freelance on temporary projects; 
and two went into graduate school.  The cameramen and post-production technicians did not 
switch jobs because they would do the same jobs elsewhere as well. For them, it makes better 
sense to say in a more prominent company to retain full workloads.  
In this section, I try to analyze the position-taking strategies applied by these 
documentary filmmakers to survive or succeed in the industry. 
 
Going international  
Some documentarians started to pursue careers as critical documentary filmmakers who 
investigate social issues and send their films to global film festivals. Fan Lixin, who had worked 
on The True Story in 2005 and 2006, is one of them.  
In the past ten years, Fan's documentary film Last Train Home has been one of the most 
influential documentary films, winning 24 international awards and getting permission from the 
Chinese government to screen in Chinese theatres. In China, most critical documentaries were 
underground. Many internationally awarded documentaries have been banned in China for not 
going through the censorship tests of the government or getting permission to attend foreign film 
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festivals. Fan’s success in both the critical documentary community and official state system 
makes him a good case for tracing the necessary strategies for making a career through 
international recognition.  
We shall account for Fan's success not just by attributing it to his personal qualities, but 
also consider broader structural factors that helped make it possible. First, his training in the 
national television system made him implicitly aware of rules of censorship and how to 
maneuver through them. Unwritten rules of censorship can only be learned during daily 
operations – you learn while initiating topics, working on-site during shoots, and editing. 
Censorship is detrimental to creativity, but it is not the reason to not pursue creativity. Instead, it 
calls upon filmmakers to respond creatively, to devise ingenious ways to survive in the system.  
An unstated method of categorizing operates among filmmakers. Topics are categorized 
into three zones, according to their risk of being censored. The first is the red zone, i.e., the 
strictly forbidden topics, including religion, homosexuality, ethnic minorities. The filmmakers 
must be very careful in this category. The second one is a green zone, where the State allows or 
encourages topics such as sports, entertainment, and economic issues. In between is the gray 
zone, where topics are somewhat sensitive but can still be touched upon if the filmmakers can 
find the right perspective and not explicitly challenge the social system or the regime. Recent 
independent documentaries are increasingly located in the green and gray zones. Fan’s Last 
Train Home portrays the lives of rural-to-urban migrant workers in the context of globalization 
and deals with intergenerational conflicts in the family. This is a safe topic. It is not celebratory 
of, nor does it challenge existing power relations in China. The earliest version of the film was 
broadcast on The True Story on CCTV in 2005.  This sensitivity to censorship helps Fan reach a 
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balance between the demands of TV broadcasting in China and the demands of international film 
festivals.  
The second factor in Fan’s success is his experience of working on global productions. 
Fan has worked as coordinator and gaffer on the Canadian documentary project Up to the 
Yangtze (Yung Chang, 2017), produced by the Canadian production company Eyereal. Eyereal 
also co-produced Fan’s film. The post-production is in Canada and the U.S. Thereby, the way 
Fan conceptualizes topics and organizes production, fundraising, and distribution is very 
international.  
The third factor is Fan’s language ability and communication skills. Fan is an English 
major, and he speaks fluent English. He can speak impromptu and take questions from the 
audience in English during global screenings of his films, including at prestigious festivals like 
Sundance and Amsterdam. He has given interviews in perfect English on CNN and other 
mainstream Western media. The accumulation of his media coverage from both domestic and 
international sources has built up his substantial cultural capital. 
This case illustrates several factors contributing to the success of a director in the global 
market: finely trained professional skills, state television background, English speaking ability 
and international connections.  
 
Surviving in the market: the dark forest self-rescue plan 
Very few people go to the top of the industry, and their success is a complex interaction between 
position, habits, and their position taking strategies. However, many documentary makers are 
struggling within the commercialized market. They try to find a way of adapting from the TV 
production mode to the independent production mode.  
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Some cultural workers were forced to leave jobs at TV stations and pushed unprepared 
into the market. Many documentary makers left CCTV in 2007 because of the new labor law that 
was passed on June 29, 2007 and took effect in January 2008. The new law sought "to specify 
rights and responsibilities of management and labor, protect labor's rights, develop harmonious 
labor relations" and to tilt the labor-management system toward workers (Chang & Qiu, 2011, 
pp. 43–47). It specifically required firms to give workers open-ended contracts if "the employee 
has been working for the employer for ten consecutive years, or where a labor contract was 
concluded as a fixed-term labor contract on two consecutive occasions or if a written contract is 
not concluded where it should be” (Becker & Elfstrom, 2010). The new law strikes many media 
organizations, because many of them apply casual employment, and a large number of workers 
do not have written contracts. The law’s stated aim is to protect the workers, but it ends up 
ruining the lives of many workers.  
As a reaction to the new law, CCTV fired almost all temporary workers to avoid an open-
ended contract. There is not a precise number of sacked workers. CCTV said the number is 1800, 
but media estimated that it is over 4000 (Cheng, 2007). Half of the workers on the documentary 
program The True Story had no contract, although many of them had worked there for many 
years. The workers were told that because of the policy change of the TV station, they had to 
leave. 
The cruelty of employers has made workers feel betrayed. Many workers are highly 
educated, with master's degrees from the best colleges in China. They came for opportunities to 
make documentaries and gave up written contracts and social welfare. But now, they know that 
when there is an iceberg ahead, they will be the first group of passengers who are thrown into the 
water.  This is a case of asymmetrical relationships between temporary workers and permanent 
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managers. Precarious work includes not only low pay, longer working time, no social welfare, no 
pensions, no contracts, but also the possibility of being sacrificed in the interests of employers.  
Guan is one of the sacked workers. By 2007, she had worked in the documentary 
program for seven years. She had a law degree and was working in a law company before joining 
a documentary program. She sued the TV station and got a settlement fee of 200,000 yuan 
($29,000). This firing was a severe blow, effectively ending her documentary career. CCTV was 
and still is the biggest player in the documentary industry that most production houses rely on for 
commissioning workers on their projects. 
Guan has responded with a plan, which she named “dark forest self-rescue plan,” and she 
kept diaries about it. The core of the plan was to build up a career as a modern entrepreneurial 
artist.  The first step, according to her plan, was going back to school to attend a two-year 
program on screenwriting. To be a cultural worker, one needs various types of cultural and social 
capital, like skills, certifications, and networks. A college education can provide all of them. A 
degree from a film college functions as a stepping stone for entering the industry. Classmates 
plan to join the industry in the future and provide mutual support to each other. Professors in 
communications at universities and film colleges are especially essential resources. They 
cultivate generations of students, many who occupy central positions in the industry. Some of the 
professors work informally in the social network. Guan had to invest 200,000 yuan ($29,000) in 
self-improvement and get ready to work as an entrepreneur for herself in the cultural 
marketplace.  
After film academy studies, she started taking documentary projects. There, she felt 
driven into slave labor:  
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I know that I am belabored in both places. But at least, in The True Story, I was 
pleasantly belabored, and here, I feel like I'm living in a nightmare. No one cares about 
the quality of the program. Cost control is their most important concern. People work 
fast, with low pay, like rats in cages. They heavily rely on commission projects. The 
production model is very vulnerable. (interview 6)  
 
 In her dark forest self-rescue plan, Guan invests economic capital in the hopes of shoring 
up social, cultural, and symbolic capital. In the “resume building” race in cultural industries, 
symbolic capital, like awards, honors or box office, is the hard currency that brings job 
opportunities. Only self-entrepreneurs can survive in the neoliberal market.  
  
Future-oriented entrepreneurs: switch to the new platform 
New technologies have restructured the organization of documentary production. Online video 
sharing platforms such as Youku, Tencent, and Iqiyi have emerged as crucial players in the 
documentary market. They have replaced TV stations as ideal employers of documentary 
makers, according to the 2017 annual report on the industry (He, 2017). These multinational 
companies, listed in the New York stock market, represent a new production mode, a new invest-
profit model, and a new management style in the documentary industry. Initially, their 
documentary channels functioned as platforms for video sharing and distribution. They bought 
copyrighted documentaries and promoted them online for click-through-rates and advertising. 
But as copyright law tightened up online content, these companies started to produce their own 
films.  
In this context, some of the CCTV documentary talents joined the online platforms as 
high-level managers. For instance, the manager of Youku’s realistic video production 
department, Yu Hongmiao, used to be chief director of a CCTV documentary program. The 
director of Tencent’s documentary center, Zhu Lexian, used to be the producer of CCTV’s 
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blockbuster The Bite of China 2. The extensive work experience at CCTV has cultivated their 
professional judgment and built up their production network. They can easily find the right 
filmmakers for outsourced projects. For instance, Youku has a long-term relationship with Fan 
Jian, a director from The True Story, and has invested in and produced his awarding-winning 
documentary film Still Tomorrow in 2015. In Tencent, Zhu has invited his old partner, Chen 
Xiaoqing, director of The Bite of China 1 and 2, to produce a food series. To some extent, the 
video-sharing companies have become significant players in documentary production and 
distribution in this field. 
New technologies also foster new opportunities for the development of the industry. Two 
directors of The True Story have established their own companies and produce videos for social 
media platforms, include WeChat, Weibo and Youku. One of them started making VR videos 
and opened VR theatres across the country.  
 
Journalism ideals: the last soldiers in the field 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, many documentary makers started their TV 
documentary careers because of the potential for getting a TV job, not because they were 
specifically interested in documentary. Thus, it was natural for some of them to switch positions 
within TV. For instance, two of The True Story directors went to work on Focus Stories, which is 
an investigative reporting program, and another director went to a crime reporting program, 
which analyzes crime cases by visual restaging.  
These documentary directors are more likely to consider themselves journalists and take 
social responsibility and truth-seeking as primary career goals.  For them, it is a step forward, 
rather than the opposite, to join Focus Reporting, because it is the most prominent watchdog 
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program aiming to find hidden evidence of wrongdoings. It investigates corruption, scandals, 
financial crises, and other wrongdoings to assist and watch local governments and warn against 
disorder. Like other TV documentary programs, it requires advanced analytic and storytelling 
skills. 
Education plays a critical role in this career trajectory. All three of these cultural workers 
graduated with degrees in journalism. Their education in journalism predisposes them to stay 
with an influential television station. Qiu, one of the three documentary makers, states:   
 
We must survive at TV stations. They are platforms, battlefields. I am not sure if we are 
making art or doing journalism, but I must stay on the battlefield. If we survive here, 
there is hope, hope to convey some message to viewers. We must live with censorship 
and keep working as watchdogs, as we did in previous documentary programs. Quitting 
is easy. I can find a job with better pay and better benefits. But I doubt that my successors 
would defend journalistic ideals and documentary values as I did. (interview 3)  
 
Working and surviving censorship in the Chinese media system requires a high degree of 
proficiency in production skills and a skilled sensitivity towards censorship. People with less 
experience are more likely to practice self-censoring and circumvent sensitive topics. 
Experienced filmmakers and journalists can approach issues from a smart perspective that may 
pass censorship. The first producer of The True Story once said that any topic could be covered 
when you find the right perspective, and the mission of TV documentary makers is to explore the 
censorship scale and find more space for expression. As Bai Yansong, a renowned host and 
producer at the news commentary department of CCTV, expressed in an interview:  
 
The censorship department will never publish an official document stating publicly that 
some sensitive topics can be covered now. It is always a bottom-up game. You make the 
documentary first. If the censors let it pass, then it is fine. Next time, your co-workers 
know they can keep going on this topic or perspective. (as cited in Liu, 2013)  
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It is always a cat-and-mouse game in the Chinese media industry, and cultural workers 
who choose to stay must struggle and creatively expand the space for autonomous journalistic 
practice. 
 
Conclusion 
TV documentary is work that combines both journalism and film arts. Cultural workers enter the 
industry with different imaginations and goals. They are motivated by the pleasure of visual 
expression, the ideals of journalism, the aura of cinema, or the need to make a living.  These 
different goals lead them to different trajectories.  
This chapter provides a case study of cultural workers on a documentary program at the 
national TV station of China, illustrating the lives and feelings of the cultural workers in an 
“ideological factory.” The flexible nature of labor now conditions their terms of employment. 
The so-called younger, ready-to-work workers and those with strong personal recommendations 
have better chances of entering this program. Once they become part of the team, new members 
go through a process of socialization. They learn ideological parameters and unspoken rules of 
censorship through daily work, including compulsory weekly meetings and intensive reviews of 
their documentary work by producers, department directors, and TV station directors. 
Precarious work is not sustainable for the individual worker. Consequently, cultural 
workers must think about exiting the system as they find that the work cannot be a life-long 
vocation. Some of them seek cultural capital in the international documentary market. Others 
reinvent themselves into self-employed entrepreneurs and struggle to survive in a more 
precarious market.  Others embrace new business opportunities and new platforms brought on by 
digital technologies. Still, a group of workers chooses to stay in national television to fight for 
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more discursive space and protect their journalistic ideals.  In the next chapter, I will discuss the 
lives of cultural workers who enter global documentary production.  
101 
CHAPTER 5 
GLOBAL DOCUMENTARY: MOBILE PRODUCTION, LOCAL LABOR 
 
A co-production with the Americans…usually turns out to be another U.S. film shot on 
location. 
— Gaumont, Variety, 1994, quoted in Miller, 2001 
 
As the national documentary labor market of China turns increasingly precarious, 
characterized by the insecurity, marginalization, and deterioration of working conditions, it has 
driven some creative workers to the international film market in search for a way to continue 
making their films. The global market, however, is not a paradise for autonomous artistic 
creation. Instead, global capitalism, represented in the documentary sector by multinational 
companies like Discovery and National Geographic Channel, has aggressively explored the 
cheap labor and broad market of developing countries for higher profits. As Miller (2001) states 
in Global Hollywood 2, when the advanced capitalist countries moved onto the global stage, new 
forms of labor were institutionalized. Chinese documentary workers, disembedded from the local 
production system, are increasingly integrated into this global production line.   On the one hand, 
global funds and awards provide incentives to individual filmmakers seeking alternative ways of 
documentary production.  On the other hand, they mask the exploitation and the alienation 
imposed upon Chinese cultural workers by global capital. 
Miller’s International Division of Creative Labor (IDCL) is a U.S-centered model. It 
focuses on the role Hollywood capital plays in this global production network. However, it does 
not account for the lives and subjectivities of the cultural workers in the peripherical countries, 
like China. What is the impact of the IDCL upon their lives? What are their attitudes? Are they 
embracing or resisting it?  
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The Chinese government, on the other hand, is seeking to introduce its culture and 
promote its soft power internationally. Soft power, a concept coined by Joseph Nye (1990, 
2004), refers to the ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce and use force. In view of the 
role that Hollywood films and American documentaries play in spreading American cultures and 
values, the Chinese government realizes that documentary, with its claim of objectivity and 
authenticity, can be a powerful way of introducing the Chinese culture to the world. For the last 
ten years, “telling Chinese stories with international appeal” has been the main theme of the 
development of the Chinese documentary industry.  
How will Chinese documentary workers react to the push and pull of pressure from 
global markets?  How will they restructure and redesign the labor process? How do they cross 
barriers of language, culture, time zones, censorship systems, and intellectual property laws to 
embed themselves into this global network? This chapter will address these questions by 
examining emerging forms of labor practice among Chinese documentary workers within the 
context of the globalization.  
 
Global hegemony and the Chinese documentary market 
Rather than a cultural and economic activity on a national scale, documentary making has 
become a much more global production. There are two approaches to bridging the gap between 
Chinese documentaries and Western ones. The first is the American mode of TV documentary, 
represented by the Discovery Channel and the National Geographic Channel. They have 
occupied a large global documentary market with their Hollywood style storytelling, fast-paced 
editing and science or wildlife focus which is presented along Hollywood codes of glossy 
production, slick edits, and easily consumable narratives.  The other is the European 
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documentary tradition, represented by documentary festivals and documentary markets such as 
in Amsterdam, Berlin, Sunnyside, and so on. Film festivals started in Europe in the 1930s 
because of the need to counteract the domination of Hollywood-style films. 
 
Documentary trade 
How does the globalization of the labor process take place? Miller (2001) proposes a model for 
analyzing the global film industry by dividing the world into three international foundations. 
They include, first, a world center such as Hollywood, second, intermediate zones nearby of 
secondary importance (Western Europe, North America and Australia), and third, outlying 
regions of labor subordinate to the center (the rest of the world). He argues that it is difficult for 
cultural products from the periphery to make their way into the center as imports. His arguments 
are supported by statistics concerning China’s documentary trade in the 2010s.  
China imported many documentaries from Europe and the United States but could only 
export very few of its products overseas. According to statistics from the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, from 2011 to 2015 the number of imported documentaries increases from 
36.8, to 59.8, to 92.7, and 74.9 million yuan (renminbi, the Chinese currency, equal to 5.3, 8.7 
and 10.9 million dollars), while the exports decreased from 18.3 to 9 million yuan (2.7 and 1.3 
million dollars). The deficit in China’s balance of documentary trade has increased 37.39% from 
18.5 to 65.9 million yuan (2.7 and 9.6 million dollars). Also, the prices for imported 
documentaries range from 10,000 to 40,000 yuan (1,450 and 5,800 dollars), while very few 
exported documentaries are higher than 10,000 yuan ($1,450).   
Europe is the primary market for documentary imports, about 1000 hours per year. 
America is the principal market for exported Chinese documentaries. The average exported 
104 
documentaries are 967 hours in the past five years with a price of 4,000 yuan ($580)/hour at 
average, far lower than the price of the imported documentaries from America (Zhou, 2017). The 
Chinese documentary industry relies heavily on the European and American markets. Sixty 
percent of the imported documentaries come from these two markets, while sixty percent of the 
exported documentaries go to the American market, eighty percent of which go to the United 
States (Zhou, 2017).  
The trade deficit in the Chinese documentary industry indicates an asymmetrical cultural 
influence. There is a gap between China and the U.S. in every aspect of documentary production, 
in terms of storytelling, artistic aesthetics, values, equipment, experience, management, and 
budget size. 
The documentary markets in the U.S and Europe has existed for a century. The 
production, distribution, and consumption of TV documentaries have become increasingly 
industrial. The western markets have made a clear set of rules, which China, as a late player, 
needs to learn from the beginning. Chinese documentary workers are learning the narrative 
structures, video storytelling techniques, and marketing strategies before playing as equals in a 
game with existing western competitors.  
On the other hand, most Chinese documentaries focus on local Chinese history, culture 
and heritage, which are not familiar to Western audiences. In recent years, the CCTV (China 
Central Television) documentary channel began producing so-called ‘blue-chip’ documentaries, 
which focus on universal topics about human beings, wildlife and adventure. The ‘blue-chips’ 
also encourage cross-border filming to explore diversified topics, scenes and cultures. They try 
to avoid controversial, ideological elements but rather focus on shared concerns about the lives 
of human beings and the planet they co-reside on with other species.  
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Learning to labor for multinational companies 
Cultural industries are about tastes, and western documentaries have dominated tastes 
internationally through a variety of methods.  In development meetings on documentary projects, 
films such as Planet Earth (BBC, 2006), Braka (Ron Fricke, 1993), or Civilizations (BBC, 1969) 
are often cited as models for new projects. The goal is to create a film that does not seem as if it 
has been made in China.   
Multinational companies, like Discovery channel have been active in the Chinese market 
since the early 2000s. However, Discovery cannot operate its own channel and get subscriber 
fees and advertising because of a government policy that forbids foreign companies from 
providing TV services in China. Discovery can only sell its contents through agencies to Chinese 
TV stations, a practice which does not generate much profit. 
The multinational companies, however, will not stop seeking continued expansion. They 
search for new areas of expansion in human life and space, seek out new sources of raw 
materials and new markets (Luxemburg, 2003), as well as new places to invest surplus in, or 
“sites of accumulation” (Harvey, 2005), and new supplies of labor (Froebel, Heinrichs, & Krey, 
1977; Huws, 2007b, 2014). In the documentary industry, the Chinese market has many of these 
resources. 
Discovery soon switched strategies and considered China not only as a market but also as 
a production base (Liu, 2009). China has rich sources of stories and topics that can be developed, 
translated and manufactured into documentaries and sold on the global market. It is, as far as the 
West is concerned, still a mysterious land that is undergoing rapid changes. More importantly, 
China has a large number of cheap documentary workers. In the early 2000s, the production fee 
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for a 30-minute documentary was about 50,000 yuan ($7,250), less than one-tenth of the 
standard American fee. 
Since 2002, Discovery partnered with Chinese TV stations to hold an annual national 
selection for documentary film directors in China, first titled “New Directors Plan,” then updated 
to “Outstanding Directors Plan,” and “Elite Directors Plan.” The competition attempted to find 
local talent, who could co-produce documentaries with the Discovery network. The Discovery 
Network Asia-Pacific decides on a theme and calls for proposals from TV directors, independent 
directors, and college students. Each year, 12 projects are selected and placed on a short list. The 
directors then receive a two-day extensive training on idea development, scriptwriting, shooting 
and editing. After that, five projects are placed on a final list. Each of the projects start 
production under the supervision of a senior producer from Discovery. 
Discovery has specific rules about documentary making. For European documentaries, 
one can tell the names of the directors from their styles. But for Discovery documentaries, you 
can’t tell the names of the directors, but you can tell they are Discovery documentaries.  
Discovery documentaries are made for a “surfing,” “glocal” cable audience (Yang, 2014). 
They must have both local flavor and global appeal. It is vital to balance between stories and 
information, as well as factual content and entertainment value. Also, all Discovery 
documentaries must be re-edited and revised into different versions for different markets.  
The network also has a specific standard for storytelling. They adapted skills of 
storytelling and editing from drama and movies into documentary storytelling, including a 
sensational opening, bringing out the theme in the first 3 minutes, and presenting a small conflict 
every several minutes. 
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This win-win idea gives young directors a chance to learn and make their dream come 
true; for Discovery, it is an economical and effective way to gather ideas and sources. For each 
proposal, Discovery spends $25,000, so they spend less than $200,000 for six projects (Liu, 
2009). As a return, they get six projects and trained, sophisticated, creative talents. They also 
build up a pool of potential directors. Through the competition, Discovery promotes its 
philosophy of documentary making and improves the brand in China. 
Many of the documentaries produced this way have won awards at international festivals. 
The directors also signed contracts with and produced documentaries for Discovery Asia Pacific. 
For example, Zhao Liang, winner of the 2004 competition, directed Confucius Food (2005), and 
Kong Linghe (2005) for Discovery Asian Pacific channel in the next year.  
The Discovery channel reproduced its taste and ideology in China by cultivating local 
filmmakers. Controlling the knowledge that is valued, sanctioned and rewarded within the 
system, Discovery has created a group of documentary makers with a distinct culture, and has 
stratified documentary workers. Discovery directors soon became elite filmmakers in China and 
spread Discovery values to other filmmakers. After several years, Discovery production rules 
and procedures have been studied and practiced by most documentary makers in China’s 
national TV stations. Ping, the producer of a documentary program on CCTV, states: 
 
We started learning the Discovery style in 2004. We studied the editing techniques used 
on Hollywood films, analyzed the audience ratings and used extensive background 
music. We wanted to make documentaries that would be pleasant to watch. (interview 
35) 
 
In addition to reproducing their production style, Chinese documentary funders and 
charity organizations have imitated the Discovery model to hold competitions. As mentioned in 
chapter 3, CNEX, a non-profitable fund cooperatively implemented by Chinese managers from 
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Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, has held similar annual competitions. It solicits entries 
in the Greater China area and provides 50,000 yuan ($7,250) to each of the finalists, in exchange 
for the copyrights to the final documentaries. 
The globalization of the Chinese documentary industry also encourages the importing of 
international talent. To make documentaries with international appeal, the TV stations started to 
collaborate with international producers, directors, photographers. The expats are also invited to 
work as juries for film festivals, hold master classes, or work as consultants. For instance, French 
film editor Matthieu Laclau edited Jia Zhangke, Fan Jian and Xu Bing's award-winning 
documentary films. Also, the blockbuster film A Bite of China 3 (CCTV, 2017) used Dutch 
photographer Reinout Steenhuizen. Chinese Life Style (CCTV, 2015) used Iranian editor 
Bahman Kiarostami, whose father is the renowned film director Abbas Kiarostami. 
In addition, China also brought western festivals and markets to China. The modern 
documentary festival is more of a documentary market than an award ceremony. It provides a 
platform, bringing together all broadcasters and filmmakers.  Cultural producers look for 
potential investors or buyers for their films, proposals and ideas in the market. In 2014, the 
annual French fest, "Sunny Side of the Doc," set its sights on Chengdu, China, bringing over 600 
documentary producers, directors, distributors and executives to the trade fair. Gao Feng, the 
director of Central Newsreel Group, states:  
 
China documentary industry is big. But it is only big in documentary consumption, not 
in production. Bringing in the French documentary festival help our filmmakers get 
familiar with the rules of international documentary trade, because not many filmmakers 
have the opportunities to go abroad to attend international documentary festivals. (Gao, 
interview, March 19, 2014) 
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Overall, Chinese documentary makers are increasingly integrated into a global assembly 
line of documentary financing, production and distribution professionals. 
 
Financing and the pitching system   
Pitching is a new practice of fundraising for documentary projects in development and early 
stages of production, whose producers and directors are looking for funding from broadcasters, 
distributors, and other funders. The filmmakers each have a fifteen-minute slot. In that slot, they 
have seven minutes to present, or pitch their ideas. That includes any clip(s) that they want to 
show. After that, there are eight minutes for questions from the decision makers on the floor. If 
people go over your 8-minute time limit, they have less time to get valuable feedback from 
decision makers. Also, there are one-to-one meetings organized with some decision makers to 
follow the discussion.  
The pitching sessions train Chinese documentary makers in effectively using speaking 
methods for the forums that take place around the world to enable producers to talk about their 
projects. 
The process of pitching is a process of self-commodification. The filmmakers must 
package their ideas and present them in ways different nationalities can understand. The decision 
makers come from different cultures and background, and the pitchers need to make them 
believe that their projects are worth the money they claim. Each selling point will be discussed. 
An Australia filmmaker describes the commercial atmosphere of the film market in China like 
this:  
 
The infrastructure in the commercial world is not set up to be able to invest in this kind 
of content easily. They want to invest in it, but where you can sit down and apply a set 
of rules to a television program that says: if we get 1.5 million viewers, then we can 
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charge a cost per thousand for advertising of AUD$100. We are going to get AUD$150 
thousand for a prime-time ad, bingo. (as quoted in Meiklejohn, 2017)) 
 
Usually, only topics of global interest are appealing to the buyers. Documentary 
filmmakers can send projects on a variety of issues, but the ones being accepted share some 
qualities. The so-called ‘global documentaries’ have some formulas. The western audience is not 
interested in cultures and histories that require a lot of background knowledge. They want stories 
they can understand. 
Pitching means extra work for Chinese documentary makers. First all, it is a job utterly 
different from filmmaking. It largely involves business skills. Tian, a senior documentary maker, 
states:  
 
I had to learn a new vocabulary like copyright, distribution fee, pre-sale, grant. All these 
words are nonexistent in my previous world. Also, I have to tell the difference between a 
commissioning editor, an executive producer, and a broadcaster. When I worked for 
CCTV, I didn’t need to think about these things. I studied Russian when I was young. It 
is even harder for me to participate in the communication with English speakers. 
(interview 31) 
 
It is rare for filmmakers to find one crucial foundation, which is going to write one fat 
check to cover all the expenses. The filmmakers must attend different festivals and pitching 
conferences repeatedly. The fundraising activities are embedded into the whole filmmaking 
process, including production, post-production and distribution. While workers are hard-pressed 
to meet deadlines, they must compete with hungry filmmakers for a limited amount of funds. 
This necessity is a significant distracting factor. 
When award-winning, independent filmmaker Fan Jian produced his documentary, the 
funding process was as time-consuming as the production itself. To make the documentary, he 
had to pitch for a pre-sale deal of about 50,000-100,000 US dollars with the largest Japanese TV 
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network, NHK. The process involved a lot of energy. There were many rounds of business 
negotiations back and forth through emails. He also had to report on the progress of the project 
regularly. He only got the funding after half a year, which was already one of the fastest possible 
results for such a process. Documentary filmmakers wishing to take this pathway must secure 
plenty of investors to get the project off the ground.  
Unfortunately, not many filmmakers succeed in obtaining a pre-sale or co-production 
deal. Even if they do, many deals still fall short of their proposed budget. They have to rely on 
their savings and persuade teammates to work for free, promising to pay them more once the 
film is finished and if, luckily, there are profits left. During the production process, creative 
workers do not take any salaries, essentially turning their labor into a financial investment in the 
project whose returns may or may not come back. 
 
Global co-production 
Ursula Huws (2007b) argues that, in the new international division of creative labor, jobs migrate 
seamlessly from continent to continent over the internet in an incessant search for the best skills 
at the cheapest price. In a parallel and contrary motion, multitudes of desperate workers, 
disembedded from the economies in which they grew up, travel the world in search of a 
livelihood. 
When the professionalization of the industry arrives at a certain level, the increasingly 
standardized skills and competencies will enable most ambitious documentary projects to look 
for talent with a global scope. 
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Nomadic production  
The labor process has been reconfigured and redesigned to fit mobile production practices for 
global documentaries. A production team on a global documentary project consists of members 
from various countries and regions. It also films across countries and continents. For instance, a 
good case here is the documentary series A Book a City, in which I worked as the series director 
from 2015 to 2016. The documentary was commissioned by a Chinese TV station. It filmed in 16 
different cities. The crews were recruited globally. The core creatives, including directors, 
directors of photography and writers, came from Beijing (China), Hong Kong (China), the U.S., 
and Hamburger (Germany). It also required local labor for below-the-line work, including local 
fixers, sound recorders, production assistants, interpreters and drivers. All the people gathered in 
the city where filming took place worked together for a short period. After the project, they left 
for home, waiting for the next task in another city. This nomadic production style has 
restructured labor relations. 
 
A 24/7 production line  
New technology has transformed the nature of documentary making and made possible the 
‘seamlessness' in organizing the work across spatial and cultural divides. Documentary making is 
no longer a location-sensitive practice. Miller argues that "Labour-market slackness, increased 
profits and developments in global transportation and communications technology have 
diminished the need for co-location of these factors, depressing labor costs and deskilling 
workers" (Miller, 2001, p. 127). Global talent has replaced local labor in important positions on 
the creative team. But what happens in practice when the work of documentary production is re-
structured? What are the interactions among individuals, institutions and global forces? 
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Global collaboration comes with its own sense of temporality and spatiality. The work 
can be distributed to people in different locations and different time zones so that at any time at 
least one person is working. This is a twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week (24/7) non-
stop production line.  I am going to use my own remote collaborative project, A Book A City, as a 
case study to explain the virtual production line. 
As the director, based in the U.S., I had to remotely direct the team filming in Germany, 
while at the same time, supervise the post-production in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong editor 
Liang could only do the editing at night. He usually finished the work at 5 or 6 in the morning. 
He sent the offline version to me, then took a 20-minute nap. He had a full day job that day. At 
night, when Liang went back to the office at about 9 pm, he had already gotten comments from 
me. Then, he spent the night making another revision. The same thing repeated several times. 
On the other side of the world, I spent the whole day preparing detailed comments. I had 
to go over all the footage to find the exact shots and write down the timeline code. It took a long 
time. After sending out the comments, I had to have a Skype video conference with the German 
production team to talk about the shooting plan. 
The German production team consisted of a Hong Kong photographer, a German location 
manager, and a Chinese presenter. They had no time to recover from the jet lag and started 
working in the early morning to make good use of the light at sunrise. They could only get off 
work after sunset, usually after 10 pm in the summertime. Then, a video conference started.  
Once the German production team finished an interview, it would upload the audio file to 
a cloud service. In half an hour, a translator from Chongqing, China would download and start to 
transcribe it. In three hours, the director in the U.S. would get the full transcripts and then be able 
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to decide on the stories and B-rolls and make a shooting plan for the next day. The German 
production team would receive the director’s plan when they got up at 5 am. 
It was like a never stopping machine. No one in the team could stop. The situation lasted 
about two months, until all eight episodes were broadcast on the TV stations. I wrote in the field 
notes: 
 
I am so worried that Liang can’t last long if he doesn’t get enough sleep. He is too busy. 
He is doing several projects simultaneously and has slept for only one or two hours for 
four consecutive days. If he gets sick, we are all dead. Too much work accounts on him. 
(Fieldnotes, October 5, 2014) 
 
Liang said in the phone meeting about the editing, “My wife threatened to throw my 
computers to the streets because I have slept in the office for a week”. 
The new technologies, especially instant messaging, have turned workers into part of a 
non-stop, 24-7 streamline. They offered both opportunities and uncertainties. The intensified 
work pace brought on by global collaboration has profound implications for workers’ stress 
levels and emotional well-being. 
Not only the core creatives, but also the below-the-line workers in the global network of 
documentary production and distribution are more likely to experience exploitation. Their 
working conditions could be worse. Translators and subtitle graphics editors are two of them. As 
mentioned above, China imported 342 hours of documentaries in 2014. Among them, the 
company in which I have done participant observation imported three U.S. documentary series, a 
total of around 90 hours. I oversaw this project. The main task was to translate the English 
scripts into Chinese, subtitle them in the films, and send them to a national television station. The 
schedule was very tight. The company formed three subtitle groups, mostly college students. It 
also outsourced part of the work to an established documentary subtitle group. The computer lab 
115 
was in a film and television technical school. There were three computers, and each computer 
could subtitle two episodes each day. This capacity meant that the translators had to finish 
translating at least six episodes per day. It was a very challenging mission as most translators 
needed two or three days to finish translating one article, and another half day to proofread the 
translation. 
When the invisible machine starts, it cannot stop. No people in this streamline can take a 
break. In the field notes on April 16, 2014, I wrote:  
 
It is no fun to translate in such a tight schedule. I am just like a robot. It is like a 
streamline that will not stop. We need to put coal into the stove every day. We are 
feeding the machines with our flesh and minds. (Fieldnote, April 16, 2014). 
 
One of the student translators expressed the frustration in the interview: 
 
I had nightmares every day. The translating is always behind schedule. I visited the 
computer lab where the young kids were adding subtitles. They were teenagers, and they 
look so tired. They looked like having worked overnight. They barely understood 
English, so it took long for them to put the Chinese subtitles in the right place. I felt 
sorry for them. For myself too. We were the same. We were laborers working at 
different links of the same production chain. As long as the computers were working, 
they had to work, and I had to provide the subtitle texts for them. We could not take a 
break. We could only rest when the computers were out of condition. I understood then 
why the factory workers destroyed machines in the old days. I just wanted to stop the 
constant running streamline and have a sound sleep. I could have escaped but I promised 
the producer to finish it. I didn't want to disappoint him. (interview 12)  
 
As Miller (2005) suggests, the above-the-line workers lie within the critical sector of 
budgets and includes supposedly proactive workers, such as writers and producers, while the 
below-the-line workers, including reactive workers, or proletarians, such as production 
assistants, interns and gaffers, are more likely to be impacted when the budget is limited.  
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In the co-production project in China, the above-the-line workers are more likely to provide 
contingent employment to foreigners, because they are more familiar with the so-called 
international tastes, aesthetics and visual grammars of documentary films. The positions of 
director of photography, director of post-production and special effects director were more likely 
to be taken by foreigners, as western workers have higher skills in these areas. However, the 
directors were rarely foreigners. Directors are the soul of a project, author of symbolic products, 
and they need to be familiar with the guidance of the State and guarantee the political correctness 
of the themes. 
 
Alienation of co-production 
The "floating factories" documentary production mode is very different from the traditional 
production organization style, which is from the 1990s, as illustrated in chapter 4. At that time, 
documentary making was mainly produced in weekly TV programs. A program usually had 
about 20-30 employees, mainly directors and photographers. They shared offices where they 
held meetings to review each other’s films. They shared editing rooms. A production team 
consisted of two people, the director, who also worked as the editor in the post-production phase, 
and the photographer who was also responsible for recording sound.  For some teams, when the 
director came from a photography background, he/she could finish all the work by him/herself, 
from scripting and shooting to recording and editing. In this way, the author had good control 
over the final product.  
The transition of the production organization has been the result of the industrialization 
of documentary making. It has been what Ursula (2007a) called the "module." Once the work has 
been divided into task pieces, then each part could be outsourced to different companies, which 
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theoretically could be in any country, if the communication among each module was well 
coordinated. 
The new division of labor in the documentary has alienated the workers from the final 
product.  Workers, engaged in the tasks of the small pieces in the chain, have been deprived of 
the whole picture of the project. As Millers (2001) says in Global Hollywood, "Work may be 
subject to the local, national, regional and international fetishization of each component, 
matching the way that the labor undertaken is itself largely fetishized away from the final text" 
(p. 114). The projects rely on the supply of experienced freelancers with standardized skills. 
They need to have the mentality to work without knowing the whole picture of the project. Chao, 
a renowned filmmaker participating in a big budget global production, notes:  
 
It is a global blockbuster. A collaboration of directors from different countries. I am 
making Chinese Stories. I have no idea what other directors do and what the final film 
will look like. I can only focus on my part, a small part. Although it is a good experience 
of participating in the global production. I feel like a worker in the Dongguan assembly 
line. (interview 22)  
 
This alienation takes place not only between the workers and the product but also among 
the workers themselves. The workers in different task modules come from different cultures, 
nations, and speak different languages. Their lives have no intersections with each other.  It is 
hard to develop a feeling of camaraderie or collegiality, which was referred to by most 
interviewees as the most significant wealth they got from work. Also, as professionals who 
receive a daily wage, they must focus on each other's jobs. The collective, communal work of 
documentary making has become isolated. The solidarity of the team has been eroded. 
Documentary maker Lu expressed the nostalgia towards the old time: 
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My photographers are in Germany, and one of the producers is French. I don't know 
their background and have no cues about their tastes and philosophy. It is hard to 
communicate about the subtle understandings of the story, the characters, and scenes, 
light. We have different working habits too. I used to work with a stable team. We have 
been working together for about ten years. We got the same training, had shared 
philosophies, and stayed in the same office. I liked the sense of working as a team. 
(interview 40)  
 
The international filmmakers from the place with advance film production culture have 
skills and professional attitudes. Also, they physically embody the "international" appearance of 
the team and will be emphasized in the media coverage of the projects. For example, in A Bite of 
China 3 (CCTV, 2017), the Dutch DOP (director of photography) and Taiwanese director had 
been reported on intensively, to highlight the international makeup of the team. It is fashionable, 
and a guarantee of high quality. The cultural industry gradually turns into a colony, where the 
creatives come from the cultural center. The U.S., the U. K., European countries, or even Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, have been portrayed as having mastery of the "higher" skills. They know what 
to do, they know what sells, and they know how to achieve goals. As a result, they earn very 
high pay compared to local cultural workers. The asymmetry in international and domestic 
workers has been striking. 
 
Distribution of profits  
The co-productions have brought about a new idea of copyright. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
most documentary workers did not think about copyright, as TV employees were employed to 
work and get a monthly salary, so they did not share in any copyright. The contracted workers 
were paid for their labor and would not share the copyright either. However, in the international 
documentary market, copyright is all people care about. All the business negotiations and trade 
are centered on the copyrights. For instance, when a pitch project won the first prize in the 
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CCTV pitching competition in 2014, CCTV wanted to buy all the copyrights in exchange for 
investing 120,000 yuan ($17,400). However, the producer’s budget was 5 million yuan (about 
$725,000). She consequently sold the distribution rights in Europe and North America and 
negotiated with potential buyers about the distribution rights in Asian area. One needs to invest 
about 1 million yuan (about $145,000) to get the distribution rights in one area. However, for 
Chinese organizations like CCTV, they still think that a documentary project costs only 100,000 
or 200,000 yuan (around $14,500 and 29,000), which has been the market rate in China for about 
a decade.  
In the 1990s, CNEX, a non-profitable documentary fund, started a pitching conference, 
and it usually results in investments in the selected project of 80,000 yuan (around $11,600) with 
all the copyright.  Documentary director Huo states:  
 
There is a pyramid. Some people at the top, while some others at the bottom. The young 
documentary professionals who want to enter this industry have to experience severe 
exploitation. For example, the Shanghai MIDA (Magnolia International Documentary 
Awards) would buy all your copyrights with 80, 000 yuan (around $11,600). When I 
was in my starting phase, I had to accept it. The young people who wanted to make 
something of their own has to take it too. Unless you are very established documentary 
makers and  have substantial bargaining power. The young people in their 20s, no way. 
You have to accept it. Then they become the ones exploited. (interview 4) 
  
The commissioning editors are more straightforward, and more streamlined in terms of 
budgetary, editorial and licensing negotiations. Many channels, particularly in the USA, insist on 
taking all the rights to a program so they can transmit and exploit it as they like. This 
exploitation can extend to worldwide transmission through their international network without 
having to pay the filmmaker additional licensing fees. The producer is effectively employed on a 
work-for-hire basis. They are given the budget to make the program, from which they keep a 10-
15% production fee.  
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Copyright is the only thing that can be traded in the market. Another interviewer talks 
about the importance of copyright: “Copyright is like you have bought a house. You owned it. 
Distribution right is like a rented apartment, you can use it but do not own it” (interview 26). The 
secrets of the cultural industry or the precariousness in the Chinese cultural industry lie in that 
the documentary workers do not share in the copyright. Only capital owns the copyrights. 
Almost all the interviewees consider it reasonable and take it for granted. “It is normal. You did 
not invest money in the project, so it is natural that you do not share the copyright,” says investor 
Jiang during the interview (interview16).   
However, in Canada, contracted creative workers share the copyright.  In Taiwan, the 
documentary worker Gird has proposed to the public TV stations, that for commissioned 
projects, once a documentary has been broadcast three times on TV, its copyright should 
automatically be returned to the creators. They can decide to whom to sell the distribution rights. 
The latest exploitation of cultural workers lies in the deprivation of a share of the copyrights for 
cultural workers. Thus, the workers are separated from the product permanently. As Nicole 
Cohen (2012) has noted, the capitalist production of cultural products, especially the video 
product, has changed, as the reproduction phase has replaced the production phase as the phase 
that generates the most significant portion of the profits. 
The lack of copyright has raised problems for the development of the market. The Art 
Film Cinema Line, a government-sponsored agency aiming to promote art films and 
documentaries, has contracted over 300 cinemas all over the country that are willing to screen art 
films and documentaries. However, a staff of the Art Film Cinema Line expressed the frustration 
of being unable to find enough films because of the copyrights:  
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Most independent films do not have a clear copyright. Some do not have a copyright 
contract at all. Some had several investors but cannot find all of them now. We cannot 
screen the films without clear copyright. What a shame. (interview 32) 
 
Social control  
The emerging of the blockbuster, blue-chip global documentaries have reinforced the social 
control of the Chinese government. When the budget concentrates on a few big-budget projects, 
it is easier for the censorship department to control. For instance, in the True Story, the creative 
team will propose about 40 topics with nearly 3 million yuan ($ 435,000), and some of them may 
deal with the sensitive social phenomenon. The censors must carefully find the message hidden 
in every word and every frame of the videos. There is still some space to negotiate for self-
expression. But now, a blue-chip documentary costs about 10 million yuan ($1.5 million). 
Because of the vast influence it may generate, only high-ranking officials can decide on the 
topics and perspectives of the big-budget production. The filmmakers are degraded in favor of 
the executive teams. All creative workers participate in is executing the project. Also, the blue-
chip documentaries not only reduce political risks but also have substantial potential for business 
rewards.   
Also, the state-owned TV stations have played essential roles in the international 
documentary festivals and compressed the space for independent documentary makers and 
alternative voices. Previously, Guangzhou international documentary festival has acted as the 
only platform for domestic independent filmmakers looking for funding and meeting 
international commissioning editors and producers, but now it has become more and more 
“official.” Among the 30 shortlisted projects for the “International Pitching Forum,” quite a few 
are submitted by directors at CCTV 10 – Science and Education Channel, or Chinese corporate 
production companies affiliated with governmental agencies, like CICC (Intercontinental 
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Communication Center). Tianqi Yu (2014) argues that such projects with more “official” content 
were carefully chosen by the judiciary committee before pitching to avoid sensitive issues being 
exposed on such an international platform.  
 
Conclusion: new labor practice in the global documentary production 
While some TV documentary workers consider global production as an alternative path for 
achieving autonomous creation, it acts as another site of laboring and exploitation.  
The international division of creative labor represents an asymmetric power relation between the 
cultural center and periphery. The U.S. and Europe have exported not only documentary 
products but also values and standards about the documentary to China.  
They have turned China into a documentary production base. The multinational 
companies like Discovery and National Geographic Channel, and the global film festivals and 
funds like Sundance, have used Chinese topics and the cheap labor to produce global products. 
To assist the transportation of the documentary product when crossing borders, they set up a set 
of standards for the global commodities and instilled them into the heads of the Chinese 
filmmakers through pitching or co-production.  
In the production process of blue-chip, global co-productions, Chinese cultural workers 
experience new forms of laboring and alienation. Guerrilla-style mobile production practices 
have alienated workers from each other and prevented solidarity of workers. Also, the production 
process taking place across temporally and spatially remote boundaries increased the length and 
the intensity of the work.   
The autonomy of cultural workers further decreases as the government seeks control of 
documentary festivals and blue-chip documentaries. Through promoting global co-production 
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and blue-chip documentaries, China’s state ideological department has achieved its goal of 
extending soft power to the global market. In addition, the TV stations have gained economic 
rewards by advertising and increasing overseas copyright sales. Considering this situation, 
researchers may ask, how can Chinese society protect the autonomy of documentary filmmakers 
in this era of capitalist globalization?  I take this up in my concluding chapter.   
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: RESISTANCE AND SOLIDARITY 
 
The goal of this study is to contribute to the latest debate on the nature of labor in cultural 
work by investigating the life and work experienced by the documentary makers in post-socialist 
China, and seek potential ways to change them.  
I began with a short review of my intervention in the debate on creative labor. I then 
investigated the various forms of resistance that cultural workers have used to contest neoliberal 
working conditions. In the end, I would like to discuss the normative aspects of documentary 
work: what kind of cultural work is good work, and what the study can contribute to disrupting 
the precarious working condition of the cultural workers in the documentary world of China. 
In Chapter 2, we saw the historical development of the employment system in the 
Chinese documentary industry, under which TV documentary makers, within a generation, 
moved from state officials with an "iron bowl" to precarious workers relying on temporary, 
contracted-based projects. Freelancing and a commissioning system have gradually replaced 
state-owned production studio as the main way of organizing production and distribution of TV 
documentaries. Temporary work and flexible employment have since then been a systematic way 
capital uses to cut costs and maximize profits. Only when people understand the sense of job 
security guaranteed by the “danwei” and “bianzhi” system in the socialist system, can they 
understand the local meanings of the current "precarity." The withering of the socialist planned 
economy and the expansion of neoliberalism set up the context for us to understand the 
"precarity with Chinese characteristics." 
While cultural workers enthusiastically believe in autonomous creation and self-
realization, many of them are unaware of the systematic exploitation and suppression they have 
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experienced. In Chapter 3, I examined the precarious working conditions of the documentary 
makers. The co-existence of both planned and market employment systems establish a strict 
pyramid hierarchy among cultural workers. Compared to the old workers who were employed in 
the old system, the new workers are inferior in promotion opportunities, salary, social welfare, 
working hours, and many other aspects of lives. Also, the cultural workers performed various 
forms of precarious practices like the internship, freelancing, moonlighting, and obligatory 
networking. In addition, the cultural workers are authors without copyright. Copyright has been 
the core site of exploitation in media industries. Neither TV employees or freelancers share 
copyrights of the product they produced. Without copyright, the cultural workers are constrained 
in the role of wage labor selling physical and mental labor in hours or in pieces. They are 
deprived of the rights to share long-term profits from the reproduction and distribution. The 
highly competitive, unprotected, and social Darwinist working condition has formed the 
neoliberal personae of the documentary makers. 
TV stations are ideological factories manufacturing consent and documentary making is 
its elite production line. As Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (2002) argue, mass media "are 
effective and powerful ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive propaganda 
function, by reliance on market forces, internalized assumptions, and self-censorship, and 
without overt coercion” (p. 306). In Chapter 4 and 5, I examined the processes, practices, and 
social relations of culture work nationally and globally.  
Chapter 4 provides a case study of a documentary program on China's national TV 
station. By focusing on the career trajectories of the workers in The True Story, I explore the 
complexity of their lives and thus, examine the underlying mechanism of the ideological factory 
governing, selecting, socializing, and eliminating workers. I also investigated the subjectivities 
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of the cultural workers in the constrained working environment: what they actively seek from the 
cultural work, how they pursue their goals, how they exit the factory, and above all, what they 
can do after having left the factory. 
Part of the crisis of cultural work under neoliberalism today is the failure to imagine 
plausible and feasible futures. However, in real life, cultural workers employ different strategies 
to survive in or exit the official production line. In my interviews recounting their life stories, I 
found four such strategies. The first is to seek global resources and compete in international 
markets. The second is to invent oneself as an entrepreneur and survive in the independent 
production market. The third is to explore opportunities of new media technologies and try to 
reconfigure the documentary production. And, the last one is to stay in the TV station, stick to 
the ideals of journalism, and fight the censorship from within. However, there is no pathway out 
of neoliberalism. When people quit from one production line, they just find themselves in 
another one. When they are excited by the new collaborative possibilities and autonomy brought 
about by global production and new technologies, they soon find out it too is ruled by the 
capitalist law to depress the share of labor. As Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1967) state, "The 
need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire 
surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections 
everywhere” (section 1.9). 
Chapter 5 illustrates that, more than ever before, control and resistance on cultural 
production have extended out of national borders and become a global production line. The 
increasing numbers of global productions and co-productions in the Chinese documentary is a 
collision of the global capital and the State government. On the one hand, global capital needs to 
find new markets and cheaper labor. Multinational companies like Discovery Channel have 
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exported documentary products and, more importantly, the aesthetics and professional codes to 
China. They have obtained a dominant position in defining what is a good, global appealing 
documentary. They disseminated the values to a generation of new Chinese filmmakers by 
providing training through their local production plans, internal training sessions of Chinese TV 
stations, and various film festivals and pitching forums. On the other hand, the Chinese 
government wants to extend its influence globally through the global distribution channels of 
multinational companies. Thus, as a result, big-budget co-productions have emerged as a 
dominant documentary genre in China. 
The precarity felt by the cultural workers in the global production is more profound, 
although masked by the novel ways of spatial and temporal organization. First, workers are 
working 24/7 now as task “modules” (Huws, 2007a) are outsourced to people across different 
time zones. Second, the introduction of global talent has impacted local workers in terms of job 
opportunities, salaries, and social welfare. Talent from Western countries take the more creative 
jobs. Also, a foreign face is often highlighted in media coverage as a symbol of the global 
production. Third, local workers are forced to update their skill sets fitting global production, 
fundraising, and distribution. Above all, they have to develop a “double consciousness” as W. E. 
B. Du Bois called it, “looking at one' self through the eyes of others” (Du Bois, 1994, p. 8). To 
an extent, the Chinese documentary makers become the workers doing OEM (original equipment 
manufacturer) work in the cultural industry. 
After looking at the lives and feelings of the cultural workers in a neoliberal market, in 
national ideological factories, and in global production chains, I want to conclude that, 
documentary making is increasingly characterized by precarity and exploitation, and the position 
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of the cultural workers grows more precarious and instrumentalized. Precarity becomes the new 
tenure. 
 
Agency and resistance 
At the heart of this study is an attempt to articulate and disrupt the feelings of helplessness, 
meaninglessness, and uselessness felt by the documentary makers. It is crucial to identify the 
processes, practices, and social relations that undermine autonomy in cultural work so that they 
can be interrupted.  
Classical Marxist scholars were criticized for neglecting the agency of the cultural 
workers. The cultural workers are not merely waiting to be dominated or exploited, they also 
organize resistance to fight for the values of work and the meanings of life. The paradoxical 
relationship between control and resistance have been an eternal theme of intellectual debates. 
As Michel Foucault says, "Where there is power, there is resistance" (1978). Karl Marx argues 
that "It will be the workers, with their courage, resolution, and self-sacrifice, who will be chiefly 
responsible for achieving victory. The petty bourgeoisie will hesitate as long as possible and 
remain fearful, irresolute and inactive."(Marx & Engels, 1850) The shifting status of 
documentary makers between "dominated fraction of the dominant group" and the "dominant 
fraction of the dominated group," the terms coined by Bourdieu, have determined the ambivalent 
ways they organize resistance. 
What is the cultural workers’ reaction to the precarious working conditions? Are they 
embracing or resisting it?  
If they do resist, what forms of resistance and what kind of strategies will they adopt? 
What kind of goals do they want to achieve? And will this resistance take effect?  Huws (2007), 
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in her article The Spark in the Engine, has depicted a picture of the reactions of knowledge 
workers of the new economy. Some workers were discarded and replaced by the young people 
who were passionate and ready to work for less payment and unstable welfare. Some actively 
participated in and reinforced the commercialization process. Some have a "cynical semi-
acceptance" that guarantees some personal security while in the meantime offers some passive 
resistance to the expansion of the market.  Some switch gears and transfer their creativity to 
other areas of cultural production. 
I find answers from the real lives of the documentary makers and the strategies they have 
used to survive in the working world. Sometimes, it is hard to tell the difference between 
survival, resistance, or obedience, as they are intertwined with each other: Survival can be the 
best resistance; obedience can be resistance too. From the interviews, observations, and my 
personal experience, I found some patterns of resistance, which I categorize into five types. 
Documentary makers have actively engaged in performing resistance at work, participating in 
anti-institutional practices, developing non-consumerist lifestyles, retreating from global co-
production to indigenous creation, and articulating discourse of resistance. 
 
Resistance at work 
Jim Shorthose (2004) argues that resistance has always been integral to many art forms and 
movements. Documentary making itself is a TV art form of resistance. One of its functions is to 
watch the existing power relations: checking government and speaking for the subordinate. For 
the cultural workers, being professional is to resist, especially when facing political or economic 
pressure. As illustrated in Chapter 5, some documentary makers consider themselves soldiers on 
a battlefield where they actively explore the discursive space of the Chinese TV. It requires 
130 
wisdom to promote the democratic practices without explicitly violating the guidelines of the 
state publicity department. 
Cultural workers creatively insert subtle subversive messages into the texts and pass the 
censorship. Also, when the pressure of profits has turned documentaries into soft advertising for 
government, corporations, or individuals, cultural workers still try their best to find space for 
expressing concerns about fairness, justice, and social responsibility. 
Asides from being professionals, documentary makers are also moral agents. They feel 
the obligation to safeguard their personal integrity apart from fulfilling their professional duties. 
So, if the propaganda or commercial constraints grieves the cultural workers’ conscience to an 
unbearable extent, they are morally bound to resist. Cultural workers deemed it an honor when 
their films were censored. It is like an "unofficial" award saying that the filmmaker has critically 
touched real social problems that are prohibited from the discussion. 
 
Anti-institutional practice  
The intuitive understanding of resistance for many interviewees are anti-institutional practices, 
that is, refusal to work for the official institutions and state ideological apparatus, or more 
specifically, ceasing to work for State-owned TV stations. In this sense, freelancing is a 
declaration of a break from the system (Tizhi 体制) in China. Stepping out of the ideological 
factory shows the courage of the cultural workers. It is an important act of resistance in that 
when one can’t change the world, he will at least not let the world change him.  
As illustrated in chapters 4 and 5, retreating from the TV station system does not mean an 
escape from exploitation or labor-capital antagonisms. TV stations are the largest employers of 
documentary jobs. They have monopolized the TV documentary funds and controlled major 
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distribution channels. Working directly for them as employees or indirectly as freelancers do not 
make a difference in nature. The ideological factory is not limited within the wall of the TV 
stations. Rather, it has extended to the home, the streets, the home or the living room of the 
cultural workers. It is hard to escape from the fate of laboring like a piece of the screw. While 
freelancing is presented as the ultimate freedom for workers (Pink, 2001), it is also an ideal 
arrangement for capital. 
Paradoxically, self-entrepreneurship is not only a form of resistance, but also a means of 
social control. The logic of self as an enterprise is that it operates according to the principle of 
active self-regulation rather than extrinsic discipline. Passive submission of this nature eliminates 
the capacity for autonomous thought and critique. Freelancers are more likely to practice self-
censorship than TV station employees, as they are more risk-sensitive and vulnerable. 
 
The anti-consumerist lifestyle  
Documentary makers not only produce films, but also produce lifestyles, and the associated 
cultural experiences, meanings, and emotions. In a way, the lifestyle of documentary making is 
as appealing as, if not more than, the films themselves. Many of the interviewees in this study 
have admitted that one of the main reasons for them to choose documentary making as the career 
is the admiration of the documentary filmmaker's anti-commercial lifestyle. 
Documentary making represents a mode of cultural production that rises above 
temptations of excessive consumerist lifestyles, or using Bourdieu’s terminology, a field of 
“economy world reversed” (Bourdieu, 1993), in which people pursue recognition instead of 
financial rewards.  Documentary work provides models, encouragement, and inspiration for 
those who want to live meaningfully, love their work and pursue creative challenges.   
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Some cultural workers take documentary making as a hobby, rather than a profession. 
When the industrialization of the cultural industry turned cultural workers into assembly line 
labor, some of them started lowering the desire for success and retreating from the competition 
for mass production. They take documentary making as a craft, a hobby, a means of self-
exploration and self-expression, rather than the pragmatic purpose of money or fame.  
There is a famous Chinese saying, "No desire is just." In the book, How to Ignite the Low 
Desire Society, management theorist Kenichi Ohmae (2015) describes the general pessimism 
among the younger generation of Japanese. The slow-growing salary, unclear future, and heavy 
burdens of professional insecurity have made the young generation less ambitious about the 
future. Rather than fighting for higher status, accumulating more wealth, buying real estate and 
cars, or getting married, people are consuming less, and turn to small enjoyments. With lower 
desires, the pursuit of "Little certain happiness" well describes the current portrait of the society. 
In the fast-developing Chinese society, cultural workers might be the first group of people who 
start to form the low desire group, actively or passively. This is also a resistance to the 
consumerist society. 
However, lifestyle can also be packaged and sold as recruitment advertising to attract 
“reserve army” who are encouraged and motivated to work for low or no pay. The commercial 
society sells not only products, but also lifestyles, and after all, identities.  
 
Demystifying global production 
As illustrated in chapter 5, there are counter-hegemonic struggles that contextualize Chinese 
documentary makers within the political-economic structures of global capitalism. Global 
production represents a priority put on the global audience instead of the local audience. It is 
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more a documentary genre out of the incentives of maximizing profits. Global production is the 
"McDonaldization" of cultural production. It represents a process of standardized and 
rationalized production. The U.S and Europe invented a genre, which with their market reach 
proved saleable across countries. Then it established direct selling stores or franchise stores in 
developing countries. It is not only about exploitation. It is also about the diversity of the culture.  
When filmmakers from different countries make the same kind of documentaries, it is 
detrimental to the diversity of documentaries. When all the big-budget projects target to the 
global audience, who will attend to the aesthetic tastes and spiritual needs of the local audience? 
Documentaries are supposed to be a location sensitive cultural product, as it needs to inform and 
enlighten citizens, articulate indigenous identity, and celebrate shared cultural roots, and build 
solidarity. 
Some Chinese filmmakers start to develop critical reflexivity on global productions and 
deal with the culturally specific topics instead. In the early 1990s, Chinese TV documentary 
recorded the lives of the marginalized people, like the minority groups in remote villages, the old 
people, the floating artists, and the homeless people. By showing their lives on screens, the 
documentary makers initiated and participated in a public discussion on how to resolve the social 
problems and make the world better. Now, some of them want to resume the mission of using 
documentary making to build up the indigenous community and participate in the local 
development, rather than packaging local scenes and stories to fulfill the desire for exotic scenes 
or experiences from the audience. Documentary filmmakers like Huo taught peasants to use DV 
to record when their houses were demolished by the government. Huo collaborated with NGOs 
to teach children to use DV to document their lives and exhibit in Beijing. The shift from seeking 
global production to attending to the cultural specificities represents a new type of resistance. 
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Narratives as a resistance 
Documentary making embodies a particular set of creative frustrations and disappointments in a 
neoliberal production system. Cultural workers must confront and articulate the normative 
bounds placed upon their work in order to mobilize and unify the cultural workers and people 
outside. To do so, they have invented vocabularies that can be used to speculate on the situation 
and name the issues so that they can be publicly discussed. For example, "TV labor" is a term 
invented by themselves to refer to the declining status of the TV workers. My research comes 
from this very motive. 
A good thing is that self-discursive practices are common in video production industry. 
They have written books, published internal journals, made documentaries, and produced films 
on their lives. The self-reflexive materials have helped form a universe of discourses that address 
the shared precarious lives. 
News Commentary Department of CCTV was the base of factual programming of CCTV 
in the 1990s. It had several factual programs, such as Living Space (Later The True Story), 
Investigative Reporting, and Focus Reporting. Nonsense, the internal distributed journal of the 
News Commentary Department launched in 1994, provides a platform for the workers to freely 
exchange opinions and ideas about their lives and jobs. In a 2015 Nonsense article, Cui 
Yongyuan talks about the difficulty of finding true love for the cultural workers. Since the 
cultural workers frequently work out of the town and work at nights, it is hard to coordinate time 
for dating. Also, some of them have met many elites and celebrities at work, and their standard 
for potential partners are pushed high which prevent them from finding a peaceful familial life 
(Cui, 2015). These vivid descriptions of the precarious life are valuable. Once it becomes public 
knowledge, it could be reproduced in other forms of arts. For example, it will lead to my 
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theoretical speculations about the phenomenon. Bourdieu's theory of distinction can account for 
the conflicting self-perception of the documentary makers. The newly emerging petty bourgeois 
are doing fancy cultural work and hanging out with social elites and celebrities, but in reality, 
they live a proletarian life. Many of them live in a rented apartment, spending half of the income 
paying the rent. They work overtime. They are vulnerable to financial or social risks. If they get 
sick or experienced accidents at work, they could be broke. The filmmakers try to move upwards 
with the cultural and social capital, but the society has dragged them downwards in the real class 
status. They have fallen from the uncrowned kings to the TV labor. 
Similarly, para-social relations with celebrities can explain the filmmakers’ distance to 
the real life. They are used to observe others’ lives rather than participate in their own. They like 
the lives in the tapes and monitors, which they can pause, fast forward, backward, zoom in/out, 
and edit. In the documentary world, they can control everything. They are the creator of the 
stories. Filmmakers’ particular sense of time and space of the distance themselves from the real 
life of their own.  Actually, because of the same quality, the documentary filmmakers can speak 
for the marginal group and the subordinate groups, but when they themselves become the 
subjects of the dominance or exploitation, they are less likely to stand up and protect themselves. 
They are not the bravest ones to resist. 
Besides complaining through the journal articles, some documentary makers make films 
about their own lives. Zhang Xiao, a music editor of Oriental Space, directed a film entitled My 
Internship Life (2007), telling a story about an intern being sexually harassed by a TV producer. 
Through the film, Zhang is dealing with the problems in the real lives of the TV documentary 
makers.  
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Also, a documentary named Mouthpiece (2009) by Guo Xizhi, a former documentary 
maker in Anhui TV and Shenzhen TV and now a professor in Shenzhen University, uses an 
ethnographic way to record the daily lives of a TV station. In the film, the director of the TV 
station says, “As reporters, you shall not simply consider us as the recorder of the social events. 
Actually, you are doing political work. You shall try to avoid the topics that are harmful to the 
Party and the lives of the people” (Mouthpiece, Guo Xizhi, 2010). 
Cultural workers have developed a cynical way of discourse, laughing at themselves to 
gain the balance in the life. The disappointment towards the declining status is clearly illustrated 
by the term, "TV labor", that they used to demean themselves in the public discourse and private 
gatherings. In the 1990s, the popular term of "uncrowned queens" showed the pride of the 
cultural workers towards the surveillance function, the mobility out of the social orders, the 
power to speak for the subordinated group, and the clean and decent work conditions. The 
filmmakers can monitor the power and speak for the suppressed voices. They can also reinvent 
the lives of ordinary people on screens. 
 
Fragmented solidarity: from union to community  
Formal institution of cultural workers functions differently in the Chinese cultural industry. In 
Western countries, the unions or guilds of the professions such as filmmakers, screenwriters, 
television workers, bring the workers together and protect their rights. Empirical studies on 
creative labors in the U.S, the U.K or Canada tend to emphasize the importance of the Union or 
the guild (Banks, 2010; Corner, 2011; Putnam & Fuller, 2014)  
In China, however, only state-owned enterprises, television stations included, have 
unions. But the functions of the Chinese unions are different from the Western one. The Chinese 
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unions are products of the old socialist planned economy. They represent not the interests of 
workers but the employers. Usually, the directors of the union are the same persons in charge of 
the Danwei. For instance, the director of the CCTV union is the vice director of CCTV. The 
primary duty of the union is to make sure the workers accept their current status quo and do not 
organize protests or demonstration (He, 2017). In the interviews, most cultural workers state that 
they seldom feel the existence of the union. Zhang, a documentary director and music editor, 
demonstratively states: 
 
I don't know what the union does. I can only recall that they arranged our annual medical 
tests and distributed labor safety product, like Shampoo, soaps, gloves, and movie tickets. 
Usually, retired television station managers work there. If I have a conflict with the 
station, I definitely won’t seek help from them. They won’t stand on my side. (interview 
11)  
 
The situation is more laborious for freelancers, as there is no union for freelancers who 
do not have a danwei. The freelancers became atomized and disembedded from the danwei 
system. 
Lacking formal institutions for themselves, the cultural workers can only seek support 
from informal communities where they exchange ideas, provide support to each other, and 
achieve a limited degree of solidarity. New technologies, like the social media of Weibo and 
WeChat, have broken the spatial limitations and brought filmmakers together. Among the 
hundreds of WeChat groups, I am going to use one example here. This WeChat group has a 
name of Documentary Family (jilu yijiaqin). It has 178 members by September 10, 2018, 
including directors, photographers, producers, managers, distributors, teachers in the 
documentary industry. The group originated from an underground documentary screening club, 
which was the first amateur club that started screening documentaries in café and bars weekly 
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since 2002. From 2010, they began screening award-winning documentaries in an art cinema. 
So, the members actively engage in both online and offline interactions and forms strong ties 
with each other. The group shared information about industrial development, events update, and 
recruitment. The informal community cannot replace unions in protecting workers in a formal 
and legal way, but it brings the atomized individuals together, and to a certain extent, builds up 
shared experiences and practical resolutions which helps to form the professional identity in a 
supportive environment. In the documentary community, culture is produced and responded to in 
an alternative, non-consumerist way, rather than as something supplied by official institutions 
and markets. The bonds achieved there formed 'new sensibilities' (Shorthose, 2004) that is, new 
forms of cultural solidarity and conviviality. 
However, resistance also constitutes an alternative form of laboring. As mentioned in 
chapter 4, networking in various communities occupies a large amount of time and energy of the 
cultural workers, which constitutes another form of exploitation. Control and resistance are just 
two sides of the same coin. 
 
What is a good documentary work for the cultural workers? 
During the interviews, several of the filmmakers asked me the same question: now I know we 
are laborers; we are exploited; we are the vulnerable victims; but what can I do to change it? It is 
the hardest question I have ever been asked. I myself have sought the answer with half of my life 
but didn't feel I am getting any closer. Finding meanings within the neoliberal trap is like looking 
for the faint light of stars in the dark night. Only when people can judge what is “good” work and 
what is "bad" work, can they calibrate the direction and mobilize the courage to go forward. It is 
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also what I attempt to contribute to with this dissertation, and with the lives and stories of the 
practitioners and myself. 
Hesmondhalph and Baker (2011) mention that normality is key to understandings of 
creative labor. They pointed out a “normative vacuum” in previous production studies, “effacing 
reasonable normativity in poststructuralist studies of work” (p. 50) and suggested to establish a 
framework for scholars and practitioners to investigate the difference between “good” work and 
“bad” work. Furthermore, they argue that “Good work” is located in both process—fair pay, 
professional autonomy, self-esteem, interest and involvement, sociality and self-realization—and 
products—products that are excellent and contribute to the common good. (p. 36). Michael Kean 
(2009) argues that the fundamental goal of creative industries is not creating wealth and jobs, but 
improving and renewing society. 
However, in reality, what kind of futures can the cultural workers expect? And what kind 
of futures can they manage to achieve? A “good” work firstly has to be sustainable. The cultural 
workers need to have decent pay so that they can support themselves and their family, and do not 
need to take multiple jobs. They should have full social welfare so that they are not afraid of 
accidents. They shall not live in the fear of losing their working ability. People should not be 
paid differently for doing the same jobs. 
Autonomy and creativity are also vital to “good” work. However, creativity is a Western 
concept, and there is a misunderstanding about the use of the term in China (Keane, 2009, 2013). 
Anthony Fung (2016) proposed a need to redefine creative labor, saying that in countries like 
China, where political priorities prevail, “creative labor might benefit from top-down support for 
their industries, even though key elements of creativity, such as free expression, cultural 
tolerance, and the marketplace of ideas, maybe stringently limited” (p. 202). In China, the 
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alternative type of creativity must be understood in its relation to the Party leadership. 
Documentary industry is one of the most politically sensitive industries, as in most cases, it is the 
direct visual illustration of the national policies. Thus, documentary making has to follow the 
national policies and the guidelines of the State Publicity Department.  
Also, documentary production shall become more visible, diverse, and autonomous. As 
the market expands, it accommodates diversified forms of documentary, instead of focusing on 
the big-budget global productions or main melody documentaries projects. Cultural workers can 
choose from the different genres and get support from the resources. People can find their futures 
in the industry, instead of taking it as a temporary fun experience during youth and being forced 
to switch gears when they want to settle down.  
Moreover, new media technologies and new forms of communication also led to the 
restructuring of documentary production and distribution. They brought opportunities for 
documentary makers to reimagine more diversified forms of work: interactive, cross-platform, 
convergent, virtual, immersive, collaborative, participatory, or transmedia. They also 
reconfigured the ways of organizing production and thus reshaped the social relations.  
As this study makes clear, the work of documentary making in China provides a 
particular case into the worldwide debate on cultural work. By investigating the live experience 
of the contemporary Chinese cultural workers, it reveals what happens where west meets east, 
capitalism meets communism, and global capital meets the authoritarian government. When 
organized resistance seems suppressed, the future of the cultural workers lies in the micro-
resistance in everyday life. In this sense, this dissertation works as part of my efforts to foster 
and promote a less alienating, more diversified, and more autonomous kind of documentary 
work.  
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APPENDIX A 
FILMOGRAPHY OF CHINESE DOCUMENTARIES 
 
 
Bakuo nanjie 16 / No.16 Barkhor South Street /八廓南街 16号 / (Duan jingchuan / 段锦川, 
1996)  
Guitu Lieche / Last Train home / 归途列车 / (Fan Lixin / 范立欣, 2009) 
Hou she / Mouthpiece / 喉舌 / (Guo Xizhi / 郭熙志, 2009)   
Huashuo changjiang / The Yangtz River /话说长江 / (Dai Weiyu / 戴维宇, 1983),  
KongJia cai / Confucius Food /孔家菜/ (Zhang Liang / 赵良, 2005),  
Kong Linghe/ Kong Linghe / 孔令和 / (Zhang Liang /赵良, 2005) 
Liulang Beijing / Booming in Beijing / 流浪北京 / (Wu Wenguang / 吴文光, 1990)  
Mang Shan / Blind Mountain /盲山 / (Li Yang/李杨, 2007)  
Old Men / Laoren / 老人 / (Yang Tianyi / 杨天已, 2000). 
Shejian shang de zhongguo / A Bite of China / 舌尖上的中国 / (Chen Xiaoqin / 陈晓卿, 2012) 
Shejian shang de zhongguo 3 / A Bite of China 3 /舌尖上的中国 3 / (Liu Hongyan / 刘鸿彦, 
2017) 
Sichou zhilu / The Silk Road/丝绸之路 / (Muto / 石坂浩二, 1980) 
Wang changcheng / The Great Wall 望长城 / (Liu Xiaoli / 刘效礼, 1991), 
Wo de shixi shenghuo / My internship life /我的实习生活 / (Zhang Xiao / 张骁, 2007) 
Yanjiang er shang / Up to the Yangtze /沿江而上 / (Zhang Qiaoyong / 张侨勇, 2007) 
Zhongguoren de huofa / Chinese Life Style /中国人的活法 / (Liu Hongyan / 刘鸿彦, 2015) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
                                            LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
Number Pseudonym Job Title Gender Age Date of interview 
1 Lin Editor and professor M 60s 7/25/14 
2 Du Director and writer F 50s 7/25/14 
3 Qiu Director M 40s 7/14/17 
4 Huo Director M 40s 3/18/17 
5 Jing Director F 40s 5/14/17 
6 Guan Director F 40s 5/15/14 
7 Fu Administrator M 40s 6/15/16 
8 Mao Producer F 50s 4/18/14 
9 Li Director M 30s 7/13/17 
10 Wang Photographer M 30s 7/13/17 
11 Zhang Director and music editor M 40s 7/26/14 
12 Yu  Translator M 20s 5/9/14 
13 Han Producer F 30s 2/27/14 
14 Fan Director M 40s 7/8/14 
15 Sheng Director M 40s 7/1/17 
16 Jiang Investor M 40s 3/25/14 
17 Xin Producer M 40s 4/6/15 
28 Xu Producer M 50s 12/13/16 
19 Li Producer F 20s 4/8/15 
20 Gao Producer M 60s 3/19/14 
21 Zhao Producer M 40s 3/18/14 
22 Chao Producer M 40s 12/23/16 
23 Guo Director M 30s 5/6/14 
24 Miao Producer F 40s 12/23/16 
25 Wu Director M 20s 7/13/17 
26 Xiao Festival organizer M 40s 7/7/17 
27 Chen Director M 30s 5/2/16 
28 Liang Editor and producer M 30s 10/8/16 
29 Song Photographer M 40s 5/16/14 
30 Fai Producer M 40s 4/20/14 
31 Tian Fund manager  F 40s 12/18/16 
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32 Lan Distribution manager F 30s 12/19/16 
33 Ping Project manager M 30s 12/28/16 
34 Fen Director M 40s 12/1/16 
35 Ping Director M 60s 8/1/16 
36 Olli Production assistant M 20s 10/1/16 
37 Mu Director M 40s 5/2/14 
38 Meng Director F 30s 5/6/15 
39 Ni Official F 40s 7/8/16 
40 Lu Photographer M 20s 7/3/15 
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